Manual of Military Training by James A. Moss (best value ebook reader .TXT) 📕

title="[Pg 320]"> only two mounted patrols have been seen during the day. The command is marching for Chester. The day is hot, the roads are good but dusty, and the crops are about to be harvested.

Sergeant Adams, explain how you would conduct the march of the advance party, beginning with your arrival at the cross roads in Salem.

Sergeant Adams: The platoon would be marching in column of squads and I would be at the head. Two pairs of connecting files would keep me in touch with the point. (Par. 1025.) I would now give this order: "Corporal Smith, take two men from your squad and patrol north along this road (pointing up the Tracy-Maxey road) for a mile and then rejoin the column on this road (Chester Pike), to the west of you." I would then say to Private Barker, "Take Carter and cut across to that railroad fill and go along the top of that (Sandy) ridge, rejoining the column beyond the ridge. Corporal Smith with a patrol is going up this road. Keep a lookout for him." When we reached the point where the road crosses the south nose of Sandy Ridge and I saw the valley in front of me with the long high ridge west of Sandy Creek, running parallel to the Chester Pike and about 800 yards west of it, I would give this order: "Corporal Davis, take the three remaining men in Corporal Smith's squad, cross the creek there (pointing in the direction of the Barton farm) go by that orchard, and move north along that high ridge, keeping the column in sight. Make an effort to keep abreast of the advance guard, which will continue along this road."

I gave Corporal Davis the remaining men out of Corporal Smith's squad because I did not want to break up another squad and as this is, in my opinion, a very important patrol, I wanted a noncommissioned officer in charge of it. Unless something else occurs this will be all the patrols I intend sending out until we pass the steel railroad trestle over Sandy Creek.

Captain: Your point about not breaking up a squad when you could avoid it by using the men remaining in an already broken squad, is a very important one. Take this particular case. You first sent out two pairs of connecting files between the advance party and your point—four men. This leaves a corporal and three men in that squad. If we assume that no patrols were out when we passed through Salem, this corporal and two of his men could have been sent up the Tracy-Maxey road, leaving one man to be temporarily attached to some squad. From the last mentioned squad you would pick your two men for the Sandy Ridge patrol and also the corporal and three men for the Barton farm, etc., patrol. This would leave three men in this squad and you would have under your immediate command two complete squads and three men. As the patrols return, organize new squads immediately and constantly endeavor to have every man attached to a squad. This is one of your most important duties, as it prevents disorder when some serious situation suddenly arises. Also it is one of the duties of the detachment commander that is generally overlooked until too late.

The direction you sent your three patrols was good and their orders clear, covering the essential points, but as you have in a very short space of time, detached nine men, almost a third of your advance party, don't you think you should have economized more on men?

Sergeant Adams: The Sandy Ridge patrol is as small as you can make it—two men. I thought the other two patrols were going to be detached so far from the column that they should be large enough to send a message or two and still remain out. I suppose it would be better to send but two men with Corporal Davis, but I think Corporal Smith should have two with him.

Captain: Yes, I agree with you, for you are entering a valley which is, in effect, a defile, and the Tracy-Maxey road is a very dangerous avenue of approach to your main body. But you must always bear in mind that it is a mistake to use one more man than is needed to accomplish the object in view. The more you send away from your advance party, the more scattered and weaker your command becomes, and this is dispersion, which constitutes one of the gravest, and at the same time, most frequent tactical errors.

To continue the problem, we will suppose you have reached the stone bridge over Sandy Creek; the point is at the cross roads by the Smith house; you can see the two men moving along Sandy Ridge; and Corporal Davis' patrol is just entering the orchard by the Barton farm. Firing suddenly commences well to the front and you hear your point reply to it.

Sergeant Adams: I halt to await information from the point.

Captain: That is absolutely wrong. You command the advance party of an advance guard; your mission requires you to secure the uninterrupted march of the main body; and at the first contact you halt, thus interrupting the march (Par. 1021). The sooner you reach the point, the better are your chances for driving off the enemy if he is not too strong, or the quicker you find out his strength and give your commander in the rear the much desired information.

Sergeant Adams: Then I push ahead with the advance party, sending back the following message—

Captain (interrupting): It is not time to send a message. You know too little and in a few minutes you will be up with the point where you can hear what has happened and see the situation for yourself. Then you can send back a valuable message. When but a few moments delay will probably permit you to secure much more detailed information, it is generally best to wait for that short time and thus avoid using two messengers. When you reach the cross roads you find six men of the point deployed behind the fence, under cover of the trees along the County Road, just west of the Chester Pike, firing at the stone wall along the Mills' farm lane. The enemy appears to be deployed behind this stone wall, from the Chester Pike west for a distance of fifty yards, and his fire is much heavier than that of your point. You think he has at least twenty rifles there. You cannot see down the Chester Pike beyond the enemy's position. Your patrol on Sandy Ridge is midway between the 68 and 66 knolls, moving north. The ground in your front, west of the road, is a potato field; that east of the road as far as the swamp, is rough grass land.

Sergeant Adams: I give order, "Corporal Gibbs, deploy your squad to the right of the Pike and push forward between the Pike and the swamp. Corporal Hall (commands the point), continue a heavy fire. Here are six more men for your squad." I give him the four connecting files and two of the three men in the advance party whose squad is on patrol duty. "Corporal Jackson, get your squad under cover here. Lacey, run back to the major and tell him the point has been stopped by what appears to be twenty of the enemy deployed behind a stone wall across the valley 500 yards in our front. I am attacking with advance party."

Captain: Corporal Davis (commands patrol near Barton farm), you can hear the firing and see that the advance is stopped. What do you do?

Corporal Davis: I would head straight across for the clump of woods on the ridge just above the Mills' farm, moving as rapidly as possible.

Captain: That is all right. Sergeant, Corporal Hall's squad keeps up a heavy fire; Corporal Gibb's squad deploys to the right of the pike, rushes forward about 75 yards, but is forced to lie down by the enemy's fire, and opens fire. Corporal Gibbs, what would your command for firing be?

Corporal Gibbs: AT THE BOTTOM OF THAT WALL. BATTLE SIGHT. CLIP FIRE.

Captain: Why at the bottom of the wall?

Corporal Gibbs: The men are winded and excited and will probably fire high, so I gave them the bottom of the wall as an objective.

Captain: The enemy's fire seems as heavy as yours. Sergeant, what do you do?

Sergeant Adams: I give this order. "Corporal Jackson, deploy your squad as skirmishers on the left of Corporal Hall's squad and open fire." What effect does this additional fire have on the enemy?

Captain: His bullets seem to go higher and wider. You appear to be getting fire superiority over him.

Sergeant Adams: If I do not see any signs of the enemy being reënforced, dust in the road behind his position, etc., I take immediate command of the squads of Corporals Hall and Jackson, and lead them forward on a rush across the potato field.

Captain: Corporal Gibbs, what do you do when you see the other two squads rush?

Corporal Gibbs: I order, FIRE AT WILL, and urge the men to shoot rapidly in order to cover the advance.

Captain: Sergeant Adams' squads are forced to halt after advancing about 150 yards.

Corporal Gibbs: I keep up a hot fire until they can resume their firing, when I lead my squad forward in a rush.

Captain: What do you do, Sergeant?

Sergeant Adams: I would have the Corporals keep up a heavy fire. By this time I should think the support would be up to the cross roads.

Captain: It is, but have you given up your attack?

Sergeant Adams: If it looks as if I could drive the enemy out on my next rush, I do so, but otherwise I remain where I am, as I have no reserve under my control and the action has gotten too serious for me to risk anything more when my chief is practically on the ground to make the next decision. He should have heard something about what is on the Pike behind the enemy, from the patrol on Sandy Ridge.

Captain: Your solution seems correct to me. Why did you send Corporal Gibbs' squad up between the pike and the swamp?

Sergeant Adams: It looked as if he would strike the enemy from a better quarter; there appeared to be better cover that way, afforded by the turn in the road, which must have some weeds, etc., along it, and the swamp would prevent him from getting too far separated from the remainder of the advance party.

Captain: The Sergeant's orders for the attack were very good. He gave his squad leaders some authority and attached his extra men to a squad. He did not attempt to assume direct control of individual men, but managed the three squads and made the squad leaders manage the individual men. This is the secret of successful troop leading. His orders were short, plain and given in proper sequence.

Problem No. 3 (Infantry)

(See Fort Leavenworth map in pocket at back of book.)