Washington's Engineer by Norman Desmarais (speed reading book TXT) 📕

Washington’s written reply on July 19 to the questionnaire presented to him ends with the following summary:

Finally, every thing considered, I do not see that we can do more than follow the plan decided on at Wethersfield and recommend to the Comte de Grasse to come at once to Sandy-Hook and take immediate possession if possible, of the post of New York and afterwards according to the circumstances which arise to form a definitive plan of campaign based on appearances which seem to appear the most sure.21

Washington sent the following note to the Comte de Rochambeau a few days later (July 25) to be communicated to the Comte de Barras at Newport:

The officer by which I sent my dispatch for Count de Grasse has returned from Monmouth and has brought me an answer from General Forman. . . . the following is an extract from that Gentleman, which your Excellency will be pleased to communicate to Count de Barras, if you think proper.

Saturday the 21st of this month Adml. Graves with six or seven ships of the line sailed from his station off Sandy Hook, the wind at South West—the Fleet steered about South East—their destination not known, but conjectured to convoy Lord Cornwallis from Chesapeake to New York.

General Forman confirms the account of the Royal Oak having gone to Halifax to refit and adds that it is thought she will not be in condition for sea this season.22

The allies could not know the destination of the British fleet under Graves at that time, but today it is possible to know what happened. A sloop arrived at Sandy Hook the day of the meeting between Rochambeau and General Washington. It bore the very important news that Colonel John Laurens would sail from France with “money, clothing and military stores”23 before the end of June. He would be in a convoy of merchantmen escorted by “one ship of the line, another armed en flute and two frigates.”24 The British Admiralty deemed it so important to seize these vessels that it issued orders to the commander of the fleet in the North to that effect. When Graves was seen setting off from his station at Sandy Hook on Saturday, July 21, he was complying with those orders. Dense fog forced him to return to Sandy Hook, where he arrived on August 18. Colonel Laurens came safely into the port of Boston with his precious cargo on the twenty-fifth. The fogs that saved him from the British delayed him so much that the passage required eighty-five days.25

This movement of the largest British ships under Graves, leaving New York harbor comparatively unprotected, seems to have perplexed Dupor-tail, who wrote the following to Washington on July 27:

I am so much vexed since three days ago by a certain idea that I cannot but submit it to Your Excellency. I remember that in the last Conference Count de Rochambeau told that the Count de Barras and all the officers pretended that it was not possible to force the entrance to the harbour of New York when there are some ships to defend it—if so why would not Admiral Barras, in this absence of the British fleet render himself master of the harbour? He could render himself master, he could penetrate every where.

I am surprised that the British left so the harbour and this makes me believe that there is something in their plan which we do not penetrate—maybe a junction with Rodney somewhere. But if the harbour cannot be fired Admiral Graves should not be in danger in it.26

General Washington replied immediately, “The subject you have written upon is equally perplexing and incomprehensible to my understanding—I will talk more freely to you thereon when we meet at two o’clock.”27

DUPORTAIL’S PLAN TO ATTACK NEW YORK

There is nothing in Washington’s papers to throw further light upon the subject discussed at the two o’clock meeting, but Duportail was preparing his plan in the meantime to be ready if and when the moment came to attack New York. He wrote on July 27,

General observations on the manner to pass over the island of New York.

If one considers the nature of the ground in the northern part of the island of New York it will be recognized I think, that it will not be a very difficult thing to take a position on the other side of devil’s creek [Spuyten Duyvil]; batteries can be established on the mountain on that side strong enough to soon force the enemy to abandon Fort Charles and after that we will be masters of Kingsbridge. The works on Cox hill are of small account by themselves and can easily be taken sword in hand. If however the enemy were to remain, after the evacuation or the taking of Fort Charles, which I do not think likely, the feeble state in which they leave the fort on Cox hill shows they do not intend to defend that part of the island, and that their veritable defense front is from Laurel hill to fort Tryon.

Let us suppose that we are masters of Kingsbridge and have taken post on the other side, let us now see how we can progress. Considering the slope of the ground beyond forts Laurel hill and Tryon, its rocky nature, and the position between themselves . . . I do not think it practicable to attack them. . . . Doubtless, going at it properly it might succeed but it is hazardous, so I would prefer the following manner to establish ourselves—which is to go by boats across the Harlem river and boldly take a position between New York and Fort Washington at a place impossible to determine before arriving on the island.

. . . Two things must be considered—whether we will have a French fleet in the Sound, or whether we will not. In the first place we need not fear to be troubled in the Harlem by vessels, galleys or armed boats of the enemy; we