Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

According to French sources, Fleischer gave Béthouart command on April 30 of the forces operating along both sides of Route 50 between Gratangen and Bjerkvik, including one Norwegian battalion. They allegedly agreed to an operational boundary between the French and Norwegian commands along a line from Durmåsfjell over Hills 1150, 1118, and 1009. The same sources claim that Béthouart delegated command of French and Norwegian forces in this area to Lieutenant Colonel Valentini, commander of the 27th Chasseurs Alpins.3

There are no indications in Norwegian records that such a command agreement was ever put into operation. The actual arrangements were apparently based on close coordination between Lieutenant Colonels Dahl and Valentini. The Norwegians placed one company from 2/15th Inf at the disposal of the French for security missions in Labergsdal, since the French had only a limited number of ski troops. Only one SES and ten men in each company had skis. The rest used snowshoes.

The 6th Brigade’s immediate objective was the Vasshaugen-Elvemo area east of Hartvigvann. Fleischer expected the brigade to reach this area by May 5. The division order of April 29 required that the 6th Brigade be prepared to start its offensive within 24 hours. It was allowed to send the reinforced Co 6, 2/16th to Gressvann early in the evening of April 29 and the reinforced Co 7, 2/16th to Brattbakken. The mission of Co 6, 2/16th was to clear the Germans from the area north of Gressvann while Co 7, 2/16 provided flank security and patrolled towards Storfossen, behind the German defensive positions at the southern end of Gressvann. Norwegian aircraft stationed at Bardufoss and naval aircraft operating from Tromsø were to support the attack.

German forces contesting the Norwegian-French offensive consisted of the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 139th Regiment. The 1st Bn, commanded by Major Stautner, consisted of 2nd, 4th, 5th, and 13th companies. Company 1 of this battalion was detached, as earlier related, to Bjørnefjell. The 1/139th covered the Gratangen-Bjerkvik road. Patrols from both battalions covered the approaches in the mountainous area in the east for about eight kilometers, to the vicinity of Lortvann and Høgtind. Since the Germans did not believe it possible for major enemy units to operate in the eastern wilderness, it was weakly defended when the Norwegian offensive began. For example, a 16-men detachment with only one machinegun had the mission of securing the Gressvann area.

The bulk of the 3/139th (Co 12 and parts of Cos 14 and 15), commanded by Major Hagemann, was co-located with the regimental headquarters in the Hartvigvann area. Company 11 of this battalion defended Bjerkvik against possible enemy landings in Herjangsfjord. The road leading west from Bjerkvik was secured by only one platoon. The coastline south of Bjerkvik was covered by three companies from Naval Battalion Kothe. The Øyjord area was occupied by Co 3, 139th. The operational boundary between the two German battalions was a line over Hills 785, 842, and 856 with the mountain tops assigned to the 1st Battalion.

6th Brigade’s Attack

The 6th Brigade ordered 1/16th Bn commanded by Major Hunstad and 2/16th Bn commanded by Major Munthe-Kaas, to prepare to execute the attack on a one-hour notice after midnight on April 30. The 1/12th Inf, now assigned to the brigade, did not participate since it was still undergoing reorganization because of its heavy losses in Gratangen on April 24. The advance was divided into three phases. The first phase line was near Hill 437, a ridgeline that separated Gressdal from the Stormyra area. The second phase line ran from Hill 1009 across Gressvann to Hill 1013. The valley in this area is actually a defile with almost vertical walls that are 1200 to 1500 feet in height. An advance through this defile was only possible if the western mountains were in friendly hands. The final phase line ran from Læigastind (Hill 1335) to Hill 1146 (Bukkefjell). The broken mountainous terrain, and their superior cross-country mobility, offered the Norwegians an opportunity to outmaneuver the Germans. The 8th Mountain Artillery Battery was to follow 1/16th Inf and set up in firing positions on Hill 437.

A platoon from Co 6, 2/16, on a security mission at the southern end of Stormyra, made the first contact with the Germans during the night of April 29. Two machinegun sections sent towards a cabin at the southern end of Gressvann ran into a German unit. This German squad-size unit had an observation mission at the southern end of the Stormyr area and withdrew as the Norwegians approached. The sergeant who commanded the Norwegian unit was wounded and he and two machine gunners were captured. The rest of the platoon took up positions on Hill 437.

The early and piecemeal forward movement of Norwegian forces in the east alerted Colonel Windisch to the fact that his troops faced a major threat in that area. He made an urgent request to General Dietl for reinforcements. Dietl had expected the main Norwegian-French effort along Route 50 because of extensive shipping activities in the Sjøvegan and Gratangen areas since the last week in April. However, he now viewed the threat through the Gressdal-Vassdal area as the most dangerous. In this respect, Generals Fleischer and Dietl were thinking alike. A successful Norwegian advance through Gressdal, Raudal, and Vassdal, slipping behind the Germans occupying the high ground to the north, would pose a direct threat to the rear of Group Windisch. The Norwegians could not only sever its supply but cut its line of retreat.

The Germans had, as already mentioned, only a 16-man detachment at the southern end of Gressvann, which served as a supply point for forward observation posts. Dietl agreed with Windisch that it was imperative to reinforce Group Windisch’s right flank quickly. He immediately stripped three companies from forces located in other areas and sent them by forced marches to the threatened area. He ordered Major Schleebrügge, who had commanded the successful attack on Bjørnefjell in