Washington's Engineer by Norman Desmarais (speed reading book TXT) 📕

generals. He emphasized the need for men and supplies of all kinds to prosecute the war. This would cost France many millions but would be greatly repaid by the destruction of Britain’s naval domination. Without any colonies, she would soon have no navy, and American commerce would be conducted with France, which would then have no rival.

He mused that France might sign a treaty with the United States and send 12,000 or 15,000 men to her aid, but he concluded that this would be the best way to ruin everything. He noted that even though America was at war with Britain, the Americans hated the French more than the British and that despite everything that France did and would do for them, they would prefer to reconcile with their former brothers than to find themselves among crowds of people they fear more.12

Congress responded immediately on November 17, by appointing Duportail to the rank of brigadier general; Laumoy and Radière, to that of colonel; and Gouvion, to that of lieutenant colonel. This was the turning point in their fortunes. They now had a rank that commanded respect and were soon indispensable to the commander in chief. They then took a leading part in every phase of the war and continued to be indispensable to the Continental Army for the duration of the war.13

2

VALLEY FORGE

General Duportail joined the Continental Army at Whitemarsh after its defeat at Germantown and attended his first council of war on November 24, 1777. The terrible winter of 1777–1778 was approaching, and the future of the United States seemed precarious. The army already lacked clothing, food, hospital accommodations, and transportation facilities. Military victories seemed more like defeats, contributing to poor morale. The commander in chief reported the state of affairs to the assembled generals (Armstrong, de Kalb, Duportail, Gates, Greene, Knox, Lafayette, Lee, Mifflin, Scott, Stirling, von Steuben, Wayne, and Woodford) and asked them to consider the question “What measures had best be pursued in the present emergency?” He asked them to put their responses in writing and to give their opinion regarding the “expediency of an attack upon Philadelphia.” Eleven of the generals were against making the attack, and only four (Scott, Stirling, Wayne, and Woodford) were in favor.1

Duportail’s memorial shows his skill of analysis and synthesis on this matter, a quality that stands out more clearly when his memorial is compared with those of the other council members. Washington was impressed. It was not simply that Duportail was a trained officer, as there were several other important European officers at the council, including de Kalb; Lafayette; and, later, von Steuben. But Washington wrote only of Duportail when he recorded, “I have a high opinion of his merit and abilities, and esteem him not only well acquainted with the particular branch he professes, but a man of sound judgment and real knowledge in military science in general.”2 This statement was not to disparage his other officers’ qualities, which he also valued, but Duportail stood out among them.

Duportail’s first memorial analyzes all aspects of the problem: the terrain, the report and preparation of the troops, the enemy, the motivation and level of training of the combatants, the weather conditions, and possible operations, among other things. He deemed that an attack would result in certain defeat and risk the reversal of any preceding gains. This first memorial (to be followed by many others of similar quality) is as follows:

Louis le Bègue de Presle, Duportail (1743–1802), by Charles Willson Peale, probably from life, c. 1781–1784. Duportail is wearing the uniform of a major general in the Continental Army. The ribbon attached at the second button on the coat facing bears the Croix de St. Louis (a reward for exceptional officers with at least ten years of service, notable as the first decoration that could be granted to non-nobles). Courtesy of Independence National Historical Park.

To attack the Enemy in their Lines appears to me a difficult and dangerous Project. It has especially this very considerable Inconvenience, the exposing our Army in case it does not succeed, to a total Defeat. This is easily demonstrated—one of the principal means proposed, is to throw two thousand men in the rear of the Enemy—if we do not succeed, these are so many men absolutely lost—as to the main body of the Army which is to attack in front, it must pass through the intervals left in the Abattis and Redoubts, which they say, form very narrow Passages—if after penetrating we should be repulsed, can Troops in disorder return easily by the Passages through which they were introduced?—Will it not be very easy for the English to cut off their Retreat—Our whole Army then may be destroyed or made prisoners—Now does it become this Army which is the principal one, to run such Risques—does it become it to stake the fate of America upon a single Action? I think not—for my part I never would place this Army in a Situation where its Rear was not perfectly free—much less where it will be inclosed on all sides without means of Retreat—to justify such an Enterprise the Success must be almost certain—to judge of this we have only to take a view of the dispositions which must be made for this attack—This view will render the Difficulties evident—first two thousand men are to be introduced by a River of which the Enemy are wholly Masters—if we embark them near the Enemy the noise may alarm them—if at a distance, the cold which they will undergo, will render the use of their arms exceedingly difficult in the morning—besides can we flatter ourselves that the River Side is unguarded—let us reflect that a single man is sufficient to make this Project miscarry and cause us the loss of two thousand men.

As to the Attack in front—these are nearly the Dispositions which would be followed—We should march upon so many Columns as there are Roads leading to the Enemy—Upon our arrival