Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

General Staff meant that the earlier British warning about Germans reaching Narvik by 2200 hours was false. District Command did not forward this message to Sundlo.

Lindbäck-Larsen was awakened around 0300 hours (0315 according to Sandvik) by a telephone call from District Command, which related that foreign warships were attacking Oslo, Bergen, and Trondheim. Lindbäck-Larsen requested District Command to insure that the battalion from Elvegårdsmoen had reached Narvik and that all bunkers were occupied. He also directed that the movement of the 2/15th Inf and the motorized artillery battery from Setermoen be expedited.

The 3rd Naval District’s chief of staff notified General Fleischer around 0345 hours that foreign warships had entered Ofotfjord. This message was followed 15 minutes later by a similar report from the District Command. At the same time, District Command reported that all was ready in Narvik. This statement was apparently in answer to Lindbäck-Larsen’s request 45 minutes earlier for confirmation that the battalion from Elvegårdsmoen had reached Narvik and that the bunkers were occupied. What the District Command used as a basis for the claim that all was ready in Narvik is not known. Colonel Sundlo tried unsuccessfully to contact District Command from 0300 until at least 0330 hours. It is true that the machinegun crews had occupied the bunkers the previous evening but the movement of the battalion was not completed. Fleischer decided to return to his headquarters and two naval aircraft were placed at his disposal for transport from Vadsø to Tromsø.

The patrol vessel Senja left Narvik at 0135 hours to escort merchant ships past the British minefield in Vestfjord. At 0340 hours, the patrol boat sighted a warship, believed to be a British destroyer, near Ramnes. This report reached Captain Askim but it was interpreted as a British cruiser. His reaction, according to Steen, was, “Thank God, there are also British ships in the Fjord.” As Senja approached to challenge the warship, it turned out to be German. A second German destroyer was also sighted. This information was transmitted to Captain Askim by radio but, for unknown reasons, he did not receive the report. The Germans sent an armed boarding party aboard the Norwegian ship, put its radio out of commission, removed critical parts from the 76mm gun, and ordered the skipper to proceed to Narvik. Captain Askim had ordered the patrol vessels at the Ofotfjord entrance not to engage foreign warships. This was a sensible order in view of the disparity in size and armaments between these small vessels and destroyers. Senja arrived in Narvik at 0630 hours.

Search for Shore Batteries

The German forces approaching Narvik were divided into three groups: Group West, Group Narvik, and Group Elvegårdsmoen. These groups were to carry out nearly simultaneous attacks on the three main objectives.

Group West consisted of the 3rd Destroyer Flotilla (Hans Lüdemann, Anton Schmitt, and Diether von Roeder) and the troops aboard these destroyers. Captain Bonte detached the 3rd Destroyer Flotilla at 0340 hours. Group West’s mission was to land two infantry companies to capture the non-existent Norwegian shore batteries at Ramnes and Hamnnes. Anton Schmitt was to land the reinforced Co 1 on the south side of Ofotfjord, in a small side fjord called Vargfjord. The plan called for the company to advance across the narrow peninsula and attack the imaginary Hamnnes battery from the rear. Thereafter, the company would continue along the north shore of Vargfjord and attack a battery the Germans believed was located at Jevik. Company 1 belonged to the 1st Battalion, which landed at Bjerkvik.

Hans Lüdemann was to land the reinforced Co 6 at Skarvik, just east of Ramnes. The company would advance westward and attack the Ramnes battery from the rear. Company 6 belonged to the 2nd Battalion, which landed in Narvik. The two destroyers remained in the fjord, prepared to support the operation with naval gunfire. These were the two destroyers encountered by Senja. The reserve for these two landings was aboard Diether von Roeder. This destroyer positioned itself near Barøy where it would be near enough to the landing sites quickly to land the reserve and at the same time be in position to assist Erich Giese when she arrived, should that be necessary.

The German troops exhausted themselves in a fruitless search in six feet of snow for the non-existent guns. They reembarked on destroyers around 0700 hours and landed in Narvik.

Capture of Elvegårdsmoen

Elvegårdsmoen was a major mobilization center as well as the training area for the 15th Infantry Regiment, the Hålogaland Engineer Battalion, and several smaller units. It was a major weapons, ammunition, and supply depot. Among the items at the depot were 4,000 rifles, 2,000 carbines, 600 handguns, 222 machineguns, 14 mortars, 1.5 million rounds of ammunition, and huge stores of uniforms, supplies, and food.

It was Group Elvegårdsmoen’s mission to capture this depot. The group consisted of the 4th Destroyer Flotilla (Wolfgang Zenker, Hermann Künne, Erich Koellner, and Erich Giese) carrying 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 139th Mountain Regiment, commanded by Colonel Windisch. The 1st Battalion was short one company, which was part of Group West. The landing force was also short about 200 men who had embarked on Erich Giese, which had still not arrived. Bonte released the 4th Destroyer Flotilla at 0410 hours and the three destroyers proceeded on a northeasterly course. The troops were landed at a wooden pier in Bjerkvik from the destroyers’ boats. The landing was unopposed and the troops advanced towards Elvegårdsmoen as soon as they came ashore.

When Major Spjeldnæs took his battalion to Narvik, he left a guard detail of 17 men from Co 3 at Elvegårdsmoen. In addition, there were about 150 non-combat personnel at the depot. It appears that Spjeldnæs failed to appoint a camp commander when he departed and the senior officer failed to assume command. Steen and Sandvik write that Spjeldnæs viewed the repositioning of the battalion as an administrative move and neglected to brief those left behind. The two authors claim that this behavior evidently stemmed from Colonel Sundlo not giving