A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1 by Surendranath Dasgupta (desktop ebook reader txt) 📕

[Footnote 4: Dharmakîrtti calls himself an adherent of Vijñanavâda in his Santânântarasiddhi, a treatise on solipsism, but his Nyâyabindu seems rightly to have been considered by the author of Nyâyabindu@tîkâ@tippani (p. 19) as being written from the Sautrântika point of view.]

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desires to have (samyagjñânapûrvikâ sarvapuru@sârthasiddhi) [Footnote ref 1]. When on proceeding, in accordance with the presentation of any knowledge, we get a thing as presented by it we call it right knowledge. Right knowledge is thus the knowledge by which one can practically acquire the thing he wants to acquire (arthâdhigati). The process of knowledge, therefore, starts with the perceptual presentation and ends with the attainment of the thing represented by it and the fulfilment of the practical need by it (arthâdhigamât samâpta@h pramâ@navyâpârah). Thus there are three moments in the perceptual acquirement of knowledge: (1) the presentation, (2) our prompting in accordance with it, and (3) the final realization of the object in accordance with our endeavour following the direction of knowledge. Inference is also to be called right knowledge, as it also serves our practical need by representing the presence of objects in certain connections and helping us to realize them. In perception this presentation is direct, while in inference this is brought about indirectly through the li@nga (reason). Knowledge is sought by men for the realization of their ends, and the subject of knowledge is discussed in philosophical works only because knowledge is sought by men. Any knowledge, therefore, which will not lead us to the realization of the object represented by it could not be called right knowledge. All illusory perceptions, therefore, such as the perception of a white conch-shell as yellow or dream perceptions, are not right knowledge, since they do not lead to the realization of such objects as are presented by them. It is true no doubt that since all objects are momentary, the object which was perceived at the moment of perception was not the same as that which was realized at a later moment. But the series of existents which started with the first perception of a blue object finds itself realized by the realization of other existents of the same series (nîlâdau ya eva santâna@h paricchinno nilajñânena sa eva tena prâpita@h tena nilajñânam pramâ@nam) [Footnote ref 2].

When it is said that right knowledge is an invariable antecedent of the realization of any desirable thing or the retarding of any undesirable thing, it must be noted that it is not meant

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[Footnote 1: Brief extracts from the opinions of two other commentators of Nyâyaybindu, Vinîtadeva and S'antabhadra (seventh century), are found in Nyâyabindu@tîkâtippanî, a commentary of Nyayabindutikâ of Dharmmottara, but their texts are not available to us.]

[Footnote 2: Nyâyabindu@tîkâ@tippanî, p. 11.]

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that right knowledge is directly the cause of it; for, with the rise of any right perception, there is a memory of past experiences, desire is aroused, through desire an endeavour in accordance with it is launched, and as a result of that there is realization of the object of desire. Thus, looked at from this point of view, right knowledge is not directly the cause of the realization of the object. Right knowledge of course directly indicates the presentation, the object of desire, but so far as the object is a mere presentation it is not a subject of enquiry. It becomes a subject of enquiry only in connection with our achieving the object presented by perception.

Perception (pratyaks'a) has been defined by Dharmakîrtti as a presentation, which is generated by the objects alone, unassociated by any names or relations (kalpanâ) and which is not erroneous (kalpanâpo@dhamabhrântam) [Footnote ref 1]. This definition does not indeed represent the actual nature (svarûpa) of perception, but only shows the condition which must be fulfilled in order that anything may be valid perception. What is meant by saying that a perception is not erroneous is simply this, that it will be such that if one engages himself in an endeavour in accordance with it, he will not be baffled in the object which was presented to him by his perception (tasmâdgrâhye arthe vasturûpe yadaviparyastam tadabhrântamiha veditavyam}. It is said that a right perception could not be associated with names (kalpanâ or abhilâpa). This qualification is added only with a view of leaving out all that is not directly generated by the object. A name is given to a thing only when it is associated in the mind, through memory, as being the same as perceived before. This cannot, therefore, be regarded as being produced by the object of perception. The senses present the objects by coming in contact with them, and the objects also must of necessity allow themselves to be presented as they are when they are in contact with the proper senses. But the work of recognition or giving names is not what is directly produced by the objects themselves, for this involves the unification of previous experiences, and this is certainly not what is presented

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[Footnote 1: The definition first given in the Pramânasamucaya (not available in Sanskrit) of Di@nnâga (500 A.D.) was "Kalpanâpodham." According to Dharmakirtti it is the indeterminate knowledge (nirvikalpa jñâna) consisting only of the copy of the object presented to the senses that constitutes the valid element presented to perception. The determinate knowledge (savikalpa jñâna), as formed by the conceptual activity of the mind identifying the object with what has been experienced before, cannot be regarded as truly representing what is really presented to the senses.]

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to the sense (pûrvad@r@s@tâparad@r@s@tañcârthamekîkurvadvijñânamasannihitavi@sayam pûrvad@r@s@tasyâsannihitatvât). In all illusory perceptions it is the sense which is affected either by extraneous or by inherent physiological causes. If the senses are not perverted they are bound to present the object correctly. Perception thus means the correct presentation through the senses of an object in its own uniqueness as containing only those features which are its and its alone (svalak@sa@nam). The validity of knowledge consists in the sameness that it has with the objects presented by it (arthena saha yatsârûpyam sâd@rs'yamasya jñânasya tatpramâ@namiha). But the objection here is that if our percept is only similar to the external object then this similarity is a thing which is different from the presentation, and thus perception becomes invalid. But the similarity is not different from the percept which appears as being similar to the object. It is by virtue of their sameness that we refer to the object by the percept (taditi sârûpyam tasya vas'ât) and our perception of the object becomes possible. It is because we have an awareness of blueness that we speak of having perceived a blue object. The relation, however, between the notion of similarity of the perception with the blue object and the indefinite awareness of blue in perception is not one of causation but of a determinant and a determinate (vyavasthâpyavyavasthâpakabhâvena). Thus it is the same cognition which in one form stands as signifying the similarity with the object of perception and is in another indefinite form the awareness as the percept (tata ekasya vastuna@h kiñcidrûpam pramâ@nam kiñcitpramâ@naphalam na virudhyate). It is on account of this similarity with the object that a cognition can be a determinant of the definite awareness (vyavasthâpanaheturhi sârûpyam), so that by the determinate we know the determinant and thus by the similarity of the sense-datum with the object {pramâ@na) we come to think that our awareness has this particular form as "blue" (pramâ@naphala). If this sameness between the knowledge and its object was not felt we could not have spoken of the object from the awareness (sârûpyamanubhûtam vyavasthâpanahetu@h). The object generates an awareness similar to itself, and it is this correspondence that can lead us to the realization of the object so presented by right knowledge [Footnote ref l].

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[Footnote 1: See also pp. 340 and 409. It is unfortunate that, excepting the Nyâyabindu, Nyâyabindu@tîkâ, Nyâyabindu@tîkâ@tippanî (St Petersburg, 1909), no other works dealing with this interesting doctrine of perception are available to us. Nyâyabindu is probably one of the earliest works in which we hear of the doctrine of arthakriyâkâritva (practical fulfilment of our desire as a criterion of right knowledge). Later on it was regarded as a criterion of existence, as Ratnakîrtti's works and the profuse references by Hindu writers to the Buddhistic doctrines prove. The word arthakriyâ is found in Candrakîrtti's commentary on Nâgârjuna and also in such early works as Lalitavistara (pointed out to me by Dr E.J. Thomas of the Cambridge University Library) but the word has no philosophical significance there.]

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Sautrântika theory of Inference [Footnote ref 1].

According to the Sautrântika doctrine of Buddhism as described by Dharmakîrtti and Dharmmottara which is probably the only account of systematic Buddhist logic that is now available to us in Sanskrit, inference (anumâna) is divided into two classes, called svârthânumâna (inferential knowledge attained by a person arguing in his own mind or judgments), and parârthânumâna (inference through the help of articulated propositions for convincing others in a debate). The validity of inference depended, like the validity of perception, on copying the actually existing facts of the external world. Inference copied external realities as much as perception did; just as the validity of the immediate perception of blue depends upon its similarity to the external blue thing perceived, so the validity of the inference of a blue thing also, so far as it is knowledge, depends upon its resemblance to the external fact thus inferred (sârûpyavas'âddhi tannîlapratîtirûpam sidhyati).

The reason by which an inference is made should be such that it may be present only in those cases where the thing to be inferred exists, and absent in every case where it does not exist. It is only when the reason is tested by both these joint conditions that an unfailing connection (pratibandha) between the reason and the thing to be inferred can be established. It is not enough that the reason should be present in all cases where the thing to be inferred exists and absent where it does not exist, but it is necessary that it should be present only in the above case. This law (niyama) is essential for establishing the unfailing condition necessary for inference [Footnote ref 2]. This unfailing natural connection (svabhâvapratibandha) is found in two types

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[Footnote 1: As the Pramâ@nasamuccaya of Diñnâga is not available in Sanskrit, we can hardly know anything of developed Buddhist logic except what can be got from the Nyâyabindu@tîkâ of Dharmmottara.]

[Footnote 2: tasmât niyamavatorevânvayavyatirekayo@h prayoga@h karttavya@h yena pratibandho gamyeta sâdhanyasa sâdhyena. Nyâyabindu@tîkâ, p. 24.]

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of cases. The first is that where the nature of the reason is contained in the thing to be inferred as a part of its nature, i.e. where the reason stands for a species of which the thing to be inferred is a genus; thus a stupid person living in a place full of tall pines may come to think that pines are called trees because they are tall and it may be useful to point out to him that even a small pine plant is a tree because it is pine; the quality of pineness forms a part of the essence of treeness, for the former being a species is contained in the latter as a genus; the nature of the species being identical with the nature of the genus, one could infer the latter from the former but not vice versa; this is called the unfailing natural connection of identity of nature (tâdâtmya). The second is that where the cause is inferred from the effect which stands as the reason of the former. Thus from the smoke the fire which has produced it may be inferred. The ground of these inferences is that reason is naturally indissolubly connected with the thing to be inferred, and unless this is the case, no inference is warrantable.

This natural indissoluble connection (svabhâvapratibandha), be it of the nature of identity of essence of the species in the genus or inseparable connection of the effect with the cause, is the ground of all inference [Footnote ref 1]. The svabhâvapratibandha determines the inseparability of connection (avinâbhâvaniyama) and the inference is made not through a series of premisses, but directly by the li@nga (reason) which has the inseparable connection [Footnote ref 2].

The second type of inference known as parârthânumâna agrees with svârthânumâna in all essential characteristics; the main difference between the two is this, that in the case of parârthânumâna, the inferential process has to be put verbally in premisses.

Pandit Ratnâkarasânti, probably of the ninth or the tenth century
A.D., wrote a paper named Antarvyâptisamarthana in which

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[Footnote 1: na hi yo yatra svabhâvena na pratibaddha@h sa tam apratibaddhavi@sayamavs'yameva na vyabhicaratîti nâsti tayoravyabhicâraniyama. Nyâyabindu@tîkâ, p. 29.]

[Footnote 2: The inseparable connection determining inference is only possible when the li@nga satisfies the three following conditions, viz. (1) pak@sasattva (existence of the li@nga in the pak@sa—the thing about which something is inferred); (2) sapak@sasattva (existence of the li@nga in those cases where the sâdhya oc probandum existed), and (3) vipak@sâsattva (its non-existence in all those places where the sâdhya did not exist). The Buddhists admitted three propositions