Meditations by Marcus Aurelius (good books to read .txt) 📕

and the same all through his life. But what I have said is not enough,

unless this also is added, what this object ought to be. For as there is

not the same opinion about all the things which in some way or other are

considered by the majority to be good, but only about some certain

things, that is, things which concern the common interest, so also ought

we to propose to ourselves an object which shall be of a common kind

[social] and political. For he who directs all his own efforts to this

object, will make all his acts alike, and thus will always be the same.

22. Think of the country mouse and of the town mouse, and of the alarm

and trepidation of the town mouse. [Footnote: 7]

23. Socrates used to call the opinions of the many by the name of

Lamiae,—bugbears to frighten children.

24. The Lacedaemonians at their public spectacles used to set seats in

the shade for strangers, but themselves sat down anywhere.

25. Socrates excused himself to Perdiccas for not going to him, saying,

It is because I would not perish by the worst of all ends; that is, I

would not receive a favor and then be unable to return it.

26. In the writings of the [Ephesians] there was this precept, constantly

to think of some one of the men of former times who practised virtue.

27. The Pythagoreans bid us in the morning look to the heavens that we

may be reminded of those bodies which continually do the same things and

in the same manner perform their work, and also be reminded of their

purity and nudity. For there is no veil over a star.

28. Consider what a man Socrates was when he dressed himself in a skin,

after Xanthippe had taken his cloak and gone out, and what Socrates said

to his friends who were ashamed of him and drew back from him when they

saw him dressed thus.

29. Neither in writing nor in reading wilt thou be able to lay down rules

for others before thou shalt have first learned to obey rules thyself.

Much more is this so in life.

30. A slave thou art: free speech is not for thee.

31. And my heart laughed within.

Odyssey, IX. 413.

32. And virtue they will curse, speaking harsh words.

HESIOD, Works and Days, 184.

33. To look for the fig in winter is a madman’s act: such is he who looks

for his child when it is no longer allowed (Epictetus, III. 24, 87).

34. When a man kisses his child, said Epictetus, he should whisper to

himself, “To-morrow perchance thou wilt die.”—But those are words of bad

omen.—“No word is a word of bad omen,” said Epictetus, “which expresses

any work of nature; or if it is so, it is also a word of bad omen to

speak of the ears of corn being reaped” (Epictetus, III. 24, 88).

35. The unripe grape, the ripe bunch, the dried grape all are changes,

not into nothing, but into something which exists not yet (Epictetus,

III. 24).

36. No man can rob us of our free will (Epictetus III. 22, 105).

37. Epictetus also said, a man must discover an art [or rules] with

respect to giving his assent; and in respect to his movements he must be

careful that they be made with regard to circumstances, that they be

consistent with social interests, that they have regard to the value of

the object; and as to sensual desire, he should altogether keep away from

it; and as to avoidance [aversion], he should not show it with respect to

any of the things which are not in our power.

38. The dispute then, he said, is not about any common matter, but about

being mad or not.

39. Socrates used to say, What do you want, souls of rational men or

irrational?—souls of rational men.—Of what rational men, sound or

unsound?—Sound.—Why then do you not seek for them?—Because we have

them.—Why then do you fight and quarrel?

BOOK XII.

1. All those things at which thou wishest to arrive by a circuitous road

thou canst have now, if thou dost not refuse them to thyself. And this

means, if thou wilt take no notice of all the past, and trust the future

to providence, and direct the present only conformably to piety and

justice. Conformably to piety, that thou mayest be content with the lot

which is assigned to thee, for nature designed it for thee and thee for

it. Conformably to justice, that thou mayest always speak the truth

freely and without disguise, and do the things which are agreeable to law

and according to the worth of each. And let neither another man’s

wickedness hinder thee, nor opinion nor voice, nor yet the sensations of

the poor flesh which has grown about thee; for the passive part will look

to this. If, then, whatever the time may be when thou shalt be near to

thy departure, neglecting everything else thou shalt respect only thy

ruling faculty and the divinity within thee, and if thou shalt be afraid

not because thou must some time cease to live, but if thou shalt fear

never to have begun to live according to nature,—then thou wilt be a man

worthy of the universe which hast produced thee, and thou wilt cease to

be a stranger in thy native land, and to wonder at things which happen

daily as if they were something unexpected, and not to be dependent on

this or that.

2. God sees the minds [ruling principles] of all men bared of the

material vesture and rind and impurities. For with his intellectual part

alone he touches the intelligence only which has flowed and been derived

from himself into these bodies. And if thou also usest thyself to do

this, thou wilt rid thyself of thy much trouble. For he who regards not

the poor flesh which envelops him, surely will not trouble himself by

looking after raiment and dwelling and fame and such like externals and

show.

3. The things are three of which thou art composed: a little body, a

little breath [life], intelligence. Of these the first two are thine, so

far as it is thy duty to take care of them; but the third alone is

properly thine. Therefore if thou shalt separate from thyself, that is,

from thy understanding, whatever others do or say, and whatever thou hast

done or said thyself, and whatever future things trouble thee because

they may happen, and whatever in the body which envelops thee or in the

breath [life], which is by nature associated with the body, is attached

to thee independent of thy will, and whatever the external circumfluent

vortex whirls round, so that the intellectual power exempt from the

things of fate can live pure and free by itself, doing what is just and

accepting what happens and saying the truth: if thou wilt separate, I

say, from this ruling faculty the things which are attached to it by the

impressions of sense, and the things of time to come and of time that is

past, and wilt make thyself like Empedocles’ sphere,

“All round and in its joyous rest reposing”;

and if thou shalt strive to live only what is really thy life, that is,

the present,—then thou wilt be able to pass that portion of life which

remains for thee up to the time of thy death free from perturbations,

nobly, and obedient to thy own daemon [to the god that is within thee]

(II. 13, 17; III. 5, 6; XI. 12).

4. I have often wondered how it is that every man loves himself more than

all the rest of men, but yet sets less value on his own opinion of

himself than on the opinion of others. If then a god or a wise teacher

should present himself to a man and bid him to think of nothing and to

design nothing which he would not express as soon as he conceived it, he

could not endure it even for a single day. So much more respect have we

to what our neighbors shall think of us than to what we shall think of

ourselves.

5. How can it be that the gods, after having arranged all things well and

benevolently for mankind, have overlooked this alone, that some men, and

very good men, and men who, as we may say, have had most communion with

the divinity, and through pious acts and religious observances have been

most intimate with the divinity, when they have once died should never

exist again, but should be completely extinguished?

But if this is so, be assured that if it ought to have been otherwise,

the gods would have done it. For if it were just, it would also be

possible; and if it were according to nature, nature would have had it

so. But because it is not so, if in fact it is not so, be thou convinced

that it ought not to have been so: for thou seest even of thyself that in

this inquiry thou art disputing with the Deity; and we should not thus

dispute with the gods, unless they were most excellent and most just; but

if this is so, they would not have allowed anything in the ordering of

the universe to be neglected unjustly and irrationally.

6. Practise thyself even in the things which thou despairest of

accomplishing. For even the left hand, which is ineffectual for all other

things for want of practice, holds the bridle more vigorously than the

right hand; for it has been practised in this.

7. Consider in what condition both in body and soul a man should be when

he is overtaken by death; and consider the shortness of life, the

boundless abyss of time past and future, the feebleness of all matter.

8. Contemplate the formative principles [forms] of things bare of their

coverings; the purposes of actions; consider what pain is, what pleasure

is, and death, and fame; who is to himself the cause of his uneasiness;

how no man is hindered by another; that everything is opinion.

9. In the application of thy principles thou must be like the

pancratiast, not like the gladiator; for the gladiator lets fall the

sword which he uses and is killed; but the other always has his hand, and

needs to do nothing else than use it.

10. See what things are in themselves, dividing them into matter, form,

and purpose.

11. What a power man has to do nothing except what God will approve, and

to accept all that God may give him.

12. With respect to that which happens conformably to nature, we ought to

blame neither gods, for they do nothing wrong either voluntarily or

involuntarily, nor men, for they do nothing wrong except involuntarily.

Consequently we should blame nobody (II. 11, 12, 13; VII. 62; VIII. 17,

18).

13. How ridiculous and what a stranger he is who is surprised at anything

which happens in life.

14. Either there is a fatal necessity and invincible order, or a kind

providence, or a confusion without a purpose and without a director (IV.

27). If then there is an invincible necessity, why dost thou resist? But

if there is a providence which allows itself to be propitiated, make

thyself worthy of the help of the divinity. But if there is a confusion

without a governor, be content that in such a tempest thou hast in

thyself a certain ruling intelligence.