Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

order “to deliver a counter-stroke against a possible attack by us upon Narvik or other Norwegian ports,”11 which was precisely the response Churchill was hoping for. Part of the British failure to take these reports as an indication that Germany was preparing to invade Scandinavia can be traced back to the estimate made by the intelligence branch of the British War Office in December 1939, which concluded that 25-30 German divisions would be required for an attack on Norway and Sweden. Intelligence reports about the assembly of a few divisions in northern Germany were discounted since such force levels appeared inadequate for an invasion.

The most important and accurate report received by the British was one on April 6 from a neutral observer in Copenhagen. The report stated that a German division had embarked on ten ships and that the troops were to land at Narvik on the night of April 8-9. Even this report failed to energize the British. The Admiralty did not believe its accuracy and did not seriously consider the possibility that the Germans might reach Narvik before them. Consequently, the report was not forwarded immediately to the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Charles Forbes.

The British continued to believe that any German operation would be in reaction to their own operations and did not consider it possible that the Germans might be planning the first strike. This mistaken evaluation based on faulty interpretation of intelligence, underestimation of German capabilities, and an uncompromising belief that the vastly superior Royal Navy ruled out any possibility of a German attack in North Norway had serious consequence for the development of the situation in Norway. This attitude is well illustrated by a notation by Laurence Collier, a high Foreign Office official on a report about German intentions and preparations, “I wish I could believe this story. German intervention in Scandinavia is just what we want.”12

The British Cancel R4 and Sail to Intercept the German Navy

British aircraft made the first sighting of German forces in the North Sea at 0848 hours on April 7. They reported seeing one cruiser and six destroyers escorted by eight fighters. A partial report reached Admiral Forbes at 1120 hours and the full report 30 minutes later. At about this same time, Forbes was given the intelligence report that the British Admiralty had received the day before from the neutral observer in Copenhagen. However, the message from the Admiralty ended on an unhelpful note, “All these reports are of doubtful value and may well be only a further move in the war of nerves.”13

Admiral Forbes also received a report about three German destroyers near the same position observed by the aircraft in the morning, and on a southerly course. He began to doubt the objective of the German thrust and remained in Scapa Flow while ordering the fleet to be ready to sail on an hour’s notice. He was also awaiting results of a bombing attack against the German naval units.

The attack by 12 Blenheim bombers took place at 1330 hours. The German ships were now 78 nautical miles north of where they were sighted earlier. The attack was unsuccessful but the aircraft reported that the German naval force consisted of one ship of the Scharnhorst class, two cruisers, and ten destroyers. Repeated radio reports by the aircraft giving the German strength, course, and speed did not reach Forbes and he did not receive their report until 1730 hours, after the planes had landed.

One is entitled to ask why Admiral Forbes remained in harbor after the first sighting. The explanation that he awaited the results of the bombing is not convincing. He could easily have received that report while at sea. With what appeared to be a sizable German foray into the North Sea (complemented by previous intelligence reports), it would seem prudent for the admiral to have taken his fleet to sea and await developments in a more central North Sea location. Whatever the German intentions, this would have placed him in a much better position to take action and could have changed the outcome of the German operations against ports in northern and central Norway.

The British concluded, from the new position of the German ships, that they were directed against a northerly goal but they could not be certain what that goal was. It could be part of a German attack against Norway, but it could also be an expedition against shipping in the Norwegian Sea or the Atlantic. They did not rule out the possibility that the Germans intended to carry out a bombardment against the southern coast of England. This would seem extremely unlikely since the Germans would not only face vastly superior British naval forces but they would also be exposed to British air power. While they were uncertain about the objective of the German force, the British military leaders, like their Norwegian counterparts, failed to settle on the one potential German course of action most detrimental to their interests.

The Home Fleet finally sailed to intercept the Germans at 2015 hours. Moulton reports that the last ships of the fleet cleared Scapa Flow at 2115 hours. The fleet consisting of the battleships Rodney (the largest in the Royal Navy in 1940) and Valiant, the battle cruiser Repulse, the cruisers Sheffield and Penelope, and ten destroyers, headed on a northeasterly course at 20 knots. A French cruiser and two destroyers were also attached to the Home Fleet. At the same time, the Germans were proceeding northward at 29 knots.

The 2nd Cruiser Squadron, consisting of the cruisers Galatea and Arethusa and 15 destroyers, had left Rosyth with orders to proceed to a position about 80 miles west of Stavanger. The 18th Cruiser Squadron, consisting of two cruisers and seven destroyers, was already at sea escorting a convoy of merchant ships to Norway. This squadron was ordered to send the merchant ships back to Scotland and to join the hunt for the German ships.

The main German force under Admiral Lütjens