The Main Enemy by Milton Bearden (epub e reader txt) 📕

have solved the problem of creating an Afghan government that can function without the support of our troops. There is dispute as to who must accomplish the sealing of the borders—the Army or state security organs. I support the proposition of Viktor Mikhailovich [Chebrikov] on the importance of meeting with Najib.”

“We can give these instructions to Comrade Kryuchkov, who is now in Kabul,” Gorbachev interjected.

“Both Comrade Kryuchkov and Comrade [Yuli] Vorontsov [a senior Foreign Ministry official] are good people,” Shevardnadze said, “but their discussions with Najib cannot replace a meeting between Najib and the General Secretary.”

“The concept of settlement exists,” Gorbachev interjected. “We have established that—but the practicalities remain unresolved.” Turning to Deputy Defense Minister Sergei Akhromeyev, he then said, “Sergei Fedorovich, perhaps you will solve it?”

Akhromeyev seemed to sense this was too big a burden for him to take on. “No,” he said flatly, “it will not be possible to solve it.”

Anatoly Dobrynin, head of the International Department of the Communist Party’s Secretariat, and before that the USSR’s ambassador to Washington through every U.S. administration from Kennedy to Reagan, stepped into the discussion. “I come out in favor of receiving Najib in Moscow. Right now a message could be sent to Comrade Kryuchkov about the meeting with Najib.”

“Military actions in Afghanistan will soon be seven years old,” Akhromeyev interjected. “There is no single piece of land in this country that has not been occupied by a Soviet soldier. Nevertheless, the majority of the territory remains in the hands of rebels. The government of Afghanistan has at its disposal a significant military force: 160,000 men in the Army, 115,000 in Sarandoy militia, and 20,000 in state security organs. There is no single military problem that has arisen and that has not been solved, and yet there are still no results. The whole problem lies in the fact that military results are not followed up by political actions. At the center there is authority; in the provinces there is not. We control Kabul and the provincial centers, but on occupied territory we cannot establish authority. We have lost the battle for the Afghan people—the government is supported by a minority of the population. Our Army has fought for five years and is in a position to maintain the situation at its present level. But under such conditions the war will continue for a long time. Fifty thousand Soviet soldiers are stationed to seal off the border, but they are not in a position to close off all passages where cargo is transferred across the border. We have the capacity to maintain the situation at its current level, as I said, but we need to look for a way out and to resolve this question, as Andrei Andreyevich [Gromyko] has said, once and for all. We must go to Pakistan.”

“Why do you hinder Najib?” Gorbachev asked his deputy defense minister.

Akhromeyev seemed defensive. “He should not be building headquarters, but a state committee on defense. We allow him to make cadre changes.”

Veteran diplomat Yuli Vorontsov, the man tasked with translating the musings of the Politburo into negotiating positions with the Americans and Pakistanis, politely interjected at this point. “A few words, if I may, to continue the thought just expressed by Comrade Deputy Defense Minister. Afghanistan is a peasant country. But it is the peasants who have least benefited from the revolution. There are only five million out of a population of eighteen million under the control of the government. To the question of how this can be explained, I have been told that the regions under the control of the counterrevolution are better supplied with essential goods shipped there as contraband from Pakistan. Urgent measures are needed to improve the situation of peasants in the government zone. Many members of PDPA leadership are without initiative and have gotten used to waiting for recommendations from our advisers. Such is not the case with Comrade Najib. He creates the impression of a talented and decisive person. He must be given the opportunity to make decisions himself, without allowing himself to become distracted by secondary details. And he must have the opportunity to create his own team himself.”

Gorbachev waited for Vorontsov to conclude his remarks, and then he spoke again. “In October of last year in a Politburo meeting we set a course of resolving the Afghan question,” he said. “The goal we raised was to expedite the withdrawal of our forces from Afghanistan and simultaneously to ensure the emergence of a friendly Afghanistan for us. It was projected that this should be realized through a combination of military and political measures. But there is no movement in either of these directions. The strengthening of the military position of the Afghan government has not taken place. National consolidation has not been ensured, mainly because Comrade Karmal hoped to continue in power in Kabul with our assistance. It was also said that we fettered the actions of the Afghan government. All in all, up until now the projected concept has been poorly realized. The problem is not in the concept itself, but in its realization. We must operate more actively, and with this guide ourselves with two questions. First of all, in the course of two years, we must effect the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan. Fifty percent by 1987, and in the following year another fifty percent. Second of all, we must pursue a widening of the social base of the regime, taking into account the arrangement of political forces. In connection with this, we should meet with Comrade Najib and possibly even with other members of the Central Committee of PDPA Politburo. We must start talks with Pakistan. Most important, we must make sure that the Americans don’t get into Afghanistan. But I think that Americans will not go into Afghanistan militarily.”

Akhromeyev agreed. “They are not going to go into Afghanistan with the armed forces,” he said.

Dobrynin added his assent. “One can reach an agreement with the Americans on this question.”

“We must give