The History of England, from the Accession of James the Second - Volume 1 by Thomas Babington Macaulay (diy ebook reader .txt) π
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/> party opposed to the court revived in an instant. During the
night which followed the outrage the whole city of London was in
arms. In a few hours the roads leading to the capital were
covered with multitudes of yeomen spurring hard to Westminster
with the badges of the parliamentary cause in their hats. In the
House of Commons the opposition became at once irresistible, and
carried, by more than two votes to one, resolutions of
unprecedented violence. Strong bodies of the trainbands,
regularly relieved, mounted guard round Westminster Hall. The
gates of the King's palace were daily besieged by a furious
multitude whose taunts and execrations were heard even in the
presence chamber, and who could scarcely be kept out of the royal
apartments by the gentlemen of the household. Had Charles
remained much longer in his stormy capital, it is probable that
the Commons would have found a plea for making him, under outward
forms of respect, a state prisoner.
He quitted London, never to return till the day of a terrible and
memorable reckoning had arrived. A negotiation began which
occupied many months. Accusations and recriminations passed
backward and forward between the contending parties. All
accommodation had become impossible. The sure punishment which
waits on habitual perfidy had at length overtaken the King. It
was to no purpose that he now pawned his royal word, and invoked
heaven to witness the sincerity of his professions. The distrust
with which his adversaries regarded him was not to be removed by
oaths or treaties. They were convinced that they could be safe
only when he was utterly helpless. Their demand, therefore, was,
that he should surrender, not only those prerogatives which he
had usurped in violation of ancient laws and of his own recent
promises, but also other prerogatives which the English Kings had
always possessed, and continue to possess at the present day. No
minister must be appointed, no peer created, without the consent
of the Houses. Above all, the sovereign must resign that supreme
military authority which, from time beyond all memory, had
appertained to the regal office.
That Charles would comply with such demands while he had any
means of resistance, was not to be expected. Yet it will be
difficult to show that the Houses could safely have exacted less.
They were truly in a most embarrassing position. The great
majority of the nation was firmly attached to hereditary
monarchy. Those who held republican opinions were as yet few, and
did not venture to speak out. It was therefore impossible to
abolish kingly government. Yet it was plain that no confidence
could be placed in the King. It would have been absurd in those
who knew, by recent proof, that he was bent on destroying them,
to content themselves with presenting to him another Petition of
Right, and receiving from him fresh promises similar to those
which he had repeatedly made and broken. Nothing but the want of
an army had prevented him from entirely subverting the old
constitution of the realm. It was now necessary to levy a great
regular army for the conquest of Ireland; and it would therefore
have been mere insanity to leave him in possession of that
plenitude of military authority which his ancestors had enjoyed.
When a country is in the situation in which England then was,
when the kingly office is regarded with love and veneration, but
the person who fills that office is hated and distrusted, it
should seem that the course which ought to be taken is obvious.
The dignity of the office should be preserved: the person should
be discarded. Thus our ancestors acted in 1399 and in 1689. Had
there been, in 1642, any man occupying a position similar to that
which Henry of Lancaster occupied at the time of the deposition
of Richard the Second, and which William of Orange occupied at
the time of the deposition of James the Second, it is probable
that the Houses would have changed the dynasty, and would have
made no formal change in the constitution. The new King, called
to the throne by their choice, and dependent on their support,
would have been under the necessity of governing in conformity
with their wishes and opinions. But there was no prince of the
blood royal in the parliamentary party; and, though that party
contained many men of high rank and many men of eminent ability,
there was none who towered so conspicously above the rest that he
could be proposed as a candidate for the crown. As there was to
be a King, and as no new King could be found, it was necessary to
leave the regal title to Charles. Only one course, therefore, was
left: and that was to disjoin the regal title from the regal
prerogatives.
The change which the Houses proposed to make in our institutions,
though it seems exorbitant, when distinctly set forth and
digested into articles of capitulation, really amounts to little
more than the change which, in the next generation, was effected
by the Revolution. It is true that, at the Revolution, the
sovereign was not deprived by law of the power of naming his
ministers: but it is equally true that, since the Revolution, no
minister has been able to retain office six months in opposition
to the sense of the House of Commons. It is true that the
sovereign still possesses the power of creating peers, and the
more important power of the sword: but it is equally true that in
the exercise of these powers the sovereign has, ever since the
Revolution, been guided by advisers who possess the confidence of
the representatives of the nation. In fact, the leaders of the
Roundhead party in 1642, and the statesmen who, about half a
century later, effected the Revolution, had exactly the same
object in view. That object was to terminate the contest between
the Crown and the Parliament, by giving to the Parliament a
supreme control over the executive administration. The statesmen
of the Revolution effected this indirectly by changing the
dynasty. The Roundheads of 1642, being unable to change the
dynasty, were compelled to take a direct course towards their
end.
We cannot, however, wonder that the demands of the opposition,
importing as they did a complete and formal transfer to the
Parliament of powers which had always belonged to the Crown,
should have shocked that great party of which the characteristics
are respect for constitutional authority and dread of violent
innovation. That party had recently been in hopes of obtaining by
peaceable means the ascendency in the House of Commons; but every
such hope had been blighted. The duplicity of Charles had made
his old enemies irreconcileable, had driven back into the ranks
of the disaffected a crowd of moderate men who were in the very
act of coming over to his side, and had so cruelly mortified his
best friends that they had for a time stood aloof in silent shame
and resentment. Now, however, the constitutional Royalists were
forced to make their choice between two dangers; and they thought
it their duty rather to rally round a prince whose past conduct
they condemned, and whose word inspired them with little
confidence, than to suffer the regal office to be degraded, and
the polity of the realm to be entirely remodelled. With such
feelings, many men whose virtues and abilities would have done
honour to any cause, ranged themselves on the side of the King.
In August 1642 the sword was at length drawn; and soon, in almost
every shire of the kingdom, two hostile factions appeared in arms
against each other. It is not easy to say which of the contending
parties was at first the more formidable. The Houses commanded
London and the counties round London, the fleet, the navigation
of the Thames, and most of the large towns and seaports. They had
at their disposal almost all the military stores of the kingdom,
and were able to raise duties, both on goods imported from
foreign countries, and on some important products of domestic
industry. The King was ill provided with artillery and
ammunition. The taxes which he laid on the rural districts
occupied by his troops produced, it is probable, a sum far less
than that which the Parliament drew from the city of London
alone. He relied, indeed, chiefly, for pecuniary aid, on the
munificence of his opulent adherents. Many of these mortgaged
their land, pawned their jewels, and broke up their silver
chargers and christening bowls, in order to assist him. But
experience has fully proved that the voluntary liberality of
individuals, even in times of the greatest excitement, is a poor
financial resource when compared with severe and methodical
taxation, which presses on the willing and unwilling alike.
Charles, however, had one advantage, which, if he had used it
well, would have more than compensated for the want of stores and
money, and which, notwithstanding his mismanagement, gave him,
during some months, a superiority in the war. His troops at first
fought much better than those of the Parliament. Both armies, it
is true, were almost entirely composed of men who had never seen
a field of battle. Nevertheless, the difference was great. The
Parliamentary ranks were filled with hirelings whom want and
idleness had induced to enlist. Hampden's regiment was regarded
as one of the best; and even Hampden's regiment was described by
Cromwell as a mere rabble of tapsters and serving men out of
place. The royal army, on the other hand, consisted in great part
of gentlemen, high spirited, ardent, accustomed to consider
dishonour as more terrible than death, accustomed to fencing, to
the use of fire arms, to bold riding, and to manly and perilous
sport, which has been well called the image of war. Such
gentlemen, mounted on their favourite horses, and commanding
little bands composed of their younger brothers, grooms,
gamekeepers, and huntsmen, were, from the very first day on which
they took the field, qualified to play their part with credit in
a skirmish. The steadiness, the prompt obedience, the mechanical
precision of movement, which are characteristic of the regular
soldier, these gallant volunteers never attained. But they were
at first opposed to enemies as undisciplined as themselves, and
far less active, athletic, and daring. For a time, therefore, the
Cavaliers were successful in almost every encounter.
The Houses had also been unfortunate in the choice of a general.
The rank and wealth of the Earl of Essex made him one of the most
important members of the parliamentary party. He had borne arms
on the Continent with credit, and, when the war began, had as
high a military reputation as any man in the country. But it soon
appeared that he was unfit for the post of Commander in Chief. He
had little energy and no originality. The methodical tactics
night which followed the outrage the whole city of London was in
arms. In a few hours the roads leading to the capital were
covered with multitudes of yeomen spurring hard to Westminster
with the badges of the parliamentary cause in their hats. In the
House of Commons the opposition became at once irresistible, and
carried, by more than two votes to one, resolutions of
unprecedented violence. Strong bodies of the trainbands,
regularly relieved, mounted guard round Westminster Hall. The
gates of the King's palace were daily besieged by a furious
multitude whose taunts and execrations were heard even in the
presence chamber, and who could scarcely be kept out of the royal
apartments by the gentlemen of the household. Had Charles
remained much longer in his stormy capital, it is probable that
the Commons would have found a plea for making him, under outward
forms of respect, a state prisoner.
He quitted London, never to return till the day of a terrible and
memorable reckoning had arrived. A negotiation began which
occupied many months. Accusations and recriminations passed
backward and forward between the contending parties. All
accommodation had become impossible. The sure punishment which
waits on habitual perfidy had at length overtaken the King. It
was to no purpose that he now pawned his royal word, and invoked
heaven to witness the sincerity of his professions. The distrust
with which his adversaries regarded him was not to be removed by
oaths or treaties. They were convinced that they could be safe
only when he was utterly helpless. Their demand, therefore, was,
that he should surrender, not only those prerogatives which he
had usurped in violation of ancient laws and of his own recent
promises, but also other prerogatives which the English Kings had
always possessed, and continue to possess at the present day. No
minister must be appointed, no peer created, without the consent
of the Houses. Above all, the sovereign must resign that supreme
military authority which, from time beyond all memory, had
appertained to the regal office.
That Charles would comply with such demands while he had any
means of resistance, was not to be expected. Yet it will be
difficult to show that the Houses could safely have exacted less.
They were truly in a most embarrassing position. The great
majority of the nation was firmly attached to hereditary
monarchy. Those who held republican opinions were as yet few, and
did not venture to speak out. It was therefore impossible to
abolish kingly government. Yet it was plain that no confidence
could be placed in the King. It would have been absurd in those
who knew, by recent proof, that he was bent on destroying them,
to content themselves with presenting to him another Petition of
Right, and receiving from him fresh promises similar to those
which he had repeatedly made and broken. Nothing but the want of
an army had prevented him from entirely subverting the old
constitution of the realm. It was now necessary to levy a great
regular army for the conquest of Ireland; and it would therefore
have been mere insanity to leave him in possession of that
plenitude of military authority which his ancestors had enjoyed.
When a country is in the situation in which England then was,
when the kingly office is regarded with love and veneration, but
the person who fills that office is hated and distrusted, it
should seem that the course which ought to be taken is obvious.
The dignity of the office should be preserved: the person should
be discarded. Thus our ancestors acted in 1399 and in 1689. Had
there been, in 1642, any man occupying a position similar to that
which Henry of Lancaster occupied at the time of the deposition
of Richard the Second, and which William of Orange occupied at
the time of the deposition of James the Second, it is probable
that the Houses would have changed the dynasty, and would have
made no formal change in the constitution. The new King, called
to the throne by their choice, and dependent on their support,
would have been under the necessity of governing in conformity
with their wishes and opinions. But there was no prince of the
blood royal in the parliamentary party; and, though that party
contained many men of high rank and many men of eminent ability,
there was none who towered so conspicously above the rest that he
could be proposed as a candidate for the crown. As there was to
be a King, and as no new King could be found, it was necessary to
leave the regal title to Charles. Only one course, therefore, was
left: and that was to disjoin the regal title from the regal
prerogatives.
The change which the Houses proposed to make in our institutions,
though it seems exorbitant, when distinctly set forth and
digested into articles of capitulation, really amounts to little
more than the change which, in the next generation, was effected
by the Revolution. It is true that, at the Revolution, the
sovereign was not deprived by law of the power of naming his
ministers: but it is equally true that, since the Revolution, no
minister has been able to retain office six months in opposition
to the sense of the House of Commons. It is true that the
sovereign still possesses the power of creating peers, and the
more important power of the sword: but it is equally true that in
the exercise of these powers the sovereign has, ever since the
Revolution, been guided by advisers who possess the confidence of
the representatives of the nation. In fact, the leaders of the
Roundhead party in 1642, and the statesmen who, about half a
century later, effected the Revolution, had exactly the same
object in view. That object was to terminate the contest between
the Crown and the Parliament, by giving to the Parliament a
supreme control over the executive administration. The statesmen
of the Revolution effected this indirectly by changing the
dynasty. The Roundheads of 1642, being unable to change the
dynasty, were compelled to take a direct course towards their
end.
We cannot, however, wonder that the demands of the opposition,
importing as they did a complete and formal transfer to the
Parliament of powers which had always belonged to the Crown,
should have shocked that great party of which the characteristics
are respect for constitutional authority and dread of violent
innovation. That party had recently been in hopes of obtaining by
peaceable means the ascendency in the House of Commons; but every
such hope had been blighted. The duplicity of Charles had made
his old enemies irreconcileable, had driven back into the ranks
of the disaffected a crowd of moderate men who were in the very
act of coming over to his side, and had so cruelly mortified his
best friends that they had for a time stood aloof in silent shame
and resentment. Now, however, the constitutional Royalists were
forced to make their choice between two dangers; and they thought
it their duty rather to rally round a prince whose past conduct
they condemned, and whose word inspired them with little
confidence, than to suffer the regal office to be degraded, and
the polity of the realm to be entirely remodelled. With such
feelings, many men whose virtues and abilities would have done
honour to any cause, ranged themselves on the side of the King.
In August 1642 the sword was at length drawn; and soon, in almost
every shire of the kingdom, two hostile factions appeared in arms
against each other. It is not easy to say which of the contending
parties was at first the more formidable. The Houses commanded
London and the counties round London, the fleet, the navigation
of the Thames, and most of the large towns and seaports. They had
at their disposal almost all the military stores of the kingdom,
and were able to raise duties, both on goods imported from
foreign countries, and on some important products of domestic
industry. The King was ill provided with artillery and
ammunition. The taxes which he laid on the rural districts
occupied by his troops produced, it is probable, a sum far less
than that which the Parliament drew from the city of London
alone. He relied, indeed, chiefly, for pecuniary aid, on the
munificence of his opulent adherents. Many of these mortgaged
their land, pawned their jewels, and broke up their silver
chargers and christening bowls, in order to assist him. But
experience has fully proved that the voluntary liberality of
individuals, even in times of the greatest excitement, is a poor
financial resource when compared with severe and methodical
taxation, which presses on the willing and unwilling alike.
Charles, however, had one advantage, which, if he had used it
well, would have more than compensated for the want of stores and
money, and which, notwithstanding his mismanagement, gave him,
during some months, a superiority in the war. His troops at first
fought much better than those of the Parliament. Both armies, it
is true, were almost entirely composed of men who had never seen
a field of battle. Nevertheless, the difference was great. The
Parliamentary ranks were filled with hirelings whom want and
idleness had induced to enlist. Hampden's regiment was regarded
as one of the best; and even Hampden's regiment was described by
Cromwell as a mere rabble of tapsters and serving men out of
place. The royal army, on the other hand, consisted in great part
of gentlemen, high spirited, ardent, accustomed to consider
dishonour as more terrible than death, accustomed to fencing, to
the use of fire arms, to bold riding, and to manly and perilous
sport, which has been well called the image of war. Such
gentlemen, mounted on their favourite horses, and commanding
little bands composed of their younger brothers, grooms,
gamekeepers, and huntsmen, were, from the very first day on which
they took the field, qualified to play their part with credit in
a skirmish. The steadiness, the prompt obedience, the mechanical
precision of movement, which are characteristic of the regular
soldier, these gallant volunteers never attained. But they were
at first opposed to enemies as undisciplined as themselves, and
far less active, athletic, and daring. For a time, therefore, the
Cavaliers were successful in almost every encounter.
The Houses had also been unfortunate in the choice of a general.
The rank and wealth of the Earl of Essex made him one of the most
important members of the parliamentary party. He had borne arms
on the Continent with credit, and, when the war began, had as
high a military reputation as any man in the country. But it soon
appeared that he was unfit for the post of Commander in Chief. He
had little energy and no originality. The methodical tactics
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