Malaysian Maverick: Mahathir Mohamad in Turbulent Times by Barry Wain (fantasy novels to read .TXT) 📕

Maidin, a former newspaper executive who later became an UMNO minister, called it "a most amusing piece of political farce".[110] Zainuddin, who was close to the prime minister, said it was "impossible" that Dr. Mahathir did not know which people were involved in "money politics" and the amounts that had changed hands.[111] The head of an UMNO committee appointed to examine the money question declared in 1995, "We've put an end to vote-buying in UMNO."[112] But nothing changed except the size of the bribes. Dr. Mahathir wept in 1996 as he implored colleagues "not to let bribery destroy the Malay race, religion and nation".[113] In 2001, he said "filthy rich" businessmen would not be allowed to vie for UMNO positions.[114] Near retirement, he was still lamenting the lack of "clear evidence" that would enable him to clean up the party.[115]

Indeed, Dr. Mahathir bore responsibility for the money culture well beyond that of a leader who failed to treat a virulent cancer repeatedly diagnosed in the UMNO body. He actively contributed to the problem by increasingly centralizing power in the hands of the party president from the early 1980s.[116] By tightening his grip he ensured rivals would coalesce into stronger factions in an effort to get a share of the contracts, privatization opportunities and special bumiputra allocations of publicly-listed stocks.

When the Asian economic crisis struck in late 1997, the government lost no time in bailing out Renong and other political favourites. Renong by then was the country's largest conglomerate with debts of more than RM25 billion, about 5 per cent of the total loans in the banking system.[117] State support was widely assumed to be an attempt to rescue major Renong shareholders, specifically Halim Saad — and by extension UMNO — at the expense of minorities.

The government also bailed out UMNO over the Putra World Trade Centre, persuading state-owned banks to forgive Khidmat Bersatu at least RM140 million in accumulated interest.[118] According to a confidential accountants' report commissioned by UMNO in late 1985 after the UMNO complex was completed, it cost almost RM360 million and was financed primarily by loans of RM199.5 million from Bank Bumiputra and RM64.9 million from Malayan Banking Bhd. As of March 1986, Khidmat Bersatu had paid just RM51,570 in interest, and the report — obtained, again, by the author in the course of his research — made it clear the company would pay no more.[119] Malaysian taxpayers had subsidized the construction of UMNO's landmark headquarters, which became a cash cow for the party.

After Anwar was sacked in late 1998, Dr. Mahathir and Daim consolidated their power and sidelined Anwar-aligned companies and businessmen, who quickly faded away. Similarly, the sensational Mahathir-Daim split in June 2001, through devoid of any public explanation or recrimination, spelled the end for Halim and other Daim protégés. Halim was summoned within two weeks by a Mahathir aide and told the government intended to take control of Renong, which would be broken up and eventually sold to new investors.[120]

Where that left UMNO's finances was anybody's and everybody's guess. It was easy to believe but impossible to prove that vast sums had been skimmed off UMNO investments on Daim's watch. As the Democratic Action Party's Lim Kit Siang said, "Once he became financial czar, you could never tell where UMNO companies ended and Daim companies began."[121] For 17 years, only Daim knew how much was in the UMNO Political Fund, since, as Dr. Mahathir said, "Yes, he informs me, but...I don't look at the books".[122] In the absence of any public accounting, word circulated inside the party that billions of dollars were missing. Dr. Mahathir gently demurred after his own retirement. "I don't think so," he said. "UMNO never had billions of dollars."[123] Daim also begged to differ, at least as far as he personally was concerned. In a comment directed at UMNO and its leaders, he said, "They don't owe me any money and I don't owe them anything."[124]

Notes

Interview with Lim Kit Siang, 31 May 2007.

Interview with Daim Zainuddin, 18 October 2007.

Interview with Mahathir Mohamad, 14 August 2007.

Edmund Terence Gomez, "Introduction: Political Business in East Asia", in Edmund Terence Gomez, ed., Political Business in East Asia (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 6.

Ibid., p. 6.

Pasuk Phongpaichit, "Thailand under Thaksin: Another Malaysia?", Working Paper No. 109, September 2004, Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, p.7.

Tunku Abdul Rahman, Viewpoints (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books (Asia) Ltd., 1978), p. 53.

Stephen Duthie, "Mahathir Rivals Ask Court to Halt New UMNO Drive", Asian Wall Street Journal, 4 April 1988.

Interview with Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, 29 May 2007.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Interview with Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, 17 January 2008.

Interview with Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, 21 March 2007.

Interview with Abdullah Ahmad, 1 August 2008. UMNO's direct majority stake in Utusan Melayu was disclosed when the company was publicly listed in 1994. Edmund Terence Gomez and Jomo K.S., Malaysia's Political Economy: Politics, Patronage and Profits (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999 edition), p. 96.

Interviews with Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, 17 January, 11 August, 2008.

Yoolim Lee, "Malaysia's Banking Magnate", Bloomberg Markets, January 2008, p. 100.

Edmund Terence Gomez, Politics in Business: UMNO's Corporate Investments, (Petaling Jaya: Fortune Enterprise, 1990), p. 58.

Ibid., p. 58.

Interview with Daim Zainuddin, 18 October 2007.

Edmund Terence Gomez, "Political Business in Malaysia", in Political Business in East Asia, p. 10l.

Peter Searle, The Riddle of Malaysian Capitalism: Rent-seekers or Real Capitalists? (Sydney: Asian Studies Association of Australia with Allen & Unwin and University of Hawai'i Press, 1999), p. 46.

Cheong Mei Sui and Adibah Amin, Daim: The Man Behind the Enigma (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications (M) Sdn. Bhd., 1995), p. 15.

Ibid., p. 15.

Raphael Pura, "Malaysia's Daim Charts Path to Power", Asian Wall Street Journal, 24 August 1984.

Ibid.

Raphael Pura, "Indosuez Unit Control Shifts to Malaysians", Asian Wall Street Journal, 15 October 1982.

Interview with Mahathir Mohamad, 20 March 2007.

Ibid.

Interview with Daim Zainuddin, 18 October 2007.

Edmund Terence Gomez, Politics in Business: UMNO's Corporate Investments, p. 58.

"Khidmat Bersatu Sdn. Bhd.: Accountants' Report for the Period from 1st June 1981 to 31st March 1986", Hanafiah Raslan & Mohamad, Kuala Lumpur.

Interview with Daim Zainuddin, 18 October 2007.

Interview