Moral Science by Alexander Bain (self help books to read .TXT) 📕

under the influence of the feelings; whence we have the class of Impassioned, Exaggerated, Irrational Motives or Ends. Of these influences, one deserves to be signalized as a source of virtuous conduct, and as approved of by mankind generally; that is, Sympathy with others.

Under the Fixed Idea, may be ranked the acquired sense of Dignity, which induces us often to forfeit pleasure and incur pain. We should not choose the life of Plato's beatified oyster, or (to use Aristotle's example) be content with perpetual childhood, with however great a share of childish happiness.

10. The Ethical end that men are tending to, and may ultimately adopt without reservation, is human Welfare, Happiness, or Being and Well-being combined, that is, Utility.

The evidence consists of such facts as these:--

(1) By far the greater part of the morality of every age and country has reference to the welfare of society. Even in the most superstitious, sentimental, and capricious despotisms, a very large share of the enactments, political and moral, consist in protecting one man from another, and in securing justice between man and man. These objects may be badly carried out, they may be accompanied with much oppression of the governed by the governing body, but they are always aimed at, and occasionally secured. Of the Ten Commandments, four pertain to Religious Worship; _six_ are Utilitarian, that is, have no end except to ward off evils, and to further the good of mankind.

(2) The general welfare is at all times considered a strong and adequate justification of moral rules, and is constantly adduced as a motive for obedience. The commonplaces in support of law and morality represent, that if murder and theft were to go unpunished, neither life nor property would be safe; men would be in eternal warfare; industry would perish; society must soon come to an end.

There is a strong disposition to support the more purely sentimental requirements, and even the excesses of mere tyranny, by utilitarian reasons.

The cumbersome ablutions of oriental nations are defended on the ground of cleanliness. The divine sanctity of kings is held to be an aid to social obedience. Slavery is alleged to have been at one time necessary to break in mankind to industry. Indissoluble marriage arose from a sentiment rather than from utility; but the arguments, commonly urged in its favour, are utilitarian.

(3) In new cases, and in cases where no sentiment or passion is called into play, Utility alone is appealed to. In any fresh enactment, at the present day, the good of the community is the only justification that would be listened to. If it were proposed to forbid absolutely the eating of pork in Christian countries, some great public evils would have to be assigned as the motive. Were the fatalities attending the eating of pork, on account of _trichiniae_, to become numerous, and unpreventible, there would then be a reason, such as a modern civilized community would consider sufficient, for making the rearing of swine a crime and an immorality. But no mere sentimental or capricious dislike to the pig, on the part of any number of persons, could now procure an enactment for disusing that animal.

(4) There is a gradual tendency to withdraw from the moral code, observances originating purely in sentiment, and having little or no connexion with human welfare.

We have abandoned the divine sacredness of kings. We no longer consider ourselves morally bound to denounce and extirpate heretics and witches, still less to observe fasts and sacred days. Even in regard to the Christian Sabbath, the opinion is growing in favour of withdrawing both the legal and popular sanction formerly so stringent; while the arguments for Sabbath observance are more and more charged with considerations of secular utility.

Should these considerations be held as adequate to support the proposition advanced, they are decisive in favour of Utility as the Moral Standard that _ought to be_. Any other standard that may be set up in competition with Utility, must ultimately ground itself on the very same appeal to the opinions and the practice of mankind.

11. The chief objections urged against Utility as the moral Standard have been in great part anticipated. Still, it is proper to advert to them in detail.

I.--It is maintained that Happiness is not, either in fact or in right, the sole aim of human pursuit; that men actually, deliberately, and by conscientious preference, seek other ends. For example, it is affirmed that Virtue is an end in itself, without regard to happiness.

On this argument it may be observed:--

(1) It has been abundantly shown in this work, that one part of the foregoing affirmation is strictly true. Men are not urged to action exclusively by their pleasures and their pains. They are urged by other motives, of the impassioned kind; among which, is to be signalized sympathy with the pains and pleasures of others. If this had been the only instance of action at variance with the regular course of the will, we should be able to maintain that the motive to act is still happiness, but not always the agent's own happiness. We have seen, however, that individuals, not unfrequently, act in opposition both to their own, and to other people's happiness; as when mastered by a panic, and when worked up into a frenzy of anger or antipathy.

The sound and tenable position seems to be this:--Human beings, in their best and soberest moods, looking before and after, weighing all the consequences of actions, are generally disposed to regard Happiness, to some beings or others, as the proper end of all endeavours. The mother is not exclusively bent on her own happiness; she is upon her child's. Howard abandoned the common pleasures of life for himself, to diminish the misery of fellow creatures.

(2) It is true that human beings are apt to regard Virtue as an end-in-itself, and not merely as a means to happiness as the final end. But the fact is fully accounted for on the general law of Association by Contiguity; there being many other examples of the same kind, as the love of money. Justice, Veracity, and other virtues, are requisite, to some extent, for the existence of society, and, to a still greater extent, for prosperous existence. Under such circumstances, it would certainly happen that the means would participate in the importance of the end, and would even be regarded as an end in itself.

(3) The great leading duties may be shown to derive their estimation from their bearing upon human welfare. Take first, Veracity or Truth. Of all the moral duties, this has most the appearance of being an absolute and independent requirement. Yet mankind have always approved of deception practised upon an enemy in war, a madman, or a highway robber. Also, secrecy or concealment, even although misinterpreted, is allowed, when it does not cause pernicious results; and is even enjoined and required in the intercourse of society, in order to prevent serious evils. But an absolute standard of truth is incompatible, even with secrecy or disguise; in departing from the course of perfect openness, or absolute publicity of thought and action, in every possible circumstance, we renounce ideal truth in favour of a compromised or qualified veracity--a pursuit of truth in subordination to the general well-being of society.

Still less is there any form of Justice that does not have respect to Utility. If Justice is defined as giving to every one their own, the motive clearly is to prevent misery to individuals. If there were a species of injustice that made no one unhappier, we may be quite sure that tribunals would not be set up for enforcing and punishing it. The idea of equality in Justice is seemingly an absolute conception, but, in point of fact, equality is a matter of institution. The children of the same parent are, in certain circumstances, regarded as unequal by the law; and justice consists in respecting this inequality.

The virtue of Self-denial, is one that receives the commendation of society, and stands high in the morality of reward. Still, it is a means to an end. The operation of the associating principle tends to raise it above this point to the rank of a final end. And there is an ascetic scheme of life that proceeds upon this supposition; but the generality of mankind, in practice, if not always in theory, disavow it.

(4) It is often affirmed by those that regard virtue, and not happiness, as the end, that the two coincide in the long run. Now, not to dwell upon the very serious doubts as to the matter of fact, a universal coincidence without causal connexion is so rare as to be in the last degree improbable. A fiction of this sort was contrived by Leibnitz, under the title of 'pre-established harmony;' but, among the facts of the universe, there are only one or two cases known to investigation.

12. II.--It is objected to Utility as the Standard, that the bearings of conduct on general happiness are too numerous to be calculated; and that even where the calculation is possible, people have seldom time to make it.

(1) It is answered, that the primary moral duties refer to conduct where the consequences are evident and sure. The disregard of Justice and Truth would to an absolute certainty bring about a state of confusion and ruin; their observance, in any high degree, contributes to raise the standard of well-being.

In other cases, the calculation is not easy, from the number of opposing considerations. For example, there are two sides to the question, Is dissent morally wrong? in other words, Ought all opinions to be tolerated? But if we venture to decide such a question, without the balancing or calculating process, we must follow blindfold the dictates of one or other of the two opposing sentiments,--Love of Power and Love of Liberty.

It is not necessary that we should go through the process of calculation every time we have occasion to perform a moral act. The calculations have already been performed for all the leading duties, and we have only to apply the maxims to the cases as they arise.

13. III.--The principle of Utility, it is said, contains no motives to seek the Happiness of others; it is essentially a form of Self-Love.

The averment is that Utility is a sufficient motive to pursue our own happiness, and the happiness of others as a means to our own; but it does not afford any purely disinterested impulses; it is a Selfish theory after all.

Now, as Utility is, by profession, a benevolent and not a selfish theory, either such profession is insincere, or there must be an obstruction in carrying it out. That the supporters of the theory are insincere, no one has a right to affirm. The only question then is, what are the difficulties opposed by this theory, and not present in other theories (the Moral Sense, for example) to benevolent impulses on the part of individuals?

Let us view the objection first as regards the Morality of Obligation, or the duties that bind society together. Of these duties, only a small number aim at positive beneficence; they are either Protective of one man against another, or they enforce Reciprocity, which is another name for Justice. The chief exception is the requiring of a minimum of charity towards the needy.

This department of duty is maintained by the force of a certain mixture of prudential and of beneficent considerations, on the part of the majority, and by prudence (as fear of punishment) on the part of the minority. But there does not appear to be anything in our professedly Benevolent Theory of Morals to interfere with the small