Essays On Education And Kindred Subjects (Fiscle Part- 11) by Herbert Spencer (best fiction novels to read TXT) 📕

Conception Of    A _Serial_ Arrangement Of    The   Sciences Is A Vicious One.

It Is Not Simply That The   Schemes We Have Examined Are Untenable; But It

Is That The   Sciences Cannot Be Rightly Placed In Any Linear Order

Whatever. It Is Not Simply That, As M. Comte Admits, A Classification

"Will Always Involve Something, If Not Arbitrary, At Least Artificial;"

It Is Not, As He Would Have Us Believe, That, Neglecting Minor

Imperfections A Classification May Be Substantially True; But It Is That

Any Grouping Of    The   Sciences In A Succession Gives A Radically Erroneous

Idea Of    Their Genesis And Their Dependencies. There Is No "One

_Rational_ Order Among A Host Of    Possible Systems." There Is No "True

_Filiation_ Of    The   Sciences." The   Whole Hypothesis Is Fundamentally

False. Indeed, It Needs But A Glance At Its Origin To See At Once How

Baseless It Is. Why A _Series_? What Reason Have We To Suppose That The

Sciences Admit Of    A _Linear_ Arrangement? Where Is Our Warrant For

Assuming That There Is Some _Succession_ In Which They Can Be Placed?

There Is No Reason; No Warrant. Whence Then Has Arisen The   Supposition?

To Use M. Comte's Own Phraseology, We Should Say, It Is A Metaphysical

Conception. It Adds Another To The   Cases Constantly Occurring, Of    The

Human Mind Being Made The   Measure Of    Nature. We Are Obliged To Think In

Sequence; It Is The   Law Of    Our Minds That We Must Consider Subjects

Separately, One After Another: _Therefore_ Nature Must Be

Serial--_Therefore_ The   Sciences Must Be Classifiable In A Succession.

See Here The   Birth Of    The   Notion, And The   Sole Evidence Of    Its Truth.

Men Have Been Obliged When Arranging In Books Their Schemes Of    Education

And Systems Of    Knowledge, To Choose _Some_ Order Or Other. And From

Inquiring What Is The   Best Order, Have Naturally Fallen Into The   Belief

That There Is An Order Which Truly Represents The   Facts--Have Persevered

In Seeking Such An Order; Quite Overlooking The   Previous Question

Whether It Is Likely That Nature Has Consulted The   Convenience Of

Book-Making.

For German Philosophers, Who Hold That Nature Is "Petrified

Intelligence," And That Logical Forms Are The   Foundations Of    All Things,

It Is A Consistent Hypothesis That As Thought Is Serial, Nature Is

Serial; But That M. Comte, Who Is So Bitter An Opponent Of    All

Anthropomorphism, Even In Its Most Evanescent Shapes, Should Have

Committed The   Mistake Of    Imposing Upon The   External World An Arrangement

Which So Obviously Springs From A Limitation Of    The   Human Consciousness,

Is Somewhat Strange. And It Is The   More Strange When We Call To Mind

How, At The   Outset, M. Comte Remarks That In The   Beginning "_Toutes Les

Sciences Sont Cultivées Simultanément Par Les Mêmes Esprits_;" That

This Is "_Inevitable Et Même Indispensable_;" And How He Further Remarks

That The   Different Sciences Are "_Comme Les Diverses Branches D'un Tronc

Unique_." Were It Not Accounted For By The   Distorting Influence Of    A

Cherished Hypothesis, It Would Be Scarcely Possible To Understand How,

After Recognising Truths Like These, M. Comte Should Have Persisted In

Attempting To Construct "_Une Échelle Encyclopédique_."

The Metaphor Which M. Comte Has Here So Inconsistently Used To Express

The Relations Of    The   Sciences--Branches Of    One Trunk--Is An

Approximation To The   Truth, Though Not The   Truth Itself. It Suggests The

Facts That The   Sciences Had A Common Origin; That They Have Been

Developing Simultaneously; And That They Have Been From Time To Time

Dividing And Subdividing. But It Does Not Suggest The   Yet More Important

Fact, That The   Divisions And Subdivisions Thus Arising Do Not Remain

Separate, But Now And Again Reunite In Direct And Indirect Ways. They

Inosculate; They Severally Send Off And Receive Connecting Growths; And

The Intercommunion Has Been Ever Becoming More Frequent, More Intricate,

More Widely Ramified. There Has All Along Been Higher Specialisation,

That There Might Be A Larger Generalisation; And A Deeper Analysis, That

There Might Be A Better Synthesis. Each Larger Generalisation Has Lifted

Sundry Specialisations Still Higher; And Each Better Synthesis Has

Prepared The   Way For Still Deeper Analysis.

And Here We May Fitly Enter Upon The   Task Awhile Since Indicated--A

Sketch Of    The   Genesis Of    Science, Regarded As A Gradual Outgrowth From

Common Knowledge--An Extension Of    The   Perceptions By The   Aid Of    The

Reason. We Propose To Treat It As A Psychological Process Historically

Displayed; Tracing At The   Same Time The   Advance From Qualitative To

Quantitative Prevision; The   Progress From Concrete Facts To Abstract

Facts, And The   Application Of    Such Abstract Facts To The   Analysis Of    New

Orders Of    Concrete Facts; The   Simultaneous Advance In Generalisation And

Specialisation; The   Continually Increasing Subdivision And Reunion Of

The Sciences; And Their Constantly Improving _Consensus_.

To Trace Out Scientific Evolution From Its Deepest Roots Would, Of

Course, Involve A Complete Analysis Of    The   Mind. For As Science Is A

Development Of    That Common Knowledge Acquired By The   Unaided Senses And

Uncultured Reason, So Is That Common Knowledge Itself Gradually Built Up

Out Of    The   Simplest Perceptions. We Must, Therefore, Begin Somewhere

Abruptly; And The   Most Appropriate Stage To Take For Our Point Of

Departure Will Be The   Adult Mind Of    The   Savage.

Commencing Thus, Without A Proper Preliminary Analysis, We Are Naturally

Somewhat At A Loss How To Present, In A Satisfactory Manner, Those

Fundamental Processes Of    Thought Out Of    Which Science Ultimately

Originates. Perhaps Our Argument May Be Best Initiated By The

Proposition, That All Intelligent Action Whatever Depends Upon The

Discerning Of    Distinctions Among Surrounding Things. The   Condition Under

Which Only It Is Possible For Any Creature To Obtain Food And Avoid

Danger Is, That It Shall Be Differently Affected By Different

Objects--That It Shall Be Led To Act In One Way By One Object, And In

Another Way By Another. In The   Lower Orders Of    Creatures This Condition

Is Fulfilled By Means Of    An Apparatus Which Acts Automatically. In The

Higher Orders The   Actions Are Partly Automatic, Partly Conscious. And In

Man They Are Almost Wholly Conscious.

Throughout, However, There Must Necessarily Exist A Certain

Classification Of    Things According To Their Properties--A Classification

Which Is Either Organically Registered In The   System, As In The   Inferior

Creation, Or Is Formed By Experience, As In Ourselves. And It May Be

Further Remarked, That The   Extent To Which This Classification Is

Carried, Roughly Indicates The   Height Of    Intelligence--That While The

Lowest Organisms Are Able To Do Little More Than Discriminate Organic

From Inorganic Matter; While The   Generality Of    Animals Carry Their

Classifications No Further Than To A Limited Number Of    Plants Or

Creatures Serving For Food, A Limited Number Of    Beasts Of    Prey, And A

Limited Number Of    Places And Materials; The   Most Degraded Of    The   Human

Race Possess A Knowledge Of    The   Distinctive Natures Of    A Great Variety

Of Substances, Plants, Animals, Tools, Persons, Etc., Not Only As

Classes But As Individuals.

What Now Is The   Mental Process By Which Classification Is Effected?

Manifestly It Is A Recognition Of    The   _Likeness_ Or _Unlikeness_ Of

Things, Either In Respect Of    Their Sizes, Colours, Forms, Weights,

Textures, Tastes, Etc., Or In Respect Of    Their Modes Of    Action. By Some

Special Mark, Sound, Or Motion, The   Savage Identifies A Certain

Four-Legged Creature He Sees, As One That Is Good For Food, And To Be

Caught In A Particular Way; Or As One That Is Dangerous; And Acts

Accordingly. He Has Classed Together All The   Creatures That Are _Alike_

In This Particular. And Manifestly In Choosing The   Wood Out Of    Which To

Form His Bow, The   Plant With Which To Poison His Arrows, The   Bone From

Which To Make His Fish-Hooks, He Identifies Them Through Their Chief

Sensible Properties As Belonging To The   General Classes, Wood, Plant,

And Bone, But Distinguishes Them As Belonging To Sub-Classes By Virtue

Of Certain Properties In Which They Are _Unlike_ The   Rest Of    The   General

Classes They Belong To; And So Forms Genera And Species.

And Here It Becomes Manifest That Not Only Is Classification Carried On

By Grouping Together In The   Mind Things That Are _Like_; But That

Classes And Sub-Classes Are Formed And Arranged According To The

_Degrees Of    Unlikeness_. Things Widely Contrasted Are Alone

Distinguished In The   Lower Stages Of    Mental Evolution; As May Be Any Day

Observed In An Infant. And Gradually As The   Powers Of    Discrimination

Increase, The   Widely Contrasted Classes At First Distinguished, Come To

Be Each Divided Into Sub-Classes, Differing From Each Other Less Than

The Classes Differ; And These Sub-Classes Are Again Divided After The

Same Manner. By The   Continuance Of    Which Process, Things Are Gradually

Arranged Into Groups, The   Members Of    Which Are Less And Less _Unlike_;

Ending, Finally, In Groups Whose Members Differ Only As Individuals, And

Not Specifically. And Thus There Tends Ultimately To Arise The   Notion Of

_Complete Likeness_. For, Manifestly, It Is Impossible That Groups

Should Continue To Be Subdivided In Virtue Of    Smaller And Smaller

Differences, Without There Being A Simultaneous Approximation To The

Notion Of    _No Difference_.

Let Us Next Notice That The   Recognition Of    Likeness And Unlikeness,

Which Underlies Classification, And Out Of    Which Continued

Classification Evolves The   Idea Of    Complete Likeness--Let Us Next Notice

That It Also Underlies The   Process Of    _Naming_, And By Consequence

_Language_. For All Language Consists, At The   Beginning, Of    Symbols

Which Are As _Like_ To The   Things Symbolised As It Is Practicable To

Make Them. The   Language Of    Signs Is A Means Of    Conveying Ideas By

Mimicking The   Actions Or Peculiarities Of    The   Things Referred To. Verbal

Language Is Also, At The   Beginning, A Mode Of    Suggesting Objects Or Acts

By Imitating The   Sounds Which The   Objects Make, Or With Which The   Acts

Are Accompanied. Originally These Two Languages Were Used

Simultaneously. It Needs But To Watch The   Gesticulations With Which The

Savage Accompanies His Speech--To See A Bushman Or A Kaffir Dramatising

Before An Audience His Mode Of    Catching Game--Or To Note The   Extreme

Paucity Of    Words In All Primitive Vocabularies; To Infer That At First,

Attitudes, Gestures, And Sounds, Were All Combined To Produce As Good A

_Likeness_ As Possible, Of    The   Things, Animals, Persons, Or Events

Described; And That As The   Sounds Came To Be Understood By Themselves

The Gestures Fell Into Disuse: Leaving Traces, However, In The   Manners

Of The   More Excitable Civilised Races. But Be This As It May, It

Suffices Simply To Observe, How Many Of    The   Words Current Among

Barbarous Peoples Are Like The   Sounds Appertaining To The   Things

Signified; How Many Of    Our Own Oldest And Simplest Words Have The   Same

Peculiarity; How Children Tend To Invent Imitative Words; And How The

Sign-Language Spontaneously Formed By Deaf Mutes Is Invariably Based

Upon Imitative Actions--To At Once See That The   Nation Of    _Likeness_ Is

That From Which The   Nomenclature Of    Objects Takes Its Rise.

Were There Space We Might Go On To Point Out How This Law Of    Life Is

Traceable, Not Only In The   Origin But In The   Development Of    Language;

How In Primitive Tongues The   Plural Is Made By A Duplication Of    The

Singular, Which Is A Multiplication Of    The   Word To Make It _Like_ The

Multiplicity Of    The   Things; How The   Use Of    Metaphor--That Prolific

Source Of    New Words--Is A Suggesting Of    Ideas That Are _Like_ The   Ideas

To Be Conveyed In Some Respect Or Other; And How, In The   Copious Use Of

Simile, Fable, And Allegory Among Uncivilised Races, We See That Complex

Conceptions, Which There Is Yet No Direct Language For,