History of the Peloponnesian War by Thucydides (free ebooks for android .txt) 📕

the allies, instead of hesitating in such a moment to sacrifice

their ships for Lacedaemon in return for her many benefits, to run

them boldly aground, land in one way or another, and make themselves

masters of the place and its garrison.

Not content with this exhortation, he forced his own steersman to

run his ship ashore, and stepping on to the gangway, was

endeavouring to land, when he was cut down by the Athenians, and after

receiving many wounds fainted away. Falling into the bows, his

shield slipped off his arm into the sea, and being thrown ashore was

picked up by the Athenians, and afterwards used for the trophy which

they set up for this attack. The rest also did their best, but were

not able to land, owing to the difficulty of the ground and the

unflinching tenacity of the Athenians. It was a strange reversal of

the order of things for Athenians to be fighting from the land, and

from Laconian land too, against Lacedaemonians coming from the sea;

while Lacedaemonians were trying to land from shipboard in their own

country, now become hostile, to attack Athenians, although the

former were chiefly famous at the time as an inland people and

superior by land, the latter as a maritime people with a navy that had

no equal.

After continuing their attacks during that day and most of the next,

the Peloponnesians desisted, and the day after sent some of their

ships to Asine for timber to make engines, hoping to take by their

aid, in spite of its height, the wall opposite the harbour, where

the landing was easiest. At this moment the Athenian fleet from

Zacynthus arrived, now numbering fifty sail, having been reinforced by

some of the ships on guard at Naupactus and by four Chian vessels.

Seeing the coast and the island both crowded with heavy infantry,

and the hostile ships in harbour showing no signs of sailing out, at a

loss where to anchor, they sailed for the moment to the desert

island of Prote, not far off, where they passed the night. The next

day they got under way in readiness to engage in the open sea if the

enemy chose to put out to meet them, being determined in the event

of his not doing so to sail in and attack him. The Lacedaemonians

did not put out to sea, and having omitted to close the inlets as they

had intended, remained quiet on shore, engaged in manning their

ships and getting ready, in the case of any one sailing in, to fight

in the harbour, which is a fairly large one.

Perceiving this, the Athenians advanced against them by each

inlet, and falling on the enemy’s fleet, most of which was by this

time afloat and in line, at once put it to flight, and giving chase as

far as the short distance allowed, disabled a good many vessels and

took five, one with its crew on board; dashing in at the rest that had

taken refuge on shore, and battering some that were still being

manned, before they could put out, and lashing on to their own ships

and towing off empty others whosc crews had fled. At this sight the

Lacedaemonians, maddened by a disaster which cut off their men on

the island, rushed to the rescue, and going into the sea with their

heavy armour, laid hold of the ships and tried to drag them back, each

man thinking that success depended on his individual exertions.

Great was the melee, and quite in contradiction to the naval tactics

usual to the two combatants; the Lacedaemonians in their excitement

and dismay being actually engaged in a sea-fight on land, while the

victorious Athenians, in their eagerness to push their success as

far as possible, were carrying on a land-fight from their ships. After

great exertions and numerous wounds on both sides they separated,

the Lacedaemonians saving their empty ships, except those first taken;

and both parties returning to their camp, the Athenians set up a

trophy, gave back the dead, secured the wrecks, and at once began to

cruise round and jealously watch the island, with its intercepted

garrison, while the Peloponnesians on the mainland, whose

contingents had now all come up, stayed where they were before Pylos.

When the news of what had happened at Pylos reached Sparta, the

disaster was thought so serious that the Lacedaemonians resolved

that the authorities should go down to the camp, and decide on the

spot what was best to be done. There, seeing that it was impossible to

help their men, and not wishing to risk their being reduced by

hunger or overpowered by numbers, they determined, with the consent of

the Athenian generals, to conclude an armistice at Pylos and send

envoys to Athens to obtain a convention, and to endeavour to get

back their men as quickly as possible.

The generals accepting their offers, an armistice was concluded upon

the terms following:

That the Lacedaemonians should bring to Pylos and deliver up to

the Athenians the ships that had fought in the late engagement, and

all in Laconia that were vessels of war, and should make no attack

on the fortification either by land or by sea.

That the Athenians should allow the Lacedaemonians on the mainland

to send to the men in the island a certain fixed quantity of corn

ready kneaded, that is to say, two quarts of barley meal, one pint

of wine, and a piece of meat for each man, and half the same

quantity for a servant.

That this allowance should be sent in under the eyes of the

Athenians, and that no boat should sail to the island except openly.

That the Athenians should continue to the island same as before,

without however landing upon it, and should refrain from attacking the

Peloponnesian troops either by land or by sea.

That if either party should infringe any of these terms in the

slightest particular, the armistice should be at once void.

That the armistice should hold good until the return of the

Lacedaemonian envoys from Athens—the Athenians sending them thither

in a galley and bringing them back again—and upon the arrival of the

envoys should be at an end, and the ships be restored by the Athenians

in the same state as they received them.

Such were the terms of the armistice, and the ships were delivered

over to the number of sixty, and the envoys sent off accordingly.

Arrived at Athens they spoke as follows:

“Athenians, the Lacedaemonians sent us to try to find some way of

settling the affair of our men on the island, that shall be at once

satisfactory to our interests, and as consistent with our dignity in

our misfortune as circumstances permit. We can venture to speak at

some length without any departure from the habit of our country. Men

of few words where many are not wanted, we can be less brief when

there is a matter of importance to be illustrated and an end to be

served by its illustration. Meanwhile we beg you to take what we may

say, not in a hostile spirit, nor as if we thought you ignorant and

wished to lecture you, but rather as a suggestion on the best course

to be taken, addressed to intelligent judges. You can now, if you

choose, employ your present success to advantage, so as to keep what

you have got and gain honour and reputation besides, and you can avoid

the mistake of those who meet with an extraordinary piece of good

fortune, and are led on by hope to grasp continually at something

further, through having already succeeded without expecting it.

While those who have known most vicissitudes of good and bad, have

also justly least faith in their prosperity; and to teach your city

and ours this lesson experience has not been wanting.

“To be convinced of this you have only to look at our present

misfortune. What power in Hellas stood higher than we did? and yet

we are come to you, although we formerly thought ourselves more able

to grant what we are now here to ask. Nevertheless, we have not been

brought to this by any decay in our power, or through having our heads

turned by aggrandizement; no, our resources are what they have

always been, and our error has been an error of judgment, to which all

are equally liable. Accordingly, the prosperity which your city now

enjoys, and the accession that it has lately received, must not make

you fancy that fortune will be always with you. Indeed sensible men

are prudent enough to treat their gains as precarious, just as they

would also keep a clear head in adversity, and think that war, so

far from staying within the limit to which a combatant may wish to

confine it, will run the course that its chances prescribe; and

thus, not being puffed up by confidence in military success, they

are less likely to come to grief, and most ready to make peace, if

they can, while their fortune lasts. This, Athenians, you have a

good opportunity to do now with us, and thus to escape the possible

disasters which may follow upon your refusal, and the consequent

imputation of having owed to accident even your present advantages,

when you might have left behind you a reputation for power and

wisdom which nothing could endanger.

“The Lacedaemonians accordingly invite you to make a treaty and to

end the war, and offer peace and alliance and the most friendly and

intimate relations in every way and on every occasion between us;

and in return ask for the men on the island, thinking it better for

both parties not to stand out to the end, on the chance of some

favourable accident enabling the men to force their way out, or of

their being compelled to succumb under the pressure of blockade.

Indeed if great enmities are ever to be really settled, we think it

will be, not by the system of revenge and military success, and by

forcing an opponent to swear to a treaty to his disadvantage, but when

the more fortunate combatant waives these his privileges, to be guided

by gentler feelings conquers his rival in generosity, and accords

peace on more moderate conditions than he expected. From that

moment, instead of the debt of revenge which violence must entail, his

adversary owes a debt of generosity to be paid in kind, and is

inclined by honour to stand to his agreement. And men oftener act in

this manner towards their greatest enemies than where the quarrel is

of less importance; they are also by nature as glad to give way to

those who first yield to them, as they are apt to be provoked by

arrogance to risks condemned by their own judgment.

“To apply this to ourselves: if peace was ever desirable for both

parties, it is surely so at the present moment, before anything

irremediable befall us and force us to hate you eternally,

personally as well as politically, and you to miss the advantages that

we now offer you. While the issue is still in doubt, and you have

reputation and our friendship in prospect, and we the compromise of

our misfortune before anything fatal occur, let us be reconciled,

and for ourselves choose peace instead of war, and grant to the rest

of the Hellenes a remission from their sufferings, for which be sure

they will think they have chiefly you to thank. The war that they

labour under they know not which began, but the peace that concludes

it, as it depends on your decision, will by their gratitude be laid to

your door. By such a decision you can become firm friends with the