Manual of Military Training by James A. Moss (best value ebook reader .TXT) 📕

We will suppose there is a gentle slope up to the next ridge or undulation of the ground, and that there are no obstructions to the view except those afforded by the ground itself. The platoon now advances, the captain remaining with the rest of the company, pointing out mistakes as well as good points, and asking the men questions, such as:

Captain: Corporal Smith, should the whole platoon have gone forward together, or would it have been better to advance by squads?

Corporal Smith: I think it should have advanced by squads.

Captain: No, it was all right to advance as they did. At this distance the enemy's infantry fire would not be very deadly, the platoon is well extended as skirmishers, it would take considerably longer to go forward to the next position by successive squads and we want to advance at this stage as rapidly as possible; for, the longer we took, the longer would the men be exposed to fire, and consequently the greater would be the number of casualties.

Captain: Sergeant Jones, why did the platoon advance at a run when moving down the slope, and begin to walk just before reaching the foot of the slope?

Sergeant Jones: Because the slope is exposed and it was necessary to get over it as quickly as possible. They began to walk just before reaching the foot of the slope, because they struck dead ground and were covered from the enemy's fire by the ridge in front.

Captain: Corporal Adams, shouldn't the platoon have halted when it reached cover, so as to give the men a rest?

Corporal Adams: No, sir; the men had not run very far and walking gave them sufficient rest. It would have been an unnecessary loss of time to halt.

Captain: Harris, why did that man run on ahead as soon as the platoon halted?

Pvt. Harris: So he could creep up the crest of the ridge and lie down in exactly the spot that is the best fire-position—that is, where he can just see to fire over the crest and where the enemy can not see him.

Captain: Yes, that's right. All the men in the platoon might not stop at the best fire-position and in the hurry and excitement of the moment the platoon commander might also fail to do so, but if a man goes forward and lies down, the whole platoon knows that they must not go beyond him. Individual men who, owing to slight undulations of ground, may not be able to fire when they halt in line with this man, can creep up until they can see. Others who, for the same reason as regards the ground, find that if they get up on a line with the man they will be unduly exposed, will halt before that time.

Captain: Sergeant Roberts, is it necessary for another platoon to provide covering fire during the advance of the platoon?

Sergeant Roberts: No sir. At this range the enemy's infantry fire would not be very effective, and it is important to husband our ammunition for the later stages of the attack.

Having asked any other questions suggested by the situation or the ground, the captain will then take the rest of the company forward over the ground covered by the platoon, halting at the place where the platoon changed its pace from a rush to a walk, so that the men can see for themselves that cover from fire has been reached. He will then move the rest of the company forward and tell them to halt and lie down in what each man considers to be the best fire-position, not necessarily adopting the same position as that chosen by the leading platoon. The platoon commanders will then go along their platoons and point out any mistakes.

The leading platoon will now join the company and another platoon will be deployed in the fire position, the platoon commander being directed to advance to the next fire-position.

As we are now about 1,000 yards from the enemy's position the question will again arise as to whether covering fire is necessary.

If the enemy's rifle fire were heavy and accurate it might be necessary, but it should be avoided if possible, on account of the expenditure of ammunition.

We will suppose that the ground falls gently towards the enemy and is very exposed to view for about 300 yards, and half this distance away there is a low bank running parallel to the front of the attack and with a small clump of three or four trees on the bank directly in front of the platoon. Four hundred yards away is the bottom of the valley covered with bushes and shrubs. On the far side the ground rises with small undulations and low foot hills to the high ground occupied by the enemy.

There appears to be no marked fire-position which will afford any cover except the bank 150 yards away. The second platoon advances in the same manner as did the first and the captain with the commanders of the remaining platoons will continue to ask questions and point out what has been done right or wrong by the leading platoon. The first question which will arise is whether the platoon can reach the fire position offered by the bank in one rush, and secondly, whether the bank is a good fire-position. A former question will again crop up as to whether the whole platoon should go forward at once or whether the advance should be made by squads.

A hundred and fifty yards is a long way to advance without a halt, and if a halt is made on such exposed ground fire must be opened. Probably three advances, each of about fifty yards, would be made, covering fire being provided by the other platoons, which will be occupying the fire-position which the leading platoon has just left. This covering fire would not endanger the leading platoon as it would be delivered from just behind the crest and the leading platoon would be over the crest and out of sight and therefore out of fire from the platoon in rear.

The selection of a fire-position during this advance would depend upon very minute folds of the ground, or very low bushes, grass, etc., which might give a certain amount of cover from view, and therefore make it difficult for the enemy to aim or range accurately. We will suppose that the leading platoon has halted to fire about fifty yards in front, the remaining platoons, in turn, should then be taken forward, examining the ground very carefully as they go, and each platoon commander asked to halt his platoon in what he considers to be the best place.

The possibility of using a scout to select a fire-position would be considered, and a fire-position selected by one platoon would be compared with that selected by another.

The third platoon would then lead during the advance to the next fire-position, and so on with the fourth platoon, if necessary, until the bank was reached. The bank will afford a good deal of material for discussion. Is it a good fire-position or is it not, should it be occupied as such or should it be avoided altogether?

If we ask an artillery officer his opinion about the matter, he will tell us that by means of the clump of trees the defenders' artillery will be able to range with absolute accuracy on that bank. The direction of the bank is parallel to their front, and therefore they can fire at any part of it for some distance right and left of the clump without materially altering their range, and if any infantry occupy the bank they can bring a very deadly fire to bear against them.

There appears to be no doubt, from an artillery point of view, that our platoon should avoid occupying it and get out of its neighborhood as rapidly as possible.

There is another drawback as regards the bank: it is some 850 yards from the enemy's position and may be expected to be under an effective rifle fire. It is no doubt a good mark for the enemy, and, now we come to the crux of the whole matter; his artillery and infantry fire might not do us much damage so long as we remain behind the bank, but they might make it very unpleasant for us directly we try to leave this cover and advance further.

Before finally deciding what to do we must consider human nature, which is entirely in favor of halting behind the bank, and if allowed to remain there long, will be opposed to leaving it. We cannot hope to gain superiority of fire over the enemy at a range of 850 yards, so that a long halt at the bank is out of the question. But it appears to be an extraordinary thing, when we are searching everywhere for cover, that we should be doubtful about occupying such good cover when we find it.

If we decide not to occupy it, the logical conclusion is that, when preparing a position for defense, we should construct a good fire-position for the attack some 850 yards away, which is the last thing we should think of doing.

There is no doubt about it, that with badly-trained troops such a fire-position would be liable to become a snare, and that if they once occupied it, there would be great difficulty in getting them forward again, and probably the attack would be brought to a standstill at a critical time.

The answer appears to be found in the simple solution of good training. We must teach our men that when they get into such positions they must use the cover afforded, but for no longer than any other fire-position, and that they must get into the habit in peace of looking upon such localities with suspicion, and with the knowledge that they are not suitable for lengthy occupation in war, if the battle is to be won.

We now come to a still more difficult question of training, namely, how far can the company get forward from the bank without being compelled to stop in order to gain superiority of fire over the defense? In war we want to get as close as possible; the moral effect on the defense is greater, our fire is more effective, and we are likely to gain our object more rapidly. In peace there is no fire to stop us, and we move forward to ridiculous positions which we could not possibly reach in war without first gaining superiority of fire. The result of this is that we try to do the same thing when first we go to war, and we are stopped, probably much further back than we should have been if we had studied the question in peace.

Even on the most open ground we must get to within 600 yards of the enemy, and if the ground affords any cover in front, the exposed space must be rushed and the more forward position gained. Having pointed out this difficulty to the company during the previous lecture, and reminded them of it on the ground, we can now extend the whole company and move forward from the bank, using covering fire and letting each platoon commander decide how far he can get to the front after a series of rushes, the company acting as a whole.

The captain can then go down the line and discuss with each platoon the position it has reached. Whilst he is doing this, the remaining platoons can be trained in fire direction and control, which should be carefully watched and criticized by the platoon commanders. One platoon, owing to the nature of the ground in front of it, can get forward further than