Unconscious Memory(Fiscle Part-3) by Samuel Butler (classic books to read .TXT) 📕

A Better Definition Of Instinct Would Be That It Is Inherited

Knowledge In Respect Of Certain Facts,  And Of The Most Suitable

Manner In Which To Deal With Them.

Von Hartmann Speaks Of "A Mechanism Of Brain Or Mind" Contrived By

Nature,  And Again Of "A Psychical Organisation," As Though It Were

Something Distinct From A Physical Organisation.

We Can Conceive Of Such A Thing As Mechanism Of Brain,  For We Have

Seen Brain And Handled It; But Until We Have Seen A Mind And Handled

It,  Or At Any Rate Been Enabled To Draw Inferences Which Will Warrant

Us In Conceiving Of It As A Material Substance Apart From Bodily

Substance,  We Cannot Infer That It Has An Organisation Apart From

Bodily Organisation.  Does Von Hartmann Mean That We Have Two Bodies-

-A Body-Body,  And A Soul-Body?

He Says That No One Will Call The Action Of The Spider Instinctive In

Voiding The Fluids From Its Glands When They Are Too Full.  Why Not?

He Is Continually Personifying Instinct; Thus He Speaks Of The "Ends

Proposed To Itself By The Instinct," Of "The Blind Unconscious

Purpose Of The Instinct," Of "An Unconscious Purpose Constraining The

Volition Of The Bird," Of "Each Variation And Modification Of The

Instinct," As Though Instinct,  Purpose,  And,  Later On,  Clairvoyance,

Were Persons,  And Not Words Characterising A Certain Class Of

Actions.  The Ends Are Proposed To Itself By The Animal,  Not By The

Instinct.  Nothing But Mischief Can Come Of A Mode Of Expression

Which Does Not Keep This Clearly In View.

It Must Not Be Supposed That The Same Cuckoo Is In The Habit Of

Laying In The Nests Of Several Different Species,  And Of Changing The

Colour Of Her Eggs According To That Of The Eggs Of The Bird In Whose

Nest She Lays.  I Have Inquired From Mr. R. Bowdler Sharpe Of The

Ornithological Department At The British Museum,  Who Kindly Gives It

Me As His Opinion That Though Cuckoos Do Imitate The Eggs Of The

Species On Whom They Foist Their Young Ones,  Yet One Cuckoo Will

Probably Lay In The Nests Of One Species Also,  And Will Stick To That

Species For Life.  If So,  The Same Race Of Cuckoos May Impose Upon

The Same Species For Generations Together.  The Instinct Will Even

Thus Remain A Very Wonderful One,  But It Is Not At All Inconsistent

With The Theory Put Forward By Professor Hering And Myself.

Returning To The Idea Of Psychical Mechanism,  He Admits That "It Is

Itself So Obscure That We Can Hardly Form Any Idea Concerning It,"

{139a} And Then Goes On To Claim For It That It Explains A Great Many

Other Things.  This Must Have Been The Passage Which Mr. Sully Had In

View When He Very Justly Wrote That Von Hartmann "Dogmatically Closes

The Field Of Physical Inquiry,  And Takes Refuge In A Phantom Which

Explains Everything,  Simply Because It Is Itself Incapable Of

Explanation."

According To Von Hartmann {139b} The Unpractised Animal Manifests Its

Instinct As Perfectly As The Practised.  This Is Not The Case.  The

Young Animal Exhibits Marvellous Proficiency,  But It Gains By

Experience.  I Have Watched Sparrows,  Which I Can Hardly Doubt To Be

Young Ones,  Spend A Whole Month In Trying To Build Their Nest,  And

Give It Up In The End As Hopeless.  I Have Watched Three Such Cases

This Spring In A Tree Not Twenty Feet From My Own Window And On A

Level With My Eye,  So That I Have Been Able To See What Was Going On

At All Hours Of The Day.  In Each Case The Nest Was Made Well And

Rapidly Up To A Certain Point,  And Then Got Top-Heavy And Tumbled

Over,  So That Little Was Left On The Tree:  It Was Reconstructed And

Reconstructed Over And Over Again,  Always With The Same Result,  Till

At Last In All Three Cases The Birds Gave Up In Despair.  I Believe

The Older And Stronger Birds Secure The Fixed And Best Sites,  Driving

The Younger Birds To The Trees,  And That The Art Of Building Nests In

Trees Is Dying Out Among House-Sparrows.

He Declares That Instinct Is Not Due To Organisation So Much As

Organisation To Instinct. {140}  The Fact Is,  That Neither Can Claim

Precedence Of Or Pre-Eminence Over The Other.  Instinct And

Organisation Are Only Mind And Body,  Or Mind And Matter; And These

Are Not Two Separable Things,  But One And Inseparable,  With,  As It

Were,  Two Sides; The One Of Which Is A Function Of The Other.  There

Was Never Yet Either Matter Without Mind,  However Low,  Nor Mind,

However High,  Without A Material Body Of Some Sort; There Can Be No

Change In One Without A Corresponding Change In The Other; Neither

Came Before The Other; Neither Can Either Cease To Change Or Cease To

Be; For "To Be" Is To Continue Changing,  So That "To Be" And "To

Change" Are One.

Whence,  He Asks,  Comes The Desire To Gratify An Instinct Before

Experience Of The Pleasure That Will Ensue On Gratification?  This Is

A Pertinent Question,  But It Is Met By Professor Hering With The

Answer That This Is Due To Memory--To The Continuation In The Germ Of

Vibrations That Were Vibrating In The Body Of The Parent,  And Which,

When Stimulated By Vibrations Of A Suitable Rhythm,  Become More And

More Powerful Till They Suffice To Set The Body In Visible Action.

For My Own Part I Only Venture To Maintain That It Is Due To Memory,

That Is To Say,  To An Enduring Sense On The Part Of The Germ Of The

Action It Took When In The Persons Of Its Ancestors,  And Of The

Gratification Which Ensued Thereon.  This Meets Von Hartmann's Whole

Difficulty.

The Glacier Is Not Snow.  It Is Snow Packed Tight Into A Small

Compass,  And Has Thus Lost All Trace Of Its Original Form.  How

Incomplete,  However,  Would Be Any Theory Of Glacial Action Which Left

Out Of Sight The Origin Of The Glacier In Snow!  Von Hartmann Loses

Sight Of The Origin Of Instinctive In Deliberative Actions Because

The Two Classes Of Action Are Now In Many Respects Different.  His

Philosophy Of The Unconscious Fails To Consider What Is The Normal

Process By Means Of Which Such Common Actions As We Can Watch,  And

Whose History We Can Follow,  Have Come To Be Done Unconsciously.

He Says,  {141} "How Inconceivable Is The Supposition Of A Mechanism,

&C.,  &C.; How Clear And Simple,  On The Other Hand,  Is The View That

There Is An Unconscious Purpose Constraining The Volition Of The Bird

To The Use Of The Fitting Means."  Does He Mean That There Is An

Actual Thing--An Unconscious Purpose--Something Outside The Bird,  As

It Were A Man,  Which Lays Hold Of The Bird And Makes It Do This Or

That,  As A Master Makes A Servant Do His Bidding?  If So,  He Again

Personifies The Purpose Itself,  And Must Therefore Embody It,  Or Be

Talking In A Manner Which Plain People Cannot Understand.  If,  On The

Other Hand,  He Means "How Simple Is The View That The Bird Acts

Unconsciously," This Is Not More Simple Than Supposing It To Act

Consciously; And What Ground Has He For Supposing That The Bird Is

Unconscious?  It Is As Simple,  And As Much In Accordance With The

Facts,  To Suppose That The Bird Feels The Air To Be Colder,  And Knows

That She Must Warm Her Eggs If She Is To Hatch Them,  As Consciously

As A Mother Knows That She Must Not Expose Her New-Born Infant To The

Cold.

On Page 99 Of This Book We Find Von Hartmann Saying That If It Is

Once Granted That The Normal And Abnormal Manifestations Of Instinct

Spring From A Single Source,  Then The Objection That The Modification

Is Due To Conscious Knowledge Will Be Found To Be A Suicidal One

Later On,  In So Far As It Is Directed Against Instinct Generally.  I

Understand Him To Mean That If We Admit Instinctive Action,  And The

Modifications Of That Action Which More Nearly Resemble Results Of

Reason,  To Be Actions Of The Same Ultimate Kind Differing In Degree

Only,  And If We Thus Attempt To Reduce Instinctive Action To The

Prophetic Strain Arising From Old Experience,  We Shall Be Obliged To

Admit That The Formation Of The Embryo Is Ultimately Due To

Reflection--Which He Seems To Think Is A Reductio Ad Absurdum Of The

Argument.

Therefore,  He Concludes,  If There Is To Be Only One Source,  The

Source Must Be Unconscious,  And Not Conscious.  We Reply,  That We Do

Not See The Absurdity Of The Position Which We Grant We Have Been

Driven To.  We Hold That The Formation Of The Embryo Is Ultimately

Due To Reflection And Design.

The Writer Of An Article In The Times,  April 1,  1880,  Says That

Servants Must Be Taught Their Calling Before They Can Practise It;

But,  In Fact,  They Can Only Be Taught Their Calling By Practising It.

So Von Hartmann Says Animals Must Feel The Pleasure Consequent On

Gratification Of An Instinct Before They Can Be Stimulated To Act

Upon The Instinct By A Knowledge Of The Pleasure That Will Ensue.

This Sounds Logical,  But In Practice A Little Performance And A

Little Teaching--A Little Sense Of Pleasure And A Little Connection

Of That Pleasure With This Or That Practice,--Come Up Simultaneously

From Something That We Cannot See,  The Two Being So Small And So Much

Abreast,  That We Do Not Know Which Is First,  Performance Or Teaching;

And,  Again,  Action,  Or Pleasure Supposed As Coming From The Action.

"Geistes-Mechanismus" Comes As Near To "Disposition Of Mind," Or,

More Shortly,  "Disposition," As So Unsatisfactory A Word Can Come To

Anything.  Yet,  If We Translate It Throughout By "Disposition," We

Shall See How Little We Are Being Told.

We Find On Page 114 That "All Instinctive Actions Give Us An

Impression Of Absolute Security And Infallibility"; That "The Will Is

Never Weak Or Hesitating,  As It Is When Inferences Are Being Drawn

Consciously."