Holocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews by Peter Longerich (booksvooks TXT) 📕

intensification of mass murder, even in the face

of military defeat.

Former ‘allies’ now made way for merciless regimes of terror that were com-

pletely dependent on the ‘Third Reich’, and which were bound to their German

masters to the bitter end.

The ‘De-Judaization’ of Denmark as the Turning Point in

German Extermination Policy

Werner Best, appointed Reich Plenipotentiary in Denmark in November 1942,

continued the relatively restrained policy towards the Danish Jews. In a note of

January 1943, Best made it clear that an intensified Judenpolitik would inevitably

destroy the basis of the previous occupation policy, namely collaboration

with the Danish constitutional monarchy. No Danish government would pass

anti-Semitic legislation, and in the end the Germans would be forced to set up

their own occupying administration. 144 Best once again confirmed this position in April. 145 As the scenario outlined by Best was highly undesirable for the Germans at this point, Luther, Ribbentrop, and even Himmler agreed with

Best’s stance. 146

However, the acts of sabotage, strikes, and unrest that increased during the

summer of 1943 brought an end to the restrained occupation policy that they

recommended. Best now advocated a radical change of direction: he suggested

that the position of the Reich Plenipotentiary be strengthened. He should govern

the country in a kind of ‘personal rule’, based on the Danish administration (with

an ‘administrative committee’ or a cabinet of specialists at its head) as well as with

the help of increased powers in the sphere of internal security, namely his own

police units. This solution, which Best had presented as a negative scenario in

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Extermination of the European Jew, 1942–1945

January, now clearly struck him as a realistic alternative to the German policy of

occupation, which was by now losing its way. 147

For a time, Best’s plans were thwarted by Hitler’s decision, at the end of August,

to declare a military emergency in Denmark. A few days later, however, Hitler

once again gave Best full political responsibility for the German occupation in

Denmark. 148 Ribbentrop gave this mandate further concrete form by ordering the installation of a non-political cabinet of specialists. 149

However, this mandate proved barely possible to implement, as Best learned

from leading Danish figures a few days after his return to Copenhagen on

6 September. Danish politicians were no longer willing to compromise themselves

by collaborating further with the Germans at government level. However, the

head of the Danish administration was prepared to make himself available to the

Reich Plenipotentiary. This purely administrative solution did not correspond to

the mandate that he had received from Ribbentrop, but in the given situation it

struck Best as the only possible solution. 150

To be able to explain the failure of the formation of a government to Berlin, and

to provide a motive for a transition to a police regime under his leadership, Best

had to be interested in intensifying the existing crisis. Such a controlled radical-

ization, however, could be achieved most simply by activating the ‘Jewish ques-

tion’ in Denmark. The deportation of the Danish Jews was precisely the means

with which the change of policy from a policy of collaboration to a police regime

could be secured; on the other hand, the Germans assumed that such a measure

would affect a relatively small minority in Danish society, so that it might later be

possible to calm the situation.

On 8 September 1943, Best suggested to the Foreign Ministry that it use the state

of emergency to attempt a ‘solution of the Jewish question’ in the country. If one

waited until the lifting of the state of emergency, one would have far greater

difficulties with the hostile reaction on the part of the Danish population, which

was to be expected at any event. ‘If the measures were taken during the present

state of emergency,’ Best argued, ‘the possibility remains that a constitutional

government can no longer be formed, so that an administrative committee under

my direction would have to be formed and I would have to legislate by decree.’ By

this time, in fact, Best already knew that there was no longer any chance of

forming a constitutional government, and that he would be forced to take over

power in Denmark himself, with the help of the administrative committee. Best

also stressed that in order to implement the deportations he would need the police

units he had already requested. Thus the deportation of the Jews would also open

up the way for a transition to a police regime, and it would immediately provide

Best with the troops he needed. 151

Best’s proposal for the deportation of the Danish Jews—presented on the day of

the announcement of the Italian-Allied ceasefire—was approved by the German

leadership. Hitler’s decision that the Danish and Italian Jews be deported,

Murders and Deportations, 1942–3

399

conceived as a warning to two insubordinate nations, thus occurred more or less

simultaneously. However, it transpired relatively quickly that the preparations for

the deportation of the Danish Jews had not been kept secret, and that failure was

likely. Best thus decided, after unsuccessfully presenting his concerns to the

German leadership, 152 to let the date for the wave of arrests leak out. If this happened, a week-long ‘head-hunt’153 would be obviated by the escape of the Jews, and further complications for the already difficult situation in Denmark

would be avoided. In the meantime, Best’s plans for the future form of occupation

rule (a strong Reichkommissar utilizing the Danish administration) had assumed

concrete form, leading him to envisage an imminent end to the state of emer-

gency. 154 In other words, if the ‘Final Solution’ in Denmark had seemed like the ideal instrument for the accomplishment of a radical change of course in occupation policy, it had now become counter-productive to the further operation of

the system of occupation. The will to accomplish the policy of extermination

reached its limits where Judenpolitik threatened to lose its function within the

system of occupation.

Thus, in the interest of the general occupation policy, Best was able to allow

the great majority of Jews living in Denmark to escape to Sweden as the result of

an unprecedented rescue action. 155 If we consider Judenpolitik in Denmark within this larger context, it can come as no surprise that early in October

Best, pre-emptively represented the flight of the Jews to the Foreign Ministry as

a success: ‘Since the objective goal of the Jewish action in Denmark was the

de-Judaization of the country and not