History of the Peloponnesian War by Thucydides (free ebooks for android .txt) 📕

_Eighteenth and Nineteenth Years of the War - Arrival of

Gylippus at Syracuse - Fortification of Decelea -

Successes of the Syracusans_

After refitting their ships, Gylippus and Pythen coasted along

from Tarentum to Epizephyrian Locris. They now received the more

correct information that Syracuse was not yet completely invested, but

that it was still possible for an army arriving at Epipolae to

effect an entrance; and they consulted, accordingly, whether they

should keep Sicily on their right and risk sailing in by sea, or,

leaving it on their left, should first sail to Himera and, taking with

them the Himeraeans and any others that might agree to join them, go

to Syracuse by land. Finally they determined to sail for Himera,

especially as the four Athenian ships which Nicias had at length

sent off, on hearing that they were at Locris, had not yet arrived

at Rhegium. Accordingly, before these reached their post, the

Peloponnesians crossed the strait and, after touching at Rhegium and

Messina, came to Himera. Arrived there, they persuaded the

Himeraeans to join in the war, and not only to go with them themselves

but to provide arms for the seamen from their vessels which they had

drawn ashore at Himera; and they sent and appointed a place for the

Selinuntines to meet them with all their forces. A few troops were

also promised by the Geloans and some of the Sicels, who were now

ready to join them with much greater alacrity, owing to the recent

death of Archonidas, a powerful Sicel king in that neighbourhood and

friendly to Athens, and owing also to the vigour shown by Gylippus

in coming from Lacedaemon. Gylippus now took with him about seven

hundred of his sailors and marines, that number only having arms, a

thousand heavy infantry and light troops from Himera with a body of

a hundred horse, some light troops and cavalry from Selinus, a few

Geloans, and Sicels numbering a thousand in all, and set out on his

march for Syracuse.

Meanwhile the Corinthian fleet from Leucas made all haste to arrive;

and one of their commanders, Gongylus, starting last with a single

ship, was the first to reach Syracuse, a little before Gylippus.

Gongylus found the Syracusans on the point of holding an assembly to

consider whether they should put an end to the war. This he prevented,

and reassured them by telling them that more vessels were still to

arrive, and that Gylippus, son of Cleandridas, had been dispatched

by the Lacedaemonians to take the command. Upon this the Syracusans

took courage, and immediately marched out with all their forces to

meet Gylippus, who they found was now close at hand. Meanwhile

Gylippus, after taking Ietae, a fort of the Sicels, on his way, formed

his army in order of battle, and so arrived at Epipolae, and ascending

by Euryelus, as the Athenians had done at first, now advanced with the

Syracusans against the Athenian lines. His arrival chanced at a

critical moment. The Athenians had already finished a double wall of

six or seven furlongs to the great harbour, with the exception of a

small portion next the sea, which they were still engaged upon; and in

the remainder of the circle towards Trogilus on the other sea,

stones had been laid ready for building for the greater part of the

distance, and some points had been left half finished, while others

were entirely completed. The danger of Syracuse had indeed been great.

Meanwhile the Athenians, recovering from the confusion into which

they had been first thrown by the sudden approach of Gylippus and

the Syracusans, formed in order of battle. Gylippus halted at a

short distance off and sent on a herald to tell them that, if they

would evacuate Sicily with bag and baggage within five days’ time,

he was willing to make a truce accordingly. The Athenians treated this

proposition with contempt, and dismissed the herald without an answer.

After this both sides began to prepare for action. Gylippus, observing

that the Syracusans were in disorder and did not easily fall into

line, drew off his troops more into the open ground, while Nicias

did not lead on the Athenians but lay still by his own wall. When

Gylippus saw that they did not come on, he led off his army to the

citadel of the quarter of Apollo Temenites, and passed the night

there. On the following day he led out the main body of his army, and,

drawing them up in order of battle before the walls of the Athenians

to prevent their going to the relief of any other quarter,

dispatched a strong force against Fort Labdalum, and took it, and

put all whom he found in it to the sword, the place not being within

sight of the Athenians. On the same day an Athenian galley that lay

moored off the harbour was captured by the Syracusans.

After this the Syracusans and their allies began to carry a single

wall, starting from the city, in a slanting direction up Epipolae,

in order that the Athenians, unless they could hinder the work,

might be no longer able to invest them. Meanwhile the Athenians,

having now finished their wall down to the sea, had come up to the

heights; and part of their wall being weak, Gylippus drew out his army

by night and attacked it. However, the Athenians who happened to be

bivouacking outside took the alarm and came out to meet him, upon

seeing which he quickly led his men back again. The Athenians now

built their wall higher, and in future kept guard at this point

themselves, disposing their confederates along the remainder of the

works, at the stations assigned to them. Nicias also determined to

fortify Plemmyrium, a promontory over against the city, which juts out

and narrows the mouth of the Great Harbour. He thought that the

fortification of this place would make it easier to bring in supplies,

as they would be able to carry on their blockade from a less distance,

near to the port occupied by the Syracusans; instead of being obliged,

upon every movement of the enemy’s navy, to put out against them

from the bottom of the great harbour. Besides this, he now began to

pay more attention to the war by sea, seeing that the coming of

Gylippus had diminished their hopes by land. Accordingly, he

conveyed over his ships and some troops, and built three forts in

which he placed most of his baggage, and moored there for the future

the larger craft and men-of-war. This was the first and chief occasion

of the losses which the crews experienced. The water which they used

was scarce and had to be fetched from far, and the sailors could not

go out for firewood without being cut off by the Syracusan horse,

who were masters of the country; a third of the enemy’s cavalry

being stationed at the little town of Olympieum, to prevent plundering

incursions on the part of the Athenians at Plemmyrium. Meanwhile

Nicias learned that the rest of the Corinthian fleet was

approaching, and sent twenty ships to watch for them, with orders to

be on the lookout for them about Locris and Rhegium and the

approach to Sicily.

Gylippus, meanwhile, went on with the wall across Epipolae, using

the stones which the Athenians had laid down for their own wall, and

at the same time constantly led out the Syracusans and their allies,

and formed them in order of battle in front of the lines, the

Athenians forming against him. At last he thought that the moment

was come, and began the attack; and a hand-to-hand fight ensued

between the lines, where the Syracusan cavalry could be of no use; and

the Syracusans and their allies were defeated and took up their dead

under truce, while the Athenians erected a trophy. After this Gylippus

called the soldiers together, and said that the fault was not theirs

but his; he had kept their lines too much within the works, and had

thus deprived them of the services of their cavalry and darters. He

would now, therefore, lead them on a second time. He begged them to

remember that in material force they would be fully a match for

their opponents, while, with respect to moral advantages, it were

intolerable if Peloponnesians and Dorians should not feel confident of

overcoming Ionians and islanders with the motley rabble that

accompanied them, and of driving them out of the country.

After this he embraced the first opportunity that offered of again

leading them against the enemy. Now Nicias and the Athenians held

the opinion that even if the Syracusans should not wish to offer

battle, it was necessary for them to prevent the building of the cross

wall, as it already almost overlapped the extreme point of their

own, and if it went any further it would from that moment make no

difference whether they fought ever so many successful actions, or

never fought at all. They accordingly came out to meet the Syracusans.

Gylippus led out his heavy infantry further from the fortifications

than on the former occasion, and so joined battle; posting his horse

and darters upon the flank of the Athenians in the open space, where

the works of the two walls terminated. During the engagement the

cavalry attacked and routed the left wing of the Athenians, which

was opposed to them; and the rest of the Athenian army was in

consequence defeated by the Syracusans and driven headlong within

their lines. The night following the Syracusans carried their wall

up to the Athenian works and passed them, thus putting it out of their

power any longer to stop them, and depriving them, even if

victorious in the field, of all chance of investing the city for the

future.

After this the remaining twelve vessels of the Corinthians,

Ambraciots, and Leucadians sailed into the harbour under the command

of Erasinides,