Holocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews by Peter Longerich (booksvooks TXT) 📕

total number of Jews murdered by Einsatzgruppe C was 75,000 by 20 October. 230

Einsatzgruppe D reported on 12 December 1941 that it had shot 54,696 people to

date, and on 8 April 1942 the total was 91,678 of which at least 90 per cent were Jews. 231

These monstrous figures indicate the huge extent of the mass murders but they

do not represent precise statistics for the numbers of victims. It is not out of the

question that, in order to underline their assiduousness, some commandos

reported exaggerated totals or reported the same figures twice. On the other

hand, whilst the Einsatzgruppe reports contain data on the Jewish victims who

Extension of Shootings to Whole Jewish Population

255

had been killed by other units, this information is neither reliable nor complete,

especially when one considers the numbers of civilians murdered by units of the

Wehrmacht or by the local militias.

Nevertheless, the total number of Jewish civilians killed by the end of 1941

during the first two phases of the persecution of the Jews in the occupied Eastern

areas must be of the order of at least 500,000.

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PART IV

GENESIS OF THE FINAL SOLUTION ON A

EUROPEAN SCALE, 1941

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chapter 14

PLANS FOR A EUROPE-WIDE DEPORTATION

PROGRAMME AFTER THE START

OF BARBAROSSA

Decision on the Final Solution in the Summer of 1941?

The Interpretation of Some ‘Key Documents’

In parallel with the preparation and escalation of the racist war of extermination

against the Soviet Union, from the spring of 1941 onwards a general, gradual

radicalization of Judenpolitik can be observed within the whole German sphere of

influence. Historians dispute whether a key decision to murder all European Jews

lies behind this radicalization, and when the decision occurred. Thus the first

months1 of 1941, the summer, 2 the autumn, 3 or even December4 of the same year are given as possible dates for a ‘Führerentscheidung’ (decision by the Führer) in

the ‘Jewish question’; on the other hand there is a tendency to stress more strongly

the idea that decisions were made as part of an ongoing process, that no concrete

individual decision by Hitler can be assumed, 5 and that there was a series of individual decisions by the dictator that led to an escalation of the persecution of

the Jews. 6

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Final Solution on a European Scale, 1941

Having already rejected the thesis of a decision to implement the ‘Final Solution’

early in 1941 or in the spring of that year, 7 we should like now to deal primarily with arguments that may be introduced to support the theory that a decision to

murder all European Jews was made some time in the summer of 1941. This thesis

still seemed plausible even into the 1970s and 1980s; until that point there were

good reasons for holding the view that Hitler had ordered the murder of Jews

living in the Soviet Union in the spring or summer of 1941. Both decisions—the

one to murder the Soviet Jews and the other to murder the European Jews—

seemed inseparably connected or at least closely related in temporal sequence. As

we have already seen in the previous chapter, however, the thesis of an early order

from the Führer to murder the Soviet Jews is no longer tenable, but must make

way for the idea of a gradual and progressive radicalization process that lasted

from spring until autumn 1941.

From this sophisticated perspective, Christopher Browning above all has devel-

oped a theory based on the idea that the fate of the European Jews was only

decided as part of a lengthier decision-making process: Browning proceeds on the

assumption that in mid-July 1941, in a state of euphoria about his imminent

victory, along with the decision to escalate the extermination policy in the Soviet

Union, Hitler set in motion the decision-making process that led to the extension

of the ‘Final Solution’ to the Jews in the rest of Europe. Then, in mid-September

1941, along with the decision in principle to deport the German Jews, but still with

reservations, he had agreed to the murder of the deportees, and in October, once

again filled with the euphoria of victory, a start had been made on putting this

decision into action. Thus, for Browning, the events of the summer and the late

summer are of the greatest importance. 8

In my view, however, there is no convincing documentary evidence for the

thesis of one or indeed of several decisions by the Führer in the spring and/or

summer of 1941. Thus Heydrich’s ‘authorization’ issued by Goering on 31 July 1941

is certainly not, as some authors assume, 9 the crucial authorization of the head of the RSHA to carry out an order already issued by Hitler to murder the European

Jews. In the letter Heydrich was not given the task of implementing the ‘Final

Solution’; in fact, Heydrich asked Goering, who had had formal responsibility for

the ‘Jewish question’ since 1938, and had put Heydrich in charge of emigration in

January 1939, to sign a declaration drafted by him. 10 This authorized him ‘to make all necessary preparations from an organizational, functional, and material point

of view for a total solution of the Jewish question within the German sphere of

influence in Europe’ and he received the task of presenting an ‘overall draft’ for the

corresponding ‘preparatory measures’. 11

The formulation contained in this authorization, that where ‘the competencies

of other central authorities are affected by these matters, they are to be involved’,

must have referred in particular to Rosenberg’s Eastern Ministry. For, once before,

in late March 1941, it had proved impossible to implement Goering’s authorization

Europe-Wide Deportation after Barbarossa

261

because the competencies of Rosenberg, already designated as Eastern Minister,

had not been clarified. 12 But now a formula had been found that took Rosenberg’s responsibilities into consideration.

This makes it clear that the preparations for the ‘total solution’ entrusted to

Heydrich were to take in the occupied Soviet territories, and hence at first the

planned mass deportation of the European Jews to the East. 13

In fact Heydrich was not to make use of his authorization until November 1941,

when he issued invitations to the Wannsee Conference and included a copy of the

letter signed by Goering in the invitation. Heydrich’s ‘empowerment’ was thus

primarily a formal ‘legitimation designed for third parties’14 and not the commission to implement the ‘Final Solution’.

Neither is there any evidence to sustain Richard Breitman’s thesis that