A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1 by Surendranath Dasgupta (desktop ebook reader txt) 📕

[Footnote 3: The Nyâya sûtra no doubt incidentally gives a definition of jâti as "samânaprasavâtmikâ jâti@h" (II. ii. 71).]

305

Vaisesika lays its main emphasis on self-consciousness as a fact of knowledge. Both the Nyâya and the Vais'e@sika sûtras admit the existence of atoms, but all the details of the doctrine of atomic structure in later Nyâya-Vais'e@sika are absent there. The Vai'se@sika calls salvation ni@hs'reyasa or mok@sa and the Nyâya apavarga. Mok@sa with Vais'e@sika is the permanent cessation of connection with body; the apavarga with Nyâya is cessation of pain [Footnote ref l]. In later times the main points of difference between the Vais'e@sika and Nyâya are said to lie with regard to theory of the notion of number, changes of colour in the molecules by heat, etc. Thus the former admitted a special procedure of the mind by which cognitions of number arose in the mind (e.g. at the first moment there is the sense contact with an object, then the notion of oneness, then from a sense of relativeness—apek@sâbuddhi—notion of two, then a notion of two-ness, and then the notion of two things); again, the doctrine of pilupâka (changes of qualities by heat are produced in atoms and not in molecules as Nyâya held) was held by Vais'e@sika, which the Naiyâyikas did not admit [Footnote ref 2]. But as the Nyâya sûtras are silent on these points, it is not possible to say that such were really the differences between early Nyâya and early Vaise@sika. These differences may be said to hold between the later interpreters of Vais'e@sika and the later interpreters of Nyâya. The Vais'e@sika as we find it in the commentary of Pras'astapâda (probably sixth century A.D.), and the Nyâya from the time of Udyotakara have come to be treated as almost the same system with slight variations only. I have therefore preferred to treat them together. The main presentation of the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika philosophy in this chapter is that which is found from the sixth century onwards.

The Vais'e@sika and Nyâya Literature.

It is difficult to ascertain definitely the date of the Vais'e@sika sûtras by Ka@nâda, also called Aulûkya the son of Ulûka, though there is every reason to suppose it to be pre-Buddhistic. It

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Professor Vanamâlî Vedântatîrtha quotes a passage from Sa@mk@sepas'a@nkarajaya, XVI. 68-69 in J.A.S.B., 1905, and another passage from a Nyâya writer Bhâsarvajña, pp. 39-41, in J.A.S.B., 1914, to show that the old Naiyâyikas considered that there was an element of happiness (sukha) in the state of mukti (salvation) which the Vais'e@sikas denied. No evidence in support of this opinion is found in the Nyâya or the Vais'e@sika sûtras, unless the cessation of pain with Nyâya is interpreted as meaning the resence of some sort of bliss or happiness.]

[Footnote 2: See Mâdhava's Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha-Aulûkyadars'ana.]

306

appears from the Vâyu purâna that he was born in Prabhâsa near Dvârakâ, and was the disciple of Somas'armâ. The time of Pras'astapâda who wrote a bhâ@sya (commentary) of the Vais'e@sika sûtras cannot also unfortunately be ascertained. The peculiarity of Pras'astapâda's bhâ@sya is this that unlike other bhâ@syas (which first give brief explanations of the text of the sûtras and then continue to elaborate independent explanations by explaining the first brief comments), it does not follow the sûtras but is an independent dissertation based on their main contents [Footnote ref 1]. There were two other bhâ@syas on the Vais'e@sika sûtras, namely Râva@na-bhâ@sya and Bharâdvâja-v@rtti, but these are now probably lost. References to the former are found in Kira@nâvalîbhâskara of Padmanâbha Mis'ra and also in Ratnaprabhâ 2. 2. II. Four commentaries were written on this bhâ@sya, namely Vyomavatî by Vyomas'ekharâcârya, Nyâyakandalî by S'ridhara, Kira@nâvalî by Udayana (984 A.D.) and Lîlâvatî S'rîvatsâcârya. In addition to these Jagadîs'a Bha@t@tâcârya of Navadvîpa and S'a@nkara Mis'ra wrote two other commentaries on the Pras'astapâda-bhâsya, namely Bhâsyasûkti and Ka@nâda-rahasya. S'a@nkara Mis'ra (1425 A.D.) also wrote a commentary on the Vais'e@sika sûtras called the Upaskâra. Of these Nyâya-kandalî of S'rîdhara on account of its simplicity of style and elaborate nature of exposition is probably the best for a modern student of Vais'e@sika. Its author was a native of the village of Bhûris@r@s@ti in Bengal (Râ@dha). His father's name was Baladeva and mother's name was Acchokâ and he wrote his work in 913 S'aka era (990 A.D.) as he himself writes at the end of his work.

The Nyâya sûtra was written by Ak@sapâda or Gautama, and the earliest commentary on it written by Vâtsyâyana is known as the Vâtsyâyana-bhâ@sya. The date of Vâtsyâyana has not

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The bhâ@sya of Pras'astapâda can hardly he called a bhâ@sya (elaborate commentary). He himself makes no such claim and calls his work a compendium of the properties of the categories (Padârthadharmasa@mgraha). He takes the categories of dravya, gu@na, karma, sâmânya, vis'e@sa and samavâya in order and without raising any discussions plainly narrates what he has got to say on them. Some of the doctrines which are important in later Nyâya-Vais'e@sika discussions, such as the doctrine of creation and dissolution, doctrine of number, the theory that the number of atoms contributes to the atomic measure of the molecules, the doctrine of pilupâka in connection with the transformation of colours by heat occur in his narration for the first time as the Vais'e@sika sûtras are silent on these points. It is difficult to ascertain his date definitely; he is the earliest writer on Vais'e@sika available to us after Ka@nâda and it is not improbable that he lived in the 5th or 6th century A.D.]

307

been definitely settled, but there is reason to believe that he lived some time in the beginning of the fourth century A.D. Jacobi places him in 300 A.D. Udyotakara (about 635 A.D.) wrote a Vârttika on Vâtsyâyana's bhâ@sya to establish the Nyâya views and to refute the criticisms of the Buddhist logician Di@nnâga (about 500 A.D.) in his Pramâ@nasamuccaya. Vâcaspatimis'ra (840 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on the Nyâyavârttika of Udyotakara called Nyâyavârttikatâtparya@tîkâ in order to make clear the right meanings of Udyotakara's Vârttika which was sinking in the mud as it were through numerous other bad writings (dustarakunibandhapa@nkamagnânâm). Udayana (984 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on the Tâtparya@tîkâ called Tâtparya@tîkâparis'uddhi. Varddhamâna (1225 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on that called the Nyâyanibandhaprakâs'a. Padmanâbha wrote a sub-commentary on that called Varddhamânendu and S'a@nkara Mis'ra (1425 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on that called the Nyâyatâtparyama@n@dana. In the seventeenth century Vis'vanâtha wrote an independent short commentary known as Vis'vanâthav@rtti, on the Nyâya sûtra, and Râdhâmohana wrote a separate commentary on the Nyâya sûtras known as Nyâyasûtravivara@na. In addition to these works on the Nyâya sûtras many other independent works of great philosophical value have been written on the Nyâya system. The most important of these in medieval times is the Nyâyamañjari of Jayanta (880 A.D.), who flourished shortly after Vâcaspatimis'ra. Jayanta chooses some of the Nyâya sûtras for interpretation, but he discusses the Nyâya views quite independently, and criticizes the views of other systems of Indian thought of his time. It is far more comprehensive than Vâcaspati's Tâtparya@tîkâ, and its style is most delightfully lucid. Another important work is Udayana's Kusumâñjali in which he tries to prove the existence of Îs'vara (God). This work ought to be read with its commentary Prakâs'a by Varddhamâna (1225 A.D.) and its sub-commentary Makaranda by Rucidatta (1275 A.D.). Udayana's Âtmatattvaviveka is a polemical work against the Buddhists, in which he tries to establish the Nyâya doctrine of soul. In addition to these we have a number of useful works on Nyâya in later times. Of these the following deserve special mention in connection with the present work. Bhâ@sâpariccheda by Vis'vanâtha with its commentaries Muktâvalî, Dinakarî and Râmarudrî, Tarkasamgraha with Nyâyanir@naya, Tarkabkâ@sâ of Kes'ava Mis'ra with

308

the commentary Nyâyapradîpa, Saptapadârthî of S'ivâditya, Târkikarak@sâ of Varadarâja with the commentary Ni@ska@n@taka of Mallinâtha, Nyâyasâra of Mâdhava Deva of the city of Dhâra and Nyâyasiddhântamañjarî of Jânakinâtha Bha@t@tâcarya with the Nyâyamanjarisara by Yâdavâcârya, and Nyâyasiddhântadîpa of S'a@sadhara with Prabhâ by S'e@sânantâcârya.

The new school of Nyâya philosophy known as Navya-Nyâya began with Ga@nges'a Upâdhyâya of Mithilâ, about 1200 A.D. Ga@nges'a wrote only on the four pramâ@nas admitted by the Nyâya, viz. pratyak@sa, anumâna, upamâna, and s'abda, and not on any of the topics of Nyâya metaphysics. But it so happened that his discussions on anumâna (inference) attracted unusually great attention in Navadvîpa (Bengal), and large numbers of commentaries and commentaries of commentaries were written on the anumâna portion of his work _Tattvacintâma@ni, and many independent treatises on sabda and anumâna were also written by the scholars of Bengal, which became thenceforth for some centuries the home of Nyâya studies. The commentaries of Raghunâtha S'iroma@ni (1500 A.D.), Mathurâ Bha@t@tâcârya (1580 A.D.), Gadâdhara Bha@t@tâcârya (1650 A.D.) and Jagadîsa Bha@t@tâcârya (1590 A.D.), commentaries on S'iroma@ni's commentary on _Tattvacintâmani, had been very widely read in Bengal. The new school of Nyâya became the most important study in Navadvîpa and there appeared a series of thinkers who produced an extensive literature on the subject [Footnote ref l].The contribution was not in the direction of metaphysics, theology, ethics, or religion, but consisted mainly in developing a system of linguistic notations to specify accurately and precisely any concept or its relation with other concepts [Footnote ref 2]. Thus for example when they wished to define precisely the nature of the concomitance of one concept with another (e.g. smoke and fire), they would so specify the relation that the exact nature of the concomitance should be clearly expressed, and that there should be no confusion or ambiguity. Close subtle analytic thinking and the development of a system of highly technical

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: From the latter half of the twelfth century to the third quarter of the sixteenth century the new school of Nyâya was started in Mithilâ (Behar); but from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century Bengal became pre-eminently the home of Nyâya studies. See Mr Cakravarttî's paper, J. A.S.B. 1915. I am indebted to it for some of the dates mentioned in this section.]

[Footnote 2: Îs'varânumâna of Raghunatha as well as his Padârthatattvanirûpa@na are, however, notable exceptions.]

309

expressions mark the development of this literature. The technical expressions invented by this school were thus generally accepted even by other systems of thought, wherever the need of accurate and subtle thinking was felt. But from the time that Sanskrit ceased to be the vehicle of philosophical thinking in India the importance of this literature has gradually lost ground, and it can hardly be hoped that it will ever regain its old position by attracting enthusiastic students in large numbers.

I cannot close this chapter without mentioning the fact that so far as the logical portion of the Nyâya system is concerned, though Ak@sapâda was the first to write a comprehensive account of it, the Jains and Buddhists in medieval times had independently worked at this subject and had criticized the Nyâya account of logic and made valuable contributions. In Jaina logic Das'avaikâlikaniryukti of Bhadrabâhu (357 B.C.), Umâsvâti's Tattvârthâdhigama sûtra, Nyâyâvatâra of Siddhasena Divâkara (533 A.D.) Mâ@nikya Nandi's (800 A.D.) Parîk@sâmukha sûtra, and Pramâ@nanayatattvâlokâla@mkâra of Deva Sûri (1159 A.D.) and Prameyakamalamârta@n@da of Prabhâcandra deserve special notice. Pramâ@nasamuccaya and Nyâyapraves'a of Di@nnâga (500 A.D.), Pramâ@nayârttika kârikâ and Nyâyabindu of Dharmakîrtti (650 A.D.) with the commentary of Dharmottara are the most interesting of the Buddhist works on systematic logic [Footnote ref l]. The diverse points of difference between the Hindu, Jain and Buddhist logic require to be dealt with in a separate work on Indian logic and can hardly be treated within the compass of the present volume.

It is interesting to notice that between the Vâtsyâyana bhâ@sya and the Udyotakara's Vârttika no Hindu work on logic of importance seems to have been written: it appears that the science of logic in this period was in the hands of the Jains and the Buddhists; and it was Di@nnâga's criticism of Hindu Nyâya that roused Udyotakara to write the Vârttika. The Buddhist and the Jain method of treating logic separately from metaphysics as an independent study was not accepted by the Hindus till we come to Ga@nges'a, and there is probably only one Hindu work of importance on Nyâya in the Buddhist style namely Nyâyasâra of Bhâsarvajña. Other older Hindu works generally treated of

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See Indian Logic Medieval School, by Dr S.C. Vidyâbhû@sa@na, for a bibliography of Jain and Buddhist Logic.]

310

inference only along with metaphysical and other points of Nyâya interest [Footnote ref 1].

The main doctrine of the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika Philosophy [Footnote ref 2].

The Nyâya-Vais'e@sika having dismissed the doctrine of momentariness took a common-sense view of things, and held that things remain permanent until suitable collocations so arrange themselves that the thing can be destroyed. Thus the jug continues to remain a jug unless or until it is broken to pieces by the stroke of a stick. Things exist not because they can produce an impression on us, or serve my purposes either directly or through knowledge, as the Buddhists suppose, but because existence is one of their characteristics. If I or you or any other perceiver did not exist, the things would continue to exist all the same. Whether they produce any effect on us