Washington's Engineer by Norman Desmarais (speed reading book TXT) 📕

Walker, Engineers of Independence: A Documentary History of the Army Engineers in the American Revolution, 1775–1783 (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Office of Administrative Services, Office of the Chief of Engineers, 1981), 328.

14. Memoir on Fortifications

Should the United States of America have, within its borders, fortified ports which would require a regular siege either by land or by sea to capture? If they should have them, how many and what principles should be followed in establishing all the other fortifications of this country according to its present state, the nature of its forces and those of America? Eighteen months ago, an officer, my compatriot, proposed, in a memoir, that the United States should not have fortified places, that they should only use field fortifications as necessary. It then appeared to me that many people in the administration had adopted this idea.

Regardless of the situation in which this officer found himself, it was easy to discover his motives in proposing such a system. We have to admit that there is something which could create an illusion in supporting his reasoning. He alleged that if the United States had fortifications and the enemy seized them, they could occupy them with few forces and it would become more difficult to expel them than from places that are totally exposed.

We certainly cannot disagree with that, but, for the same reason, we cannot deny that it would also be more difficult for the enemy to first route the Americans from these fortifications to occupy them. The question seems to basically come down to this: is it better to keep one’s house well locked? It is not better to leave the doors open to be able to more easily chase thieves who might take possession of it.

If this were the case, fortifications would not be necessary anywhere, no more in Europe than in America. The particular circumstances in which America finds itself require more fortification according to the same rationale of the memoir’s author.

He says that the fortifications would require garrisons drawn from the regular army or from the militia which are already inadequate for the many sites where we should be prepared to face an enemy who can move rapidly from one end of the continent to the other by means of their vessels. But it is precisely for this reason that it would be good to fortify the most important locations on the coast so that we might resist an enemy with few men and give the troops time to muster to come to their aid before they are destroyed.

But let’s look at the reasoning of those who don’t want the United States to have fortifications to see if they hold any validity. Behold. It’s as if the United States built more fortifications, forts which the present state of their population, the number of their troops, their arsenals of all types could not furnish or supply, in a word, which they cannot defend.

Certainly, the enemy could suddenly attack some of the fortifications which are insufficiently supplied, seize them and occupy them. But if the United States only have places and forts which they can easily supply and defend, they would certainly have the advantage. I’ll even say that they cannot do without them.

In fact, America’s grandeur is primarily based on trade, but trade requires vessels to go to foreign countries. It needs to receive foreign vessels in its ports. It needs to begin to establish a navy to protect its coasts and the merchant marine. It therefore needs shipyards, stores, all kinds of warehouses, everything, most of which needs to be collected in the same place for mutual aid.

But if these sites are exposed, the enemy could come destroy these works. That will make all the work and expenses useless. N.B. let’s remove all the difficulties. If the fortified ports of the United States could be impregnable, the warnings would be useless. Nobody would doubt that having them was a great advantage.

But, we might ask, can we have impregnable places? Can we make them? Undoubtedly, if absolutely necessary, there is no impregnable place. If we want to suppose that the attacking force were in condition and resolved to sacrifice the number of men, the quantity of munitions, money, etc. necessary to do so. But the means of all forces are limited. They can sacrifice 3, 4, 6, 10,000 men, if you want, and the time and everything necessary in proportion. But they would not sacrifice 15, 20, 25,000 men if this loss would not be rewarded by the taking of the city.

Therefore, if a place is fortified in such a way as to require a greater loss of men and other things than the attacking force is willing to make, it is clear that the place is impregnable for them. It is in this sense that the United States can have them and even have only them. This is how.

In Europe, we estimate that it requires an army of eight or nine times stronger than the garrison to besiege an ordinary place, that is fortified according to the common principles of the art and which does have any particular advantage of location,

Thus, a garrison built for 4000 men at a mediocre site can only be besieged by an army of more than 30,000 men. But what European power could send an army of 30,000 men to a single location in America? Certainly not the British.

But that is not all. I was speaking about a location such as our fortified cities of Europe, most of which were not originally destined to be fortifications, which are not in favorable locations or whose sites haven’t been optimized. Their initial fortifications were constructed in the infancy of the art and then improved according to circumstances, sometimes according to certain principles sometimes others.

But here, where there is nothing constructed or on a hill 10 or 11 miles long, we can select the most advantageous sites. I am convinced that we could have some places which, with very few supplies,