Through Three Campaigns: A Story of Chitral, Tirah and Ashanti by G. A. Henty (mini ebook reader TXT) 📕

A mile farther, the head of the column reached the camping place, which was a strong village built into the river cleft. On the left the 36th Sikhs and part of the Ghoorkhas cleared the way; while the Bombay Pioneers, and the rest of the Ghoorkhas, became heavily engaged with the enemy in some villages on the right. All along the line a brisk engagement went on. The camp pickets took up their positions early in the afternoon, and a foraging party went out and brought in supplies, after some fighting.

Kempster's Brigade had not been able to reach the camp, and settled itself for the night three miles farther up the valley. It, too, had its share of fighting.

All night it rained heavily, and the morning of the 11th broke cold and miserable. It was freezing hard; the hilltops, a hundred feet above the camp, were wrapped in snow; and the river had swollen greatly. The advance guard waded out into the river bed, and the whole of the brigade followed, the Ghoorkhas clearing the sides of the valley. In a short time they passed into the Zakka-Khel section of the Bara Valley.

Curiously enough, the opposition ceased here. It may be that the enemy feared to show themselves on the snow on the hilltops; or that, being short of ammunition, they decided to reserve themselves for an attack upon the other brigade. Scarcely a shot was fired until the valley broadened out into the Akerkhel, where some small opposition was offered by villagers on either bank. This, however, was easily brushed aside.

The advance guard of the 3rd Brigade almost caught up the rear guard of the 4th and, by four in the afternoon, its baggage was coming along nicely, so that all would be in before nightfall. The rear guard of the brigade, consisting of the Gordons, Ghoorkhas, and 2nd Punjab Infantry, had been harassed as soon as they started and, as the day wore on, the enemy increased greatly in numbers. As the flanking parties fell back to join the rear guard, they were so pressed that it was as much as they could do to keep them at bay.

When about three miles from camp, the baggage took a wrong road. In trying a piece of level ground, they became helplessly mixed up in swampy rice fields. The enemy, seeing the opportunity they had waited for, outflanked the rear guard, and began pouring a heavy fire into the baggage. The flanking parties were weak, for the strain had been so severe that many men from the hospital escort and baggage guard had been withdrawn, to dislodge the enemy from the surrounding spurs.

The Pathans were almost among the baggage, when a panic seized the followers. As night began to fall, the officer commanding the Gordons, with two weak companies of his regiment, two companies of the Ghoorkhas, and a company of the 2nd Punjab Infantry and some Ghoorkhas, found himself in a most serious position. The guns had limbered up and pushed on, and the rear guard remained, surrounded by the enemy, hampered with its wounded, and stranded with doolies. As the native bearers had fled these doolies were, in many cases, being carried by the native officers.

The enemy grew more and more daring, and a few yards, only, divided the combatants. Captain Uniacke, retiring with a few of the Gordons, saw that there was only one course left: they must entrench for the night. He was in advance of the actual rear guard, attempting to hold a house against the fire of quite a hundred tribesmen.

Collecting four men of his regiment, and shouting wildly, he rushed at the doorway. In the dusk the enemy were uncertain of the number of their assailants and, in their horror of the bayonet, they fired one wild volley and fled. To continue the ruse, Captain Uniacke climbed to the roof, shouting words of command, as if he had a company behind him. Then he blew his whistle, to attract the rear guard as it passed, in the dark.

The whistle was heard and, in little groups, they fell back with the wounded to the house. It was a poor place, but capable of defence; and the Pathans drew off, knowing that there was loot in abundance to be gained down by the river.

As night wore on the greatest anxiety prevailed, when transport officers and small parties straggled in, and reported that tribesmen were looting and cutting up followers, within a mile of camp; and that they had no news to give of the men who composed the rear guard. So anxious were the headquarter staff that a company of the Borderers were sent out, to do what they could.

Lieutenant Macalister took them out and, going a mile up the river, was able to collect many followers and baggage animals, but could find no signs of the rear guard. Early in the morning a company of the 2nd Punjab Infantry went out, as a search party, and got into communication with the rear guard. They were safe in the house; but could not move, as they were hampered with the wounded, and were surrounded by the enemy. Two regiments and a mountain battery therefore went out and rescued them from their awkward predicament, bringing them into camp, with as much baggage as could be found.

The casualties of the day amounted to a hundred and fifty animals, and a hundred followers killed. Of the combatants two officers were wounded, and fourteen Gordons were wounded, and four killed.

Owing to the necessity of sending out part of the 4th Brigade, to support the cut-off rear of the 3rd Brigade, it was impossible to continue the march that day. Next morning, the order of the brigade was changed. The 23rd was to lead, handing over a battery of artillery to the 4th, for service in the rear guard. It was also ordered that flanking parties were to remain in position, until the baggage had passed. The advance guard consisted of the 2nd Punjab Infantry, and the 1st and 2nd Ghoorkhas. The others were told off to burn and destroy all villages on either side of the nullah. The baggage of the whole division followed the main guard.

Directly the camp was left, the sides of the nullah enlarged and, for half a mile, the road lay through a narrow ravine. The drop was rapid; for the river, swollen by the fallen snow, had become literally a torrent; and the scene with the baggage was one of extreme confusion. The recent disaster had given a frenzied impulse to the generally calm followers, and all felt anxiety to press forward, with an impetus almost impossible to control. The mass of baggage became mixed in the ravine, but at last was cleared off and, when the valley opened, they moved forward at their greatest speed, but now under perfect control.

After this the opposition became less, and the village of Gulikhel was reached by the 3rd Brigade. The village stands on the left bank of the Bara. Immediately below it a nullah becomes a narrow gorge, almost impassable in the present state of the river. It is several miles long. There was, however, a road over a neighbouring saddle. The path up from the river was narrow, but sufficient to allow two loaded mules to pass abreast. It wound for some seven miles, over a low hill, until the river bed was again reached.

The next ford was Barkhe. The advance guard was well up in the hills by midday, when it met the Oxfordshire Regiment, which had come out seven miles to meet the force; but the baggage of a division, filing out of the river bed in pairs, is a serious matter, and there was necessarily a block in the rear.

General Westmacott moved as soon as the baggage was off but, long before it was through the first defile, his pickets were engaged, and a general action followed. The enemy, fighting with extraordinary boldness, kept within a few yards of the pickets. Followers with baggage animals were constantly hit, as they came up but, at half-past ten, the rear guard regiments marched out of camp, under cover of artillery fire.

The fighting was so severe that, within an hour, the ammunition of the 3rd Ghoorkhas was expended and, shortly afterwards, the two regiments of the rear guard were forced to call up their first reserve ammunition mules. The march was continued at a rapid pace, until they reached the block caused by the narrowness of the path. Here the whole river reach became choked with animals and doolies. The wounded were coming in fast, when the Pathans, taking advantage of the block, attacked in great force, hoping to compel the retreating force to make their way down the long river defile.

General Westmacott, however, defended his right with energy; the rear-guard regiments supporting each other, while the batteries were in continual action. The Borderers, Sikhs, and Ghoorkhas stood well to their task, till the last of the baggage animals were got out of the river bed.

The country now had become a rolling plateau, intersected by ravines and thickly covered with low jungle, in which the enemy could creep up to within three or four yards of the fighting line. Progress was, consequently, very slow. To be benighted in such a country would have meant disaster, so General Westmacott selected a ridge, which he determined to hold for the night. The wearied men were just filing up, when a tremendous rush was made by the Afridis. For a moment, it seemed as if they would all be enveloped and swept away; but the officers threw themselves into the ranks, magazines were worked freely, and the very bushes seemed to melt away before the hail of shot. The tribesmen were swept back in the darkness, and they never tried a second rush. Their firing also slackened very much, and this permitted the men to form a camp, and see to the wounded.

That day the rear guard lost one officer killed and three wounded, eighteen men killed, eighty-three wounded, and six missing. The night in camp was a terrible experience. The troops had been fighting since early morning, the frost was bitter, and they had neither water, food, nor blankets. General Westmacott passed the night with the sentry line.

Early in the morning the action recommenced and, stubbornly contesting each foot, at times almost in hand-to-hand conflict with tribesmen in the bushes, the rear guard fell back. The summit of the Kotal was passed; but the enemy continued to harass their retirement down to the river, where the picket post of the 9th Ghoorkhas was reached. The retirement from the Tirah had cost a hundred and sixty-four killed and wounded. As a military achievement, this march of Lockhart's 2nd Division should have a prominent place in the history of the British army.

After a quiet day, the force marched into Swaikot. Next morning the troops in camp there gathered on each side of the road, cheering their battle-grimed comrades, and bringing down hot cakes to them. It was a depressing sight. The men were all pinched and dishevelled, and bore on their faces marks of the terrible ordeal through which they had just passed.

The advance guard were followed by the wounded. The 4th Brigade followed. They were even more marked by hardship and strife than those who had preceded them. Then the rear guard marched in, and the first phase of the Tirah expedition was at an end.

The expedition had carried out its object successfully. The Afridis had been severely punished, and had been taught what they had hitherto believed impossible, that their defiles were not impregnable, and that the long arm of the British Government could reach them in their recesses. The lesson had been a very severe one, but it had been attained at a terrible cost. It is to be hoped that it will never have to be repeated.

But while the regiment were resting quietly in their cantonment, there had been serious fighting on the road to Chitral. After some hesitation, the government had decided that this post should remain in our hands, and a strong force was therefore stationed at the Malakand. This, after clearing the country, remained quietly at the station; until news was received of the attack on our fort at Shabkadr, near Peshawar, by the Mohmunds and, two days later, news came that a large council had been held by the fanatics of various tribes, at which they decided to join the tribes in the Upper Valley of Swat.

On the 14th of August the force set out from Thana, under Sir Bindon Blood, on their march for the Upper Swat. The 11th Bengal Lancers were sent forward in order to reconnoitre the country. The enemy were found in force near Jelala, at the entrance to the Upper Swat river, their advance post being established in some Buddhist ruins on a ridge. The Royal West Kent, however, advanced and