Holocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews by Peter Longerich (booksvooks TXT) 📕

already intervened in the Foreign Ministry’s

preparations for the Madagascar Project via a letter to Ribbentrop. 94 The problem of the millions of Jews under German rule (to which Heydrich

assigned the figure 3¼ million) could no longer be solved by emigration:

‘therefore a territorial final solution is necessary’. Heydrich asked ‘to take

part . . . in the discussions that are envisaged on the final solution to the Jewish

question’.

A few days later, on 3 July, Rademacher presented a draft for the Madagascar

project. 95 His deft formula, ‘all Jews out of Europe’, showed unambiguously what kind of territorial solution was being sought at this point. He imagined that France

would ‘place Madagascar at [Germany’s] disposal for the solution of the Jewish

question’, as a mandate: ‘the part of the island that has no military importance

would be placed under the administration of a German police governor who

would report to the office of the Reichsführer SS. The Jews will be able to run their

own administration in this territory . . . ’ Rademacher’s goal was to ensure that the

Jews remained ‘a bargaining counter in German hands to guarantee the future

good behaviour of their racial associates in America’; the Madagascar Project,

then, was to function as a form of ‘hostage taking’, as the ‘Jewish reservation’ in

Poland had been intended to.

Another document by Rademacher, dated 2 July (‘Plan for a Solution to the

Jewish Question’96) contains further information about his intentions. ‘From a German perspective, the Madagascar solution means the creation of a huge

ghetto. Only the security police have the necessary experience in this field; they

have the means to prevent a break-out from the island. In addition, they have

experience of carrying out in an appropriate manner such punishment measures

as become necessary as a result of hostile actions against Germany by Jews in

the USA.’

Whilst Rademacher was obtaining expert opinion on the feasibility of his

project, 97 and whilst the Reich Office for Area Planning (Reichsstelle für Raumordnung) was confirming to Goering (who was thereby also involved in

the ‘planning for the final solution’) the existence of sufficient ‘settlement possi-

bilities’ on the island, 98 the Reich Security Head Office was putting together its own version of the Madagascar Plan, which was ready in booklet form by 15

August. 99 It contained the suggestion that a ‘police state’ be set up for the four million Jews who would be on the island at that point under German rule. The

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The Persecution of the Jews, 1939–1941

RSHA estimated that a period of four years would be necessary to transport these

people to Madagascar by ship.

In a later note, dated 30 August, Rademacher explicitly supported a sugges-

tion that had in the meantime been made by Victor Brack, 100 who was based in the Chancellery of the Führer of the NSDAP and responsible for overseeing the

‘euthanasia’ programme. Brack proposed ‘using the wartime transport systems

that he had developed for the Führer for the transport of Jews to Madagascar at

a later date’. The mention of Brack and the fact that another key figure

responsible for the ‘euthanasia programme’, the Director of the Chancellery of

the Führer, Philipp Bouhler, was being considered for the role of Governor in

Madagascar, taken together cast the Madagascar Project in a very dark light

indeed. Furthermore, Rademacher’s document shows that the estimate of the

number of Jews that were to be settled on Madagascar had by then reached 6½

million, which suggests that the Jews from the south-east European states

and the northern French colonies were now being included in the plans for

deportation.

Fantastic though the Madagascar Plan now seems, it cannot simply be

dismissed as merely distraction tactics for a Judenpolitik that had reached a

dead-end. 101 It is precisely the lack of feasibility in this plan that points up the cynical, calculating nature of German Judenpolitik: the idea that millions of

European Jews would be deported to Madagascar for years and years, and the

fact that—without even considering the ‘punishment measures’ that Radema-

cher envisaged—a large proportion of the transported Jews would presumably

die there relatively quickly as victims of the hostile living conditions they would

meet, all this makes it perfectly clear that behind this project lay the intention of

bringing about the physical annihilation of the Jews under German rule. How-

ever, this was an intention that appropriate ‘good behaviour’ on the part of

the United States might cause to be revised. From the point of view of the RSHA

the Madagascar Project was a means of perpetuating the plans for a ‘Jewish

reservation’ in the General Government that were at that time unrealizable,

and of extending them to the Jews of Western Europe. When the Madagascar

Plan had to be suspended in the autumn of 1940 because of the failure to make

peace with Great Britain the preparations for Barbarossa immediately opened

up a new perspective for a ‘territorial solution’ of the ‘Jewish question’. For a

period of a few months, then, ‘Madagascar’ stood for ‘anywhere’ that might

permit the execution of a ‘final solution’, or in other words for the option of

initiating a slow and painful end for the Jews of Europe in conditions inimical

to life.

Inspired by the intention to annihilate the Jews under German rule, Hitler was

to keep coming back to the Madagascar Project time and again until 1942, by

which time the idea of ‘anywhere’ had been replaced by that of ‘nowhere’. 102 In the Foreign Ministry the plan was officially shelved in February 1942. 103

Deportations

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Judenpolitik between the Madagascar

Plan and ‘Barbarossa’

The German Regime and the Polish Jews

The progress of the war and the overall plans of the National Socialist regime for

the fate of the Jews under German rule had direct consequences for Judenpolitik in

the General Government.

The halt put to deportations of Jews into the General Government in March

1940 was initially seen as a provisional measure. 104 However, in the summer of 1940, after the victory in France, the aim of establishing a ‘Jewish reservation’ in

Poland was definitively abandoned. On 8 July, Frank informed his colleagues a few

days later, 105 Hitler had assured him that no further deportations into the General Government would take place, in view of the Madagascar Project. On 9 July

Himmler made the definitive end to deportations into Frank’s area known

internally. 106

Besides putting an end to the deportations,