William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (book club reads txt) 📕

that the capacity of Harrowby was rated far higher by

foreigners than by Englishmen.[740] The instructions to the Earl,

drafted by Lord Mulgrave on 27th October, reveal Pitt's resolve to go

very far in order to buy the support of Prussia. They empowered Harrowby

to offer her the Belgic provinces and such German lands as would

connect them with the Westphalian domains of Prussia. The need of money

for the immediate equipment of her army being also urgent, Harrowby was

to offer a yearly subsidy of £12 10_s._ for each Prussian soldier

actually serving against France, the hope being expressed that from

150,000 to 200,000 men would be forthcoming. At the same time Pitt

explained that at the general peace Great Britain would restore all her

acquisitions oversea, Malta and the Cape of Good Hope alone excepted.

Harrowby was also charged to do all in his power to effect the

liberation of North Germany and Holland by the Russo-Swedish force then

mustering at Stralsund. Such were the plans of Pitt. Even in this brief

outline, their magnanimity is apparent. In order to assure the freedom

of the Continent, he was ready to pour forth the wealth of Britain, and

to sacrifice all her conquests, except those two bulwarks of Empire,

Malta and the Cape.[741] Already even before Nelson gained the mastery

of the seas at Trafalgar, Baird's force had set sail for the reduction

of the Cape. It achieved its purpose in the month in which Pitt died. It

is not generally known that the foundation of our South African Empire

was due primarily to his foresight. The war having originated in

Napoleon's aggressions and his threats respecting Egypt and the Orient

generally, Pitt resolved that England should thenceforth dominate both

the sea route and the overland route to the East Indies.

 

Unfortunately, owing to the fogs on the River Elbe and other delays at

Hamburg, Harrowby did not reach Berlin until the middle of

November;[742] and a fortnight earlier (3rd November) the sovereigns of

Russia and Prussia had framed the Treaty of Potsdam. Ostensibly, it

bound Prussia to side with the Allies unless within four weeks Napoleon

accepted her armed mediation, which she proposed to offer forthwith. She

required from the French Emperor a full recognition of the independence

of Germany, Holland, Switzerland, and Naples, which of course implied

the withdrawal of French troops from those lands. Napoleon was also to

grant to the dispossessed King of Sardinia the following

indemnities--Genoa, Parma, and Piacenza; while Austria was to recover

Central Venetia as far as the River Mincio. The Allies flattered

themselves that Napoleon would at once reject these terms and throw

Prussia into their arms. Such, too, was the conviction of Pitt. While

regretting that France should keep Piedmont and find no barrier opposed

to her in Holland,[743] he felt so convinced of Napoleon's refusal and

of Prussia's good faith that he prepared to satisfy her demand for a

British subsidy. Prussian troops were marching into Hanover, as if with

the aim of ousting the French and restoring the authority of George III;

and Hardenberg assured Harrowby in their first interview, on 16th

November, that that force would protect the flank of the Anglo-Russian

expedition then about to enter the Electorate.

 

On the surface, then, everything seemed to augur a brilliant success for

Pitt's policy. As had happened before, the recklessness of Napoleon

favoured the British cause; and it is probable that, if Frederick

William had sent to the French headquarters any one but Count Haugwitz,

Prussia would have drawn the sword. Napoleon was in great danger. True,

he met with little opposition in his advance to Vienna and thence into

Moravia. But the deeper he plunged into that province, the worse would

be his position if 180,000 Prussians were launched at his flank and

rear. The Court of Berlin was well aware that the destinies of Europe

lay in its hands; and for once a fatal confidence possessed Frederick

William. He and his advisers used the crisis, not in the magnanimous

spirit which impelled Pitt to sacrifice nearly the whole of Britain's

naval conquests, but in order to assure Prussia's gain even at the

expense of the solidarity of the European League. The Coalition's

extremity was Prussia's opportunity. Hanover was her price for joining

Such was the purport of a secret article of the Treaty of Potsdam,

to which the Czar had most reluctantly given his consent.

 

In order to bring the utmost possible pressure to bear upon the British

Government, a special Russian envoy, Count d'Oubril, set out from Berlin

to London, crossing Harrowby on the way. Oubril arrived in London on or

about 16th November; and after a short delay Vorontzoff and he

communicated to Pitt the document containing the ominous demand. The

Russian ambassador noted that Pitt, despite long training in the

concealment of his feelings, displayed some emotion on reading the

fateful words. In truth, they dealt the second of the strokes which

struck him to the heart. But, collecting himself with an effort, he

informed Vorontzoff that, so great was the King's attachment to Hanover,

the patrimony of his family for upwards of a thousand years, that no

Minister would venture ever to name the proposal, as it might either

kill him or drive him mad. All the arguments of Vorontzoff and Oubril on

behalf of the Prusso-Russian demand utterly failed. Pitt expressed a

desire to meet Prussia's wishes for a better western frontier, but never

at the expense of Hanover.[744] Thus he deliberately faced a terrible

diplomatic reverse rather than expose the King to a recurrence of his

mental malady. A little later he recovered his equanimity; for on 19th

November he informed Harrowby that, though Hanover was out of the

question, yet he hoped to find an equivalent which would satisfy

Prussia. The two Emperors could not in their present plight object to

her gaining a large accession of territory. Moreover it would be an

infinite disgrace to them now to make a separate peace with Napoleon.

 

    Still [he added] even if this should happen, we have a strong

    interest that a separate peace should provide all the security

    that can be obtained for the Continent. If decent terms are

    obtained, particularly if France is obliged _really_ to evacuate

    Holland and leave it in a state of independence, and if the

    three great Continental Powers after extorting concessions from

    France in the moment of victory, unite cordially in an

    obligation to resist all future encroachments, not only Europe

    will have gained much, but we shall have gained for the separate

    objects of this country more than enough to compensate for all

    the expense of subsidies in this year; and we may return to a

    state of separate war with little to guard against but the

    single point of Boulogne and with increased means of

    concentrating both our naval and land defence. The first object

    therefore of my wishes is, the immediate rejection of the

    mediation[745] and the _embarking Prussia at any rate in active

    and decisive operations_ towards Germany and Holland, leaving

    it to be considered afterwards what territorial arrangements can

    be agreed upon to secure her permanent co-operation. The next

    would be, in the event of negotiation, our being included in it,

    on the terms of restoring all our conquests except Malta and the

    Cape--and the third (and tho' the worst not a bad one) as good a

    separate peace as possible for our perfidious Allies, leaving us

    to fight our battle for ourselves....[746]

 

Pitt's indignation against Prussia did not lead him to fling a refusal

at her. On the contrary, he sought to postpone that announcement until

the expiration of the four weeks, within which she must make her

decision to side with or against Napoleon. Such was the purport of his

letter of 23rd November to Harrowby. He also announced an increase in

the numbers of the British force destined to serve in Hanover. This

expedition under General Don was now being pushed on with great zeal. It

met with disapproval from Canning, who with much sagacity pointed out,

on 29th November, that if the war were continued the gain of a month or

two was a trifling object; whereas, if the Allies ended the war, France

would certainly offer Hanover to Prussia.[747] The dash of pessimism in

Canning's nature enabled him to discern difficulties and dangers which

were hidden from Pitt's ever hopeful vision. Mulgrave seems to have

shared Pitt's view; for he signed all the despatches relating to the

Hanoverian expedition. On 23rd November he informed Harrowby that, early

in the year 1806, as many as 70,000 British and Hanoverian troops would

be ready for service, either in Hanover or wherever they could be

employed to most effect. He therefore expected that by that time the

Allies would have nearly 300,000 men in North Germany; and, as the

resources of Austria were not depleted by the disaster at Ulm, she and

Russia ought then to have nearly half a million of men on foot.[748]

 

                  *       *       *       *       *

 

Pitt's eagerness to receive news from Harrowby appears in the closing

phrases of his letter of 29th November to that envoy: "We are counting

moments till we hear in what state you found things on your arrival [at

Berlin], and what has been Haugwitz's reception at the French

headquarters." Again, on 5th December, he sent off to him a letter,

which as being the last of any importance written by him at Downing

Street, must be given in full:

 

                                    Downing St. _Dec. 5th, 1805_.

 

    DEAR HARROWBY,

 

    I am grieved to hear by your letter of the 24th that you had

    been so much persecuted by headaches, and that you had allowed

    the secret article of Potsdam [_sic_] to give you so much

    uneasiness. You must I am sure be satisfied that the way in

    which you have treated it is _the best possible_, because it

    gives no hopes of the thing being consented to, and at the same

    time avoids the necessity of any formal and official negative.

    The great object I think is that Prussia should if possible,

    decide on the result of Ct Haugwitz's mission, without giving

    to the evil councillors of the King of Prussia the advantage of

    stating to him that this object is precluded for ever. At the

    same time we cannot in good faith give the least assurance that

    it is likely to be ever attainable. Woronzow [Vorontzoff] who

    has been in town for ten days but is gone again, writes to

    Alopeus that he has received from him the _mémoire raisonné_ on

    the exchange of Hanover, but cannot present it to us till he has

    orders to do so from his own Court. We are therefore supposed to

    know nothing more of the matter.

 

    On the whole state of things, you will perhaps be angry with me

    for saying that my hopes are still sanguine. I think I see great

    chance of Prussia agreeing to co-operate either for a definite

    object or a limited time, in return for subsidies and for our

    assurance (which you know to be a very sincere one) of wishing

    to procure for them important acquisitions. The question of

    Hanover may I think be left aloof. As to plans of operations, it

    is almost idle to say anything. But you will have seen that we

    think the first and _essential_ point is to act (as Prussia

    seems to intend) with a force sure of success in the rear of the

    French Army in Germany. Still I cannot conceive what can be the

    military reasons why an attack on Holland should not take place

    at the same time, or at least should not be prepared so as to be

    put into execution whenever the effect of any great success of

    the Allies, or a frost, or an appearance of good disposition in

    the country, should afford a favourable opening for such an

    enterprise, the advantages of which in its impression and

    consequences I need not state to you. We have finally decided

    with a view to this chance and for the sake of shewing at any

    rate our readiness to co-operate, to send the 12,000 men which

    have been prepared, to Embden [_sic_], and if this wind

    continues, I hope they will sail within three days. Endeavour to

    make Prussia send under General Kalkreuth (or whoever may be the

    general they destine for that quarter) not merely 10,000 men,

    but enough to make such an army as can scarce be resisted. Our

    force with the Russians (exclusive of the Swedes and after

    allowing for something to watch Hameln[749]) will be near

    40,000 men.