History of the Peloponnesian War by Thucydides (free ebooks for android .txt) 📕

ostensible cause be great or small, resolved against making

concessions or consenting to a precarious tenure of our possessions.

For all claims from an equal, urged upon a neighbour as commands

before any attempt at legal settlement, be they great or be they

small, have only one meaning, and that is slavery.

“As to the war and the resources of either party, a detailed

comparison will not show you the inferiority of Athens. Personally

engaged in the cultivation of their land, without funds either private

or public, the Peloponnesians are also without experience in long wars

across sea, from the strict limit which poverty imposes on their

attacks upon each other. Powers of this description are quite

incapable of often manning a fleet or often sending out an army:

they cannot afford the absence from their homes, the expenditure

from their own funds; and besides, they have not command of the sea.

Capital, it must be remembered, maintains a war more than forced

contributions. Farmers are a class of men that are always more ready

to serve in person than in purse. Confident that the former will

survive the dangers, they are by no means so sure that the latter will

not be prematurely exhausted, especially if the war last longer than

they expect, which it very likely will. In a single battle the

Peloponnesians and their allies may be able to defy all Hellas, but

they are incapacitated from carrying on a war against a power

different in character from their own, by the want of the single

council-chamber requisite to prompt and vigorous action, and the

substitution of a diet composed of various races, in which every state

possesses an equal vote, and each presses its own ends, a condition of

things which generally results in no action at all. The great wish

of some is to avenge themselves on some particular enemy, the great

wish of others to save their own pocket. Slow in assembling, they

devote a very small fraction of the time to the consideration of any

public object, most of it to the prosecution of their own objects.

Meanwhile each fancies that no harm will come of his neglect, that

it is the business of somebody else to look after this or that for

him; and so, by the same notion being entertained by all separately,

the common cause imperceptibly decays.

“But the principal point is the hindrance that they will

experience from want of money. The slowness with which it comes in

will cause delay; but the opportunities of war wait for no man. Again,

we need not be alarmed either at the possibility of their raising

fortifications in Attica, or at their navy. It would be difficult

for any system of fortifications to establish a rival city, even in

time of peace, much more, surely, in an enemy’s country, with Athens

just as much fortified against it as it against Athens; while a mere

post might be able to do some harm to the country by incursions and by

the facilities which it would afford for desertion, but can never

prevent our sailing into their country and raising fortifications

there, and making reprisals with our powerful fleet. For our naval

skill is of more use to us for service on land, than their military

skill for service at sea. Familiarity with the sea they will not

find an easy acquisition. If you who have been practising at it ever

since the Median invasion have not yet brought it to perfection, is

there any chance of anything considerable being effected by an

agricultural, unseafaring population, who will besides be prevented

from practising by the constant presence of strong squadrons of

observation from Athens? With a small squadron they might hazard an

engagement, encouraging their ignorance by numbers; but the

restraint of a strong force will prevent their moving, and through

want of practice they will grow more clumsy, and consequently more

timid. It must be kept in mind that seamanship, just like anything

else, is a matter of art, and will not admit of being taken up

occasionally as an occupation for times of leisure; on the contrary,

it is so exacting as to leave leisure for nothing else.

“Even if they were to touch the moneys at Olympia or Delphi, and try

to seduce our foreign sailors by the temptation of higher pay, that

would only be a serious danger if we could not still be a match for

them by embarking our own citizens and the aliens resident among us.

But in fact by this means we are always a match for them; and, best of

all, we have a larger and higher class of native coxswains and sailors

among our own citizens than all the rest of Hellas. And to say nothing

of the danger of such a step, none of our foreign sailors would

consent to become an outlaw from his country, and to take service with

them and their hopes, for the sake of a few days’ high pay.

“This, I think, is a tolerably fair account of the position of the

Peloponnesians; that of Athens is free from the defects that I have

criticized in them, and has other advantages of its own, which they

can show nothing to equal. If they march against our country we will

sail against theirs, and it will then be found that the desolation

of the whole of Attica is not the same as that of even a fraction of

Peloponnese; for they will not be able to supply the deficiency except

by a battle, while we have plenty of land both on the islands and

the continent. The rule of the sea is indeed a great matter.

Consider for a moment. Suppose that we were islanders; can you

conceive a more impregnable position? Well, this in future should,

as far as possible, be our conception of our position. Dismissing

all thought of our land and houses, we must vigilantly guard the sea

and the city. No irritation that we may feel for the former must

provoke us to a battle with the numerical superiority of the

Peloponnesians. A victory would only be succeeded by another battle

against the same superiority: a reverse involves the loss of our

allies, the source of our strength, who will not remain quiet a day

after we become unable to march against them. We must cry not over the

loss of houses and land but of men’s lives; since houses and land do

not gain men, but men them. And if I had thought that I could persuade

you, I would have bid you go out and lay them waste with your own

hands, and show the Peloponnesians that this at any rate will not make

you submit.

“I have many other reasons to hope for a favourable issue, if you

can consent not to combine schemes of fresh conquest with the

conduct of the war, and will abstain from wilfully involving

yourselves in other dangers; indeed, I am more afraid of our own

blunders than of the enemy’s devices. But these matters shall be

explained in another speech, as events require; for the present

dismiss these men with the answer that we will allow Megara the use of

our market and harbours, when the Lacedaemonians suspend their alien

acts in favour of us and our allies, there being nothing in the treaty

to prevent either one or the other: that we will leave the cities

independent, if independent we found them when we made the treaty, and

when the Lacedaemonians grant to their cities an independence not

involving subservience to Lacedaemonian interests, but such as each

severally may desire: that we are willing to give the legal

satisfaction which our agreements specify, and that we shall not

commence hostilities, but shall resist those who do commence them.

This is an answer agreeable at once to the rights and the dignity of

Athens. It must be thoroughly understood that war is a necessity;

but that the more readily we accept it, the less will be the ardour of

our opponents, and that out of the greatest dangers communities and

individuals acquire the greatest glory. Did not our fathers resist the

Medes not only with resources far different from ours, but even when

those resources had been abandoned; and more by wisdom than by

fortune, more by daring than by strength, did not they beat off the

barbarian and advance their affairs to their present height? We must

not fall behind them, but must resist our enemies in any way and in

every way, and attempt to hand down our power to our posterity

unimpaired.”

Such were the words of Pericles. The Athenians, persuaded of the

wisdom of his advice, voted as he desired, and answered the

Lacedaemonians as he recommended, both on the separate points and in

the general; they would do nothing on dictation, but were ready to

have the complaints settled in a fair and impartial manner by the

legal method, which the terms of the truce prescribed. So the envoys

departed home and did not return again.

These were the charges and differences existing between the rival

powers before the war, arising immediately from the affair at

Epidamnus and Corcyra. Still intercourse continued in spite of them,

and mutual communication. It was carried on without heralds, but not

without suspicion, as events were occurring which were equivalent to a

breach of the treaty and matter for war.