Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

Lillehammer to bolster the Norwegian forces, consisting of two infantry battalions and a battery of artillery on east side of Lake Mjøsa under General Hvinden-Haug and two reduced battalions and a number of improvised units on the west side under Colonel Dahl.

Morgan ordered his units at Dombås to Lillehammer and this decision was endorsed by Ironside on April 20. Since Hammer has been cancelled the previous day, there was no longer an urgent need for Morgan’s troops to move north. The British planners had reached the conclusion that Trondheim could not be held, even if captured, without a significant increase in the resources the Allies had made available. The dispatch of the best troops to Narvik contributed to this state of affairs.

Ruge accompanied Morgan to the railroad station at about 0300 hours on April 20 to greet the British troops. One of Ruge’s officers, Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) Roscher-Nielsen, remembers the disappointment: “These were not regular troops … and we were alarmed to see that they were only armed with rifles and light machineguns … No antiaircraft guns, no heavy antitank weapons, no artillery, no vehicles …”7

Morgan not only agreed to place the 148th Brigade under Norwegian command, he allowed the two battalions to be spread out among Norwegian units. This was an unorthodox step and the issue was raised at a conference at midday on April 20. It was a tense meeting because Ruge was angered by a suggestion from the British that there was an intelligence leak at his headquarters. According to Derry, Ruge presented a written document demanding that all British units comply with his orders or he would resign.

King-Salter had decoded a message from Ironside to Ruge less than two hours earlier. This message told Ruge that Morgan had instructions to cooperate but would not come under Ruge’s command. In this delicate situation, King-Salter decided to delay the message to Ruge. The conference ended on a positive note with Morgan promising cooperation and Ruge stating that he would try to hold the front near Lillehammer until Trondheim had fallen. His new allies had failed to tell him that the attack on Trondheim had been cancelled a day earlier.

Ruge’s decision to spread the British units among the Norwegian troops would be unwise under normal circumstances, but these were far from normal. After seeing that the British troops were not regulars and lacked all types of necessary weapons and equipment, Ruge was probably uneasy about their ability to hold a major sector against the Germans. The British infantrymen, with limited training, found themselves in completely unfamiliar surroundings, waist-deep in snow, and without equipment for winter warfare. They had no maps of the area, no artillery, no radio communications, no means of transport, and no supply organization. They relied on Norwegians for support in these areas. It was also hoped that the appearance of British troops in the major units would serve to stiffen Norwegian resolve and boost their morale. In the end, it had the opposite effect.

The German Breakthrough

A half battalion of Foresters, commanded by Major Roberts, was attached to Task Force Dahl with the mission of protecting its right flank. Lieutenant Colonel Ford, with the rest of the Foresters, was positioned behind the Torkilsen Battalion at Lundehøgda on the east side of Lake Mjøsa. Two companies of the Leicester’s, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Garman, were given a reserve mission behind the 2nd Cavalry Regiment near Åsmarka.

Major Roberts’ troops were recalled from their flank security mission and ordered to Biri. The Norwegian front in that area, under attack from battle groups Adlholch, Zanthier, and Nickelmann, was in danger of collapsing after hard fighting, including several Norwegian counterattacks. Colonel Dahl decided on April 21 to pull his line back to the area near Fåberg since his left flank was exposed after the Germans broke through Norwegian lines east of Lake Mjøsa. The withdrawal went well, covered by the two companies of Foresters and a Norwegian ski company and engineers. The covering force had difficulties extracting. It sustained a number of casualties, and many troops became separated from their units.

There were approximately 2,000 Norwegian soldiers contesting the German advance to the east of Lake Mjøsa but they were exhausted after ten days of continuous delaying actions. The 7-kilometer long Norwegian front was held by the Torkilsen Bn on the right with an approximate strength of 575. The left was held by units of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment. The Germans opened their attack on April 20 with one infantry battalion and a machinegun battalion along the road and railroad against the Norwegian positions on Lundehøgda, and one infantry battalion along the Moelv-Arneberg-Lillehammer road against the 2nd Cavalry Regiment.

The German attacks on the Norwegian positions at Lundehøgda were repelled all day but part of the defending force withdrew in the evening to Biskopåsen, about four kilometers behind the line. A British mortar section and two light antitank squads were sent forward to strengthen the Norwegian line. The Germans resumed their attack on April 21, with heavy artillery, mortar, and air support. The British mortars were silenced quickly. This was the first ground action between German and British forces in World War II. The Norwegian lines held until after 1400 hours when the right flank was driven back. The Norwegians counterattacked but the commander was badly wounded, the executive officer was killed, and the Germans were able to roll up the Norwegian positions. Despite problems in disengaging, the Norwegians eventually brought most forces to Biskopåsen but that position was abandoned in the evening. More than half of the Torkilsen Bn was captured or missing during the disengagement and withdrawal. By the end of the second day of fighting, it consisted of only 216 men.

A motorized machinegun company from the 2nd Cavalry Regiment held the German attack in check until noon on the 21st when it withdrew to the main positions at Arneberg. The Germans quickly attacked this position and the pressure increased during the afternoon. The 2nd Cavalry Regiment retreated during