not interfere with others
55
Or, that it is only a
high kind of happiness that can be shared by all
56
Both of which suppositions are false
57
The conditions of social health are a moral end only when we each feel a personal delight in maintaining them
58
In this case they will supply us with a
small portion of the moral aid needed
59
But this case is not a possible one
60
There is indeed the natural impulse of sympathy that might tend to make it so
61
But this is counterbalanced by the corresponding impulse of selfishness
63
And this impulse of sympathy itself is of very limited power
63
Except under very rare conditions
63
The conditions of general happiness are far too vague to do more than very slightly excite it
64
Or give it power enough to neutralise any personal temptation
66
At all events they would excite no enthusiasm
67
For this purpose there must be some prize before us, of recognised positive value, more or less definite
67
And before all things, to be enjoyed by us individually
67
Unless this prize be of great value to begin with, its value will not become great because great numbers obtain it
71
Nor until we know what it is, do we gain anything by the hope that men may more completely make it their own in the future
72
The modern positive school requires a great general enthusiasm for the general good
73
They therefore presuppose an extreme value for the individual good
74
Our first enquiry must be therefore what the higher individual good is
76
CHAPTER IV.
GOODNESS AS ITS OWN REWARD.
What has been said in the last chapter is really admitted by the positive school themselves
77
As we can learn explicitly from George Eliot
78
In
Daniel Deronda
78
That the fundamental moral question is, '
In what way shall the individual make life pleasant?'
79
And the right way, for the positivists, as for the Christians, is an inward way
80
The moral end is a certain inward state of the heart, and the positivists say it is a sufficient attraction in itself, without any aid from religion
81
And they support this view by numerous examples
82
But all such examples are useless
83
Because though we may get rid of religion in its pure form
83
There is much that we have not got rid of, embodied still in the moral end
84
To test the intrinsic value of the end, we must sublimate this religion out of it
86
For this purpose we will consider, first, the three general characteristics of the moral end, viz.
88
Its inwardness
88
Its importance
89
And its absolute character
91
Now all these three characteristics can be explained by religion
93
And cannot be explained without it
96
The positive moral end must therefore be completely divested of them
100
The next question is, will it be equally attractive then?
100
CHAPTER V.
LOVE AS A TEST OF GOODNESS.
The positivists represent love as a thing whose value is self-dependent
101
And which gives to life a positive and incalculable worth
103
But this is supposed to be true of one form of love only
104
And the very opposite is supposed to hold good of all other forms
105
The right form depends on the conformity of each of the lovers to a certain inward standard
105
As we can see exemplified in the case of Othello and Desdemona, etc.
107
The kind and not the degree of the love is what gives love its special value
108
And the selection of this kind can be neither made nor justified on positive principles
109
As the following quotations from ThΓ©ophile Gautier will show us
110
Which are supposed by many to embody the true view of love
110
According to this view, purity is simply a disease both in man and woman, or at any rate no merit
116
If love is to be a moral end, this view must be absolutely condemned
117
But positivism cannot condemn it, or support the opposite view
117
As we shall see by recurring to Professor Huxley's argument
118
Which will show us that all moral language as applied to love is either distinctly religious or else altogether ludicrous
122
For it is clearly only on moral grounds that we can give that blame to vice, which is the measure of the praise we give to virtue
123
The misery of the former depends on religious anticipations
124
And so does also the blessedness of the latter
125
As we can see in numerous literary expressions of it
126
Positivism, by destroying these anticipations, changes the whole character of the love in question
128
And prevents love from supplying us with any moral standard
131
The loss sustained by love will indicate the general loss sustained by life
131
CHAPTER VI.
LIFE AS ITS OWN REWARD.
We must now examine what will be the practical result on life in general of the loss just indicated
132
To do this, we will take life as reflected in the mirror of the great dramatic art of the world
134
And this will show us how the moral judgment is the chief faculty to which all that is great or intense in this art appeals
136
We shall see this, for instance, in
Macbeth
137
In
Hamlet
137
In
Antigone
137
In
Measure for Measure, and in
Faust
138
And also in degraded art just as well as in sublime art
139
In profligate and cynical art, such as Congreve's
140
And in concupiscent art
141
Such as
Mademoiselle de Maupin
141
Or such works as that of Meursius, or the worst scenes in Petronius
142
The supernatural moral judgment is the chief thing everywhere
143
Take away this judgment, and art loses all its strange interest
144
And so will it be with life
145
The moral landscape will be ruined
145
Even the mere sensuous joy of living in health will grow duller
146
Nor will culture be of the least avail without the supernatural moral element
148
Nor will the devotion to truth for its own sake, which is the last refuge of the positivists when in despair
149
For this last has no meaning whatever, except as a form of concrete theism
152
The reverence for Nature is but another form of the devotion to truth, and its only possible meaning is equally theistic
157
Thus all the higher resources of positivism fail together
161
And the highest positive value of life would be something less than its present value
161
CHAPTER VII.
THE SUPERSTITION OF POSITIVISM.
From what we have just seen, the visionary character of the positivist conception of progress becomes evident
163
Its object is far more plainly an illusion than the Christian heaven
164
All the objections urged against the latter apply with far more force to the former
165
As a matter of fact, there is no possible object sufficient to start the enthusiasm required by the positivists
167
To make the required enthusiasm possible human nature would have to be completely changed
168
Two existing qualities, for instance, would have to be magnified to an impossible extentβimagination
169
And unselfishness
170
If we state the positive system in terms of common life, its visionary character becomes evident
172
The examples which have suggested its possibility are quite misleading
173
The positive system is really far more based on superstition than any religion
175
Its appearance can only be accounted for by the characters and circumstances of its originators
175
And a consideration of these will help us more than anything to estimate it rightly
178
And will let us see that its only practical tendency is to deaden all our present interests, not to create any new ones
179
CHAPTER VIII.
THE PRACTICAL PROSPECT.
It is not contended that the prospect just described will, as a fact, ever be realised
183
But only that it will be realised
if certain other prospects are realised
185
Which prospects may or may not be visionary
186
But the progress towards which is already begun
187
And also the other results, that have been described already
187
Positive principles have already produced a moral deterioration, even in places where we should least imagine it
187
As we shall see if we pierce beneath the surface
189
In the curious condition of men who have lost faith, but have retained the love of virtue
189
The struggle was hard, when they had all the helps of religion
190
It is harder now
190
Conscience still survives, but it has lost its restraining power
191
Temptation almost inevitably dethrones it
192
And its full prestige can never be recovered
193
It can do nothing but deplore; it cannot remedy
194
In such cases the mind's decadence has begun; and its symptoms are
194
Self-reproach
195
Life-weariness
195
And indifference
195
The class of men to whom this applies is increasing, and they are the true representatives of the work of positive thought
196
It is hard to realise this ominous fact
197
But by looking steadily and dispassionately at the characteristics of the present epoch we may learn to do so
198
We shall see that the opinions now forming will have a weight and power that no opinions ever had before
199
And their tendency, as yet latent, towards pessimism is therefore most momentous
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