Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

for those troops that were landed by sea or air. The ships were to pretend to be merchant ships on their way to Murmansk and were to arrive at their real destinations before the warships or airplanes.

The 1st Sea Transport Echelon consisted of 15 merchant ships that assembled in Stettin on March 12 and began loading units from the 69th and 163rd Infantry Divisions on April 4 (3,761 troops, 672 horses, 1,377 vehicles and 5,935 tons of supplies). These forces were earmarked for Oslo, Kristiansand, Stavanger, and Bergen. Two large tankers loaded with fuel sailed from Wilhelmshaven: one to Narvik and one to Trondheim. Another large tanker sailed from Murmansk to Narvik. Five smaller tankers would later bring fuel from Hamburg to Oslo, Stavanger, Bergen, and Trondheim. The ships of the 1st Sea Transport Echelon and the tankers sailed individually, and no visible protective measures were taken. For security reasons, none of the ships from the Export Echelon, the 1st Sea Transport Echelon or the tankers was allowed to leave German harbors earlier than six days before the day of the attack. The time allowed for these ships to reach their destination proved inadequate in many cases and led to serious supply difficulties. However, it was the limited number of tankers for Narvik that caused the most serious problems for the navy.

The 2nd Sea Transport Echelon consisted of 11 merchant ships and carried troops from the 196th Infantry Division (8,450 troops, 969 horses, 1,283 vehicles and 2,170 tons of supplies). It sailed from Goetnhafen (Gdynia) and Köningsberg to Oslo. These ships were scheduled to arrive in Oslo two days after the invasion.

The 3rd Sea Transport Echelon consisted of 12 merchant ships that were to proceed from Hamburg to Oslo with 6,065 troops, 893 horses, 1,347 vehicles and 6,050 tons of supplies. These ships were scheduled to arrive in Oslo six days after the invasion. Further reinforcements and supplies, consisting of 40,000 troops, 4,000 horses, 10,000 vehicles, and 40,000 tons of supplies were to be brought to Oslo as quickly as possible. The returning ships of the 2nd and 3rd Sea Transport Echelons would be used in this effort.

The German attack on Norway was fully underway when the last task force, Task Force 6, departed the Elbe estuary at 0445 hours on April 8, 1940. The first attack wave carried more than 30,000 German sailors and soldiers.

This operation was an extremely hazardous undertaking, and its success rested on three pillars: complete tactical surprise, the determination and professionalism of those involved, and mistakes by the enemy. There was an extremely slim margin between success and failure. The key element of achieving tactical surprise carried enormous risks. Any action or intelligence that aroused suspicions in Britain or Norway could lead to catastrophe. The overwhelming British naval forces present in or around the North Sea presented a grave threat to the German attack groups. A mobilization of the Norwegian Army as late as April 8, providing additional personnel for the coastal fortresses, and laying the planned minefields, could have made the German landings very costly. Mobilization before the German capture of the depots would have opened the possibilities of Norwegian counterattacks against the isolated German landing forces. Admiral Carls’ assessment on the evening of April 7 was somber, realistic, and prophetic.

The risks are great, and there will be losses. But in view of the great significance of the operation, the price to be paid will not be too great if most of the surface fleet is lost. One must be prepared for the loss of at least half of the committed naval forces if Norwegian or British resistance is encountered.54

The eagerness to carry out Operation Weserübung exhibited by many officers in the German Navy is traceable to their desire to avoid the conditions that prevailed in World War I by acquiring operational bases on Europe’s open coastline that would make a British blockade difficult or impossible. This would greatly simplify and extend the navy’s operational range. It is therefore strange that they were prepared to sacrifice most of the navy in this endeavor, particularly in view of Hitler’s shift of priority to the army and the improved prospects of acquiring bases on the French coast. An outcome along the lines anticipated by Admiral Carls seems to go directly against the objectives the German Navy was trying to achieve.

The Views of the Opposing Admiralties

Did the two admiralties think with precision along the same lines in correct strategy as claimed by Churchill in his now famous quote? Strategy is driven by objectives and capabilities. There was a distinct, although subtle, difference in the objectives of the two sides. Churchill’s desire was to provoke the Germans into operations in Scandinavia, operations that he believed could be challenged effectively and successfully by the Allies and thereby bring quick military victories in a war that had stagnated. Threatening the German source of badly needed iron was a means of provoking this confrontation. The French, likewise, wanted to open a new front in order to divert German attention and resources from their border. They also viewed the threat against the flow of iron ore as a means by which to open the new front. Both Churchill and his friends across the Channel felt that if they succeeded in this process, the maritime blockade of Germany would become more effective, especially if they succeeded in severing the flow of iron ore. To this end, they were willing to accept great political and military risks.

The Allies certainly possessed the capability to bring on the confrontation desired by Churchill and Reynaud. It is a much different question to ask if they could have succeeded in cutting the flow of iron ore to Germany. A realization of the difficulties involved in doing so may help explain Churchill’s lukewarm support for Ironside’s project of invading northern Sweden. The Allies lacked expertise in arctic warfare and were ignorant as to the problems of geography, climate, and the lack of lines of communications in northern