Troublous Times in Canada by John A. MacDonald (ebook pc reader .txt) 📕

around. At this moment a small number of men (about 25 or 30) broke from the ranks and ran down the road, leaving the remainder standing mostly faced to the rear. These men were all dressed in green. Immediately behind those that were running away came from six to eight in red coats, who ran after the others down the road. The skirmishers and supporters were all retiring. I then ran over to the hospital and told Dr. May that our men were retiring. He said he would take all the wounded men with him. Just afterwards I noticed a great rush of men to the rear. I had left the hospital to see how matters were, and to see if our men were still retiring, and had started to return, but the rush of men was so great that I could not get across to the hospital. This retreat continued, with the red and green mixed together. I passed down and got up on the ammunition waggon, and found that Dr. May was ahead of me with his patients. While on the waggon I noticed in the rear of the retiring column a number of men (between 100 and 200, I think), composed of red and green, seeming to be drawn up across the road in pretty good order. Down the road a short distance an attempt was made to rally or re-form the men, which was to a good extent successful. Before we came to Ridgeway there was a halt. A man in uniform came and took the horse which Col. Booker had been using. Shortly after this I saw Col. Booker on the horse coming towards Ridgeway. From all I saw and heard of the men. I can bear testimony that with very few exceptions there was no evidence of cowardice. They displayed good spirit, and were all eager to meet the Fenians on the following morning.


This concluded the evidence taken by the Court of Inquiry in regard to the matter under consideration. After due deliberation, and a careful sifting of all the testimony given, the following was given as the result of the investigation, which received the approval of the Militia authorities:-


OPINION.

The Court having duly considered the evidence brought forward by Lieut.-Col. Booker, as well as such evidence as the Court have considered necessary, with a view of the further elucidation of the truth, are of opinion:-

First-That so far as the courage and character of Lieut.-Col. Booker: with reference to his conduct in the command of the force engaged with the enemy at Lime Ridge on Saturday, the 2nd of June last, are affected, there is not the slightest foundation for the unfavorable imputations cast upon him in the public prints, and most improperly circulated through that channel and otherwise. On the contrary, the Court desire to express the further opinion that Lieut.-Col. Booker having, as will appear, fallen into an error, promptly exerted himself in person to repair the effects of that error, in a manner which can leave no stain upon his personal courage and conduct, subsequently to the period of actual conflict with the force opposed, and also that the disposition of his forces, the manner in which, before an unseen enemy whose strength was unknown to him, he planned his attack, and the desire and anxiety which he showed to carry out these plans to the best of his ability at points where it was his duty to be, have in conjunction with the statements of officers and others in evidence before the Court, led the Court to believe that at no period of that day could want of personal coolness be imputed to Lieut.-Col. Booker.

With reference to the circumstances connected with the late engagement at Lime Ridge, this Court are further of opinion that the entire force under command of Lieut.-Col. Booker, from the formation of the expedition to the time it came out of action, was under disadvantages with which Her Majesty's regular forces have seldom or ever, it is submitted, had to contend-in the want, of cavalry, artillery, commissariat arrangements, or even the requisite means of carrying with them cooked provisions, or supplying themselves with water in the country through which they were about to move, in a season when the heat rendered it especially needful that this last point should receive careful attention.

Further, that more than half of the two battalions forming the largest proportion of the whole force which left Port Colborne for Stevensville on the morning of the 2nd of June, was composed of youths not exceeding, and in many instances not having reached twenty years of age; that a large proportion of the force had been for a very short time accustomed to bear arms; that a somewhat less proportion had not even been exercised with blank cartridge, and that practice with ball cartridge was by very many of the rank and file of that force to be entered upon for the first time in their lives on that day.

That notwithstanding these disadvantages, the Court have, from the evidence produced, arrived at the conviction that no force could have commenced a march with the knowledge that they were advancing into a country occupied by an enemy whose numbers (exaggerated as they were afterwards known to be) were unknown to them, and whose position they might at any moment he called upon to attack, in finer spirits, or a more ready desire to show by obedience to command, that they were deserving of the confidence which their employment on the occasion showed was reposed in their courage, and in this respect no difference was perceptible between the mere tyros and the more seasoned men of the expedition.

This the Court find was the state of facts up to the time (which will be referred to in a later part of this opinion) on the arrival of the force under Lieut.-Col. Booker at Ridgeway, on the line of the Buffalo and Lake Huron Railway, and its being formed in open column of companies. The Court find that the order in which it advanced to form a junction with the brigade under Col. Peacocke, of Her Majesty's 16th Regiment, at Stevensville, was as follows:-

The 2nd Battalion (or Queen's Own Rifles) in front, the York Rifles (attached to the Thirteenth Battalion, of which it formed the leading company), the Thirteenth Battalion next, and last the Caledonia Rifle Company, forming the rear guard, the advance guard of the force being No. 5 Company of the Queen's Own, having forty Spencer rifles as part of their armament; and the Court are of opinion that Lieut.-Col. Booker, in advancing, used every precaution by extending companies to skirmish to the right and left of the road by which he was moving his force, which military rule and the nature of the country demanded; and that in the forward movement from Ridgeway, the manner in which it was conducted by Lieut.-Col. Booker and the officers of the force under his orders, was regular, and in accordance with the well-understood rules by which such duties are governed; and here the Court think it their duty to point to the fact that in Lieut.-Col. Booker his force had a commanding officer who, for the first time in his experience, found himself in command of a larger body than one weak battalion on parade; and that this officer, being without the assistance of any staff, and not even accompanied by a mounted officer or orderly to transmit his instructions, was placed in a position of unusual difficulty in the event of coming into contact with the enemy.

The Court have further found, from the evidence adduced before them, that the column under Lieut.-Col. Booker was proceeding in this order and had reached a point on the way leading from Ridgeway to Stevensville, at about two miles from the former point, when the advanced guard became aware that the woods on the right and left fronts of the line of advance were occupied by the enemy; and are further of opinion, that the movements then directed by Lieut.-Col. Booker and the subsequent disposition of the force at his disposal (up to a time to be subsequently mentioned), were in strict accordance with laid down principles, and such as at least to hold an enemy not greatly superior in numbers in check, if not to drive them back-and that the manner in which the movements directed were executed, the advance of the companies of the Queen's Own sent out to strengthen the skirmishers on the left, the advance of the right wing of the Thirteenth Battalion extended on the right of the road, and No. 10 Company of the Queen's Own rather to the right, was highly creditable to the officers and men, particularly as during the whole of these movements the force was under fire from an unseen enemy under cover of the woods, our troops being in open ground and exposed to the effects of such a fire, which fortunately, though well sustained, was not very effective.

The Court is of opinion that to this point the direction of the attack and the position of the attacking force was well and skilfully managed, and the enemy had been forced back to a considerable distance from the position when first encountered.

The Court find that at this time, and when everything looked favorable for the attacking force, there occurred an alarm, of the truth of which a moment's reflection on the part of the men with whom it originated, and who appear to have been some of the advanced skirmishers, would have shown the impossibility. It was to the effect that a force of cavalry was advancing upon our force, and instantly the cry of "Cavalry", spread with electric rapidity from the front to where the Colonel stood in reserve, with which part of the force Lieut.-Col. Booker as commanding officer remained, and thus assuming the cry to have its origin in the fact that that officer gave the order "Look out for cavalry!" squares were formed instantly to meet cavalry, both by the column and by the skirmishers within hearing of that order-a mistake which, being as quickly discovered, Lieut.-Col. Booker endeavored to remedy by the order to "Re-form column."

The Court, with respect to this part of the affair, are of opinion that to adopt the idle rumor that the enemy's force was partly composed of cavalry in a country where such an arm could be of scarcely any value in attack, or to assume, even for a moment, that a mounted corps which he could not see was advancing at such a rate as to render it necessary to give the words of caution which he used, was ill-judged, and was the first act which gave rise to the disorganization of his force, which then followed.

This Court further find that at this moment, and when the officer commanding had, as before mentioned, given the order to "Re-form column," he perceived that the column was rapidly falling back. The attempt to re-form not having been successful, the men became mingled together, and that the effect of the mistake just referred to became so perceptible in the disorganization of the column at a moment when, in the opinion of this Court, to have given the order to advance would have had the best effect in the encouragement of the force, and in a very short period would have effected the rout of the enemy. The officer in command (apparently hesitating as to whether he should advance or retreat) unfortunately gave the order to retire, and the bugles having taken it up at the advanced posts of the attack, our force began to fall back; and notwithstanding the exertions of the officers, who in every case shown in the evidence before the Court