Elements of Military Art and Science by Henry Wager Halleck (books you have to read txt) 📕

Bessières entered the army at twenty-six, became a colonel at thirty, general of brigade at thirty-two, and general of division at thirty-four. He died at forty-seven.

Duroc was a captain at twenty-three, chef-de-bataillon at twenty-six, colonel and chef-de-brigade at twenty-seven, and general of division at thirty. He died at forty-one.

This list might be still further extended with the same results, but names enough have been given to show that the generals who assisted Napoleon in his immortal campaigns were all, with scarcely an exception, young men, still burning with the fires of youthful ardor and enthusiasm. The grade of marshal was not created till after Napoleon became emperor. On ascending the throne of the empire, he nominated to this rank eighteen of the most distinguished generals of France. Some of these were generals of the earlier wars of the Revolution, and had never served under him. Others were younger men, several being only thirty-four, thirty-five, and thirty-six years of age. The mean age of all was forty-four. He afterwards made seven more marshals, whose mean age was forty-three. These appointments, however, were regarded as rewards for past services, rather than as a grade from which service was expected, for several of the older marshals were never called into the field after their promotion.

Having noticed the ages of the principal generals who commanded in the armies of Napoleon, let us look for a moment at those who opposed him. In the campaign of 1796 the enemy's forces were directed by Beaulieu, then nearly eighty years of age; Wurmser, also an octogenarian, and Alvinzi, then over seventy: these had all three distinguished themselves in earlier life, but had now lost that youthful energy and activity so essential for a military commander.

In the campaign of 1800 the general-in-chief of the Austrian forces was Melas, an old general, who had served some fifty years in the army; he had distinguished himself so long ago as the Seven Years' War, but he had now become timid and inefficient, age having destroyed his energy.

In the campaign of 1805 the French were opposed by Kutusof, then sixty, and Mack, then fifty-three; the plan of operations was drawn up by still more aged generals of the Aulic council.

In the campaign of 1806 the French were opposed by the Duke of Brunswick, then seventy-one, Hohenlohe, then sixty, and Mollendorf, Kleist, and Massenbach, old generals, who had served under the great Frederick,—men, says Jomini, "exhumed from the Seven Years' War,"—"whose faculties were frozen by age,"—"who had been buried for the last ten years in a lethargic sleep."

In the campaign of 1807 the French were opposed by Kamenski, then eighty years of age, Benningsen, then sixty, and Buxhowden, then fifty-six. The Allies now began to profit by their experience, and in 1809 the Austrian army was led by the young, active, skilful, and energetic Archduke Charles; and this campaign, although the commander-in-chief was somewhat fettered by the foolish projects of the old generals of the Aulic council, and thwarted by the disobedience of his brother, was nevertheless the most glorious in the Austrian annals of the wars of the Revolution.

At the opening of the campaign of 1812 the Emperor Alexander, young, (only thirty-five,) active, intelligent, and ambitious, had remodelled his army, and infused into it his own energy and enthusiastic love of glory. He was himself at its head, and directed its operations. Kutusof was for a short time the nominal commander-in-chief, and exhibited an activity unusual at his age, but he was surrounded by younger generals—Barclay-de-Tolley, and Miloradowich, then forty-nine, Wintzengerode, then forty-three, Schouvalof, then thirty-five, and the Archduke Constantine, then thirty-three,—generals who, at the heads of their corps, and under the young emperor and his able staff of young officers, in the two succeeding campaigns, rolled back the waves of French conquest, and finally overthrew the French empire. Wellington, who led the English in these campaigns, was of the same age as Napoleon, and had been educated at the same time with him in the military schools of France. The Austrians were led by Schwartzenburg, then only about thirty, and the Prussians by Yorck, Bulow, and Blücher. The last of these was then well advanced in life, but all his movements being directed by younger men,—Scharnhorst and Gneisenau,—his operations partook of the energy of his able chiefs of staff.

In the campaign of 1815, Napoleon was opposed by the combinations of Wellington and Gneisenau, both younger men than most of his own generals, who, it is well known, exhibited, in this campaign, less than in former ones, the ardent energy and restless activity which had characterized their younger days. Never were Napoleon's, plans better conceived, never did his troops fight with greater bravery; but the dilatory movements of his generals enabled his active enemies to parry the blow intended for their destruction.

In the American war of 1812, we pursued the same course as Austria, Prussia, and Russia, in their earlier contests with Napoleon, i.e., to supply our armies with generals, we dug up the Beaulieus, the Wurmsers, the Alvinzis, the Melases, the Macks, the Brunswicks, and the Kamenskis of our revolutionary war; but after we had suffered sufficiently from the Hulls, the Armstrongs, the Winchesters, the Dearborns, the Wilkinsons, the Hamptons, and other veterans of the Revolution, we also changed our policy, and permitted younger men—the Jacksons, the Harrisons, the Browns, the McReas, the Scotts,[49] the Ripleys, the Woods, the McCombs, the Wools, and the Millers—to lead our forces to victory and to glory. In the event of another war, with any nation capable of opposing to us any thing like a powerful resistance, shall we again exhume the veterans of former days, and again place at the head of our armies respectable and aged inefficiency; or shall we seek out youthful enterprise and activity combined with military science and instruction? The results of the war, the honor of the country, the glory of our arms, depend, in a great measure, upon the answer that will be given to this question.

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