Summa Theologica by Saint Thomas Aquinas (whitelam books .TXT) 📕

Reply Obj. 4: This enumeration contains some belonging to true justice. To particular justice belongs justice of exchange, which he describes as "the habit of observing equality in commutations." To legal justice, as regards things to be observed by all, he ascribes legislative justice, which he describes as "the science of political commutations relating to the community." As regards things which have to be done in particular cases beside the general laws, he mentions common sense or good judgment,* which is our guide in such like matters, as stated above (Q. 51, A. 4) in the treatise on prudence: wherefore he says that it is a "voluntary justification," because by his own free will man observes what is just according to his judgment and not according to the written law. [*St. Thomas indicates the Greek derivation: eugnomosyne quasi 'bona gnome.'] These two are ascribed to prudence as their director, and to justice as their executor. Eusebeia (piety) means good worship and consequently is the same as religion, wherefore he says that it is the science of "the service of God" (he speaks after the manner of Socrates who said that 'all the virtues are sciences') [*Aristotle, Ethic. vi, 13]: and holiness comes to the same, as we shall state further on (Q. 81, A. 8). Eucharistia (gratitude) means "good thanksgiving," and is mentioned by Macrobius: wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x) that "a kind man is one who is ready of his own accord to do good, and is of gentle speech": and Andronicus too says that "kindliness is a habit of voluntary beneficence." Liberality would seem to pertain to humanity.

Reply Obj. 5: Epieikeia is annexed, not to particular but to legal justice, and apparently is the same as that which goes by the name of eugnomosyne (common sense). _______________________

OF RELIGION
(In Eight Articles)

We must now consider each of the foregoing virtues, in so far as our present scope demands. We shall consider (1) religion, (2) piety, (3) observance, (4) gratitude, (5) revenge, (6) truth, (7) friendship, (8) liberality, (9) epieikeia. Of the other virtues that have been mentioned we have spoken partly in the treatise on charity, viz. of concord and the like, and partly in this treatise on justice, for instance, of right commutations and of innocence. Of legislative justice we spoke in the treatise on prudence.

Religion offers a threefold consideration: (1) Religion considered in itself; (2) its acts; (3) the opposite vices.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether religion regards only our relation to God?

(2) Whether religion is a virtue?

(3) Whether religion is one virtue?

(4) Whether religion is a special virtue?

(5) Whether religion is a theological virtue?

(6) Whether religion should be preferred to the other moral virtues?

(7) Whether religion has any external actions?

(8) Whether religion is the same as holiness? _______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 1]

Whether Religion Directs Man to God Alone?

Objection 1: It would seem that religion does not direct man to God alone. It is written (James 1:27): "Religion clean and undefiled before God and the Father is this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation, and to keep oneself unspotted from this world." Now "to visit the fatherless and widows" indicates an order between oneself and one's neighbor, and "to keep oneself unspotted from this world" belongs to the order of a man within himself. Therefore religion does not imply order to God alone.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 1) that "since in speaking Latin not only unlettered but even most cultured persons ere wont to speak of religion as being exhibited, to our human kindred and relations as also to those who are linked with us by any kind of tie, that term does not escape ambiguity when it is a question of Divine worship, so that we be able to say without hesitation that religion is nothing else but the worship of God." Therefore religion signifies a relation not only to God but also to our kindred.

Obj. 3: Further, seemingly latria pertains to religion. Now "latria signifies servitude," as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1). And we are bound to serve not only God, but also our neighbor, according to Gal. 5:13, "By charity of the spirit serve one another." Therefore religion includes a relation to one's neighbor also.

Obj. 4: Further, worship belongs to religion. Now man is said to worship not only God, but also his neighbor, according to the saying of Cato [*Dionysius Cato, Breves Sententiae], "Worship thy parents." Therefore religion directs us also to our neighbor, and not only to God.

Obj. 5: Further, all those who are in the state of grace are subject to God. Yet not all who are in a state of grace are called religious, but only those who bind themselves by certain vows and observances, and to obedience to certain men. Therefore religion seemingly does not denote a relation of subjection of man to God.

On the contrary, Tully says (Rhet. ii, 53) that "religion consists in offering service and ceremonial rites to a superior nature that men call divine."

I answer that, as Isidore says (Etym. x), "according to Cicero, a man is said to be religious from religio, because he often ponders over, and, as it were, reads again (relegit), the things which pertain to the worship of God," so that religion would seem to take its name from reading over those things which belong to Divine worship because we ought frequently to ponder over such things in our hearts, according to Prov. 3:6, "In all thy ways think on Him." According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 3) it may also take its name from the fact that "we ought to seek God again, whom we had lost by our neglect" [*St. Augustine plays on the words reeligere, i.e. to choose over again, and negligere, to neglect or despise.]. Or again, religion may be derived from religare (to bind together), wherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 55): "May religion bind us to the one Almighty God." However, whether religion take its name from frequent reading, or from a repeated choice of what has been lost through negligence, or from being a bond, it denotes properly a relation to God. For it is He to Whom we ought to be bound as to our unfailing principle; to Whom also our choice should be resolutely directed as to our last end; and Whom we lose when we neglect Him by sin, and should recover by believing in Him and confessing our faith.

Reply Obj. 1: Religion has two kinds of acts. Some are its proper and immediate acts, which it elicits, and by which man is directed to God alone, for instance, sacrifice, adoration and the like. But it has other acts, which it produces through the medium of the virtues which it commands, directing them to the honor of God, because the virtue which is concerned with the end, commands the virtues which are concerned with the means. Accordingly "to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation" is an act of religion as commanding, and an act of mercy as eliciting; and "to keep oneself unspotted from this world" is an act of religion as commanding, but of temperance or of some similar virtue as eliciting.

Reply Obj. 2: Religion is referred to those things one exhibits to one's human kindred, if we take the term religion in a broad sense, but not if we take it in its proper sense. Hence, shortly before the passage quoted, Augustine says: "In a stricter sense religion seems to denote, not any kind of worship, but the worship of God."

Reply Obj. 3: Since servant implies relation to a lord, wherever there is a special kind of lordship there must needs be a special kind of service. Now it is evident that lordship belongs to God in a special and singular way, because He made all things, and has supreme dominion over all. Consequently a special kind of service is due to Him, which is known as latria in Greek; and therefore it belongs to religion.

Reply Obj. 4: We are said to worship those whom we honor, and to cultivate [*In the Latin the same word colere stands for "worship" and "cultivate"] a man's memory or presence: we even speak of cultivating things that are beneath us, thus a farmer (agricola) is one who cultivates the land, and an inhabitant (incola) is one who cultivates the place where he dwells. Since, however, special honor is due to God as the first principle of all things, to Him also is due a special kind of worship, which in Greek is Eusebeia or Theosebeia, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1).

Reply Obj. 5: Although the name "religious" may be given to all in general who worship God, yet in a special way religious are those who consecrate their whole life to the Divine worship, by withdrawing from human affairs. Thus also the term "contemplative" is applied, not to those who contemplate, but to those who give up their whole lives to contemplation. Such men subject themselves to man, not for man's sake but for God's sake, according to the word of the Apostle (Gal. 4:14), "You . . . received me as an angel of God, even as Christ Jesus." _______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 2]

Whether Religion Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not a virtue. Seemingly it belongs to religion to pay reverence to God. But reverence is an act of fear which is a gift, as stated above (Q. 19, A. 9). Therefore religion is not a virtue but a gift.

Obj. 2: Further, every virtue is a free exercise of the will, wherefore it is described as an "elective" or voluntary "habit" [*Ethic. ii, 6]. Now, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3) latria belongs to religion, and latria denotes a kind of servitude. Therefore religion is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, according to Ethic. ii, 1, aptitude for virtue is in us by nature, wherefore things pertaining to virtue belong to the dictate of natural reason. Now, it belongs to religion "to offer ceremonial worship to the Godhead" [*Cf. A. 1], and ceremonial matters, as stated above (I-II, Q. 99, A. 3, ad 2; Q. 101), do not belong to the dictate of natural reason. Therefore religion is not a virtue.

On the contrary, It is enumerated with the other virtues, as appears from what has been said above (Q. 80).

I answer that, As stated above (Q. 58, A. 3; I-II, Q. 55, AA. 3, 4) "a virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his act good likewise," wherefore we must needs say that every good act belongs to a virtue. Now it is evident that to render anyone his due has the aspect of good, since by rendering a person his due, one becomes suitably proportioned to him, through being ordered to him in a becoming manner. But order comes under the aspect of good, just as mode and species, according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii). Since then it belongs to religion to pay due honor to someone, namely, to God, it is evident that religion is a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: To pay reverence to God is an act of the gift of fear. Now it belongs to religion to do certain things through reverence for God. Hence it follows, not that religion is the same as the gift of fear, but that it is referred thereto as to something more excellent; for the gifts are more excellent than the moral virtues, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 1, ad 3; I-II, Q. 68, A. 8).

Reply Obj. 2: Even a slave can voluntarily do his duty by his master, and so "he makes a virtue of necessity" [*Jerome, Ep. liv, ad Furiam.], by doing his duty voluntarily. In like manner, to render due service to God may be an act of virtue, in so far as man does so voluntarily.

Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to the dictate of natural reason that man should do something through reverence for God. But that he should do this or that determinate thing does not belong to the dictate of natural reason, but is established by Divine or human law. _______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 3]

Whether Religion Is One Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not one virtue. Religion directs us to God, as stated above (A. 1). Now in God there are three Persons; and also many attributes, which differ at least logically from one another. Now a logical difference in the object suffices