A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1 by Surendranath Dasgupta (desktop ebook reader txt) 📕

But so long as it is borne in mind that the name is not identical with the thing but is only associated with it as being the same as was previously acquired, there cannot be any objection to the association of the name. But the Buddhists further object that there is no reason why one should identify a thing seen at the present moment as being that which was seen before, for this identity is never the object of visual perception. To this Vâcaspati says that through the help of memory or past impressions (sa@mskâra) this can be considered as being directly the object of perception, for whatever may be the concomitant causes when the main cause of sense-contact is

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[Footnote 1: Nyâyamañjarî, pp. 93-100, "Pañca caite kalpanâ bhavanti jâtikalpanâ, gu@nakalpanâ, kriyâkalpanâ, nâmakalpanâ dravyakalpanâ ceti, tâs'ca kvacidabhede'pi bhedakalpanât kvacicca bhede'pyabhedakalpanât kalpanâ ucyante." See Dharmakîrtti's theory of Perception, pp. 151-4. See also pp. 409-410 of this book.]

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present, this perception of identity should be regarded as an effect of it. But the Buddhists still emphasize the point that an object of past experience refers to a past time and place and is not experienced now and cannot therefore be identified with an object which is experienced at the present moment. It has to be admitted that Vâcaspati's answer is not very satisfactory for it leads ultimately to the testimony of direct perception which was challenged by the Buddhists [Footnote ref 1]. It is easy to see that early Nyâya-Vais'e@sika could not dismiss the savikalpa perception as invalid for it was the same as the nirvikalpa and differed from it only in this, that a name was associated with the thing of perception at this stage. As it admits a gradual development of perception as the progressive effects of causal operations continued through the contacts of the mind with the self and the object under the influence of various intellectual (e.g. memory) and physical (e.g. light rays) concomitant causes, it does not, like Vedânta, require that right perception should only give knowledge which was not previously acquired. The variation as well as production of knowledge in the soul depends upon the variety of causal collocations.

Mind according to Nyâya is regarded as a separate sense and can come in contact with pleasure, pain, desire, antipathy and will. The later Nyâya writers speak of three other kinds of contact of a transcendental nature called sâmânyalak@sa@na, jñânalak@sa@na and yogaja (miraculous). The contact sâmânyalak@sa@na is that by virtue of which by coming in contact with a particular we are transcendentally (alaukika) in contact with all the particulars (in a general way) of which the corresponding universal may be predicated. Thus when I see smoke and through it my sense is in contact with the universal associated with smoke my visual sense is in transcendental contact with all smoke in general. Jñânalak@sa@na contact is that by virtue of which we can associate the perceptions of other senses when perceiving by any one sense. Thus when we are looking at a piece of sandal wood our visual sense is in touch with its colour only, but still we perceive it to be fragrant without any direct contact of the object with the organ of smell. The sort of transcendental contact (alaukika sannikar@sa) by virtue of which this is rendered

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[Footnote 1: Tâtparya@tîkâ, pp. 88-95.]

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possible is called jñânalak@sa@na. But the knowledge acquired by these two contacts is not counted as perception [Footnote ref l].

Pleasures and pains (sukha and du@hkha) are held by Nyâya to be different from knowledge (jñâna). For knowledge interprets, conceives or illumines things, but sukha etc. are never found to appear as behaving in that character. On the other hand we feel that we grasp them after having some knowledge. They cannot be self-revealing, for even knowledge is not so; if it were so, then that experience which generates sukha in one should have generated the same kind of feeling in others, or in other words it should have manifested its nature as sukha to all; and this does not happen, for the same thing which generates sukha in one might not do so in others. Moreover even admitting for argument's sake that it is knowledge itself that appears as pleasure and pain, it is evident that there must be some differences between the pleasurable and painful experiences that make them so different, and this difference is due to the fact that knowledge in one case was associated with sukha and in another case with du@hkha, This shows that sukha and du@hkha are not themselves knowledge. Such is the course of things that sukha and du@hkha are generated by the collocation of certain conditions, and are manifested through or in association with other objects either in direct perception or in memory. They are thus the qualities which are generated in the self as a result of causal operation. It should however be remembered that merit and demerit act as concomitant causes in their production.

The yogins are believed to have the pratyak@sa of the most distant things beyond our senses; they can acquire this power by gradually increasing their powers of concentration and perceive the subtlest and most distant objects directly by their mind. Even we ourselves may at some time have the notions of future events which come to be true, e.g. sometimes I may have the intuition that "To-morrow my brother will come,"

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[Footnote 1:Siddhântamuktâvalî on Kârikâ 63 and 64. We must remember that Ga@nges'a discarded the definition of perception as given in the Nyâya sûtra which we have discussed above, and held that perception should be defined as that cognition which has the special class-character of direct apprehension. He thinks that the old definition of perception as the cognition generated by sense-contact involves a vicious circle (Tattvacintâma@ni, pp. 538-546). Sense-contact is still regarded by him as the cause of perception, but it should not be included in the definition. He agrees to the six kinds of contact described first by Udyotakara as mentioned above.]

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and this may happen to be true. This is called pratibhânajñâna, which is also to be regarded as a pratyak@sa directly by the mind. This is of course different from the other form of perception called mânasa-pratyak@sa, by which memories of past perceptions by other senses are associated with a percept visualized at the present moment; thus we see a rose and perceive that it is fragrant; the fragrance is not perceived by the eye, but the manas perceives it directly and associates the visual percept with it. According to Vedânta this acquired perception is only a case of inference. The prâtibha-pratyak@sa however is that which is with reference to the happening of a future event. When a cognition is produced, it is produced only as an objective cognition, e.g. This is a pot, but after this it is again related to the self by the mind as "I know this pot." This is effected by the mind again coming in contact for reperception of the cognition which had already been generated in the soul. This second reperception is called anuvyavasâya, and all practical work can proceed as a result of this anuvyavasâya [Footnote ref. l].

Inference.

Inference (anumâna) is the second means of proof (prâmâ@na) and the most valuable contribution that Nyâya has made has been on this subject. It consists in making an assertion about a thing on the strength of the mark or liñga which is associated with it, as when finding smoke rising from a hill we remember that since smoke cannot be without fire, there must also be fire in yonder hill. In an example like this smoke is technically called liñga, or hetu. That about which the assertion has been made (the hill in this example) is called pak@sa, and the term "fire" is called sâdhya. To make a correct inference it is necessary that the hetu or liñga must be present in the pak@sa,

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[Footnote 1: This later Nyâya doctrine that the cognition of self in association with cognition is produced at a later moment must be contrasted with the triputîpratyak@sa doctrine of Prabhâkara, which holds that the object, knower and knowledge are all given simultaneously in knowledge. Vyavasâya (determinate cognition), according to Ga@nges'a, gives us only the cognition of the object, but the cognition that I am aware of this object or cognition is a different functioning succeeding the former one and is called anu (after) vyavasâya (cognition), "_idamaha@m jânâmîti vyavasâye na bhâsate taddhakendriyasannikar@sâbhâvât kintvida@mvi@sayakajñânatvavis'i@s@tasya jñânasya vais'i@styamâtmani bhâsate; na ca svaprakâs'e vyavasâya tâd@rs'a@m svasya vais'i@s@tya@m bhâsitumarhati, pûrva@m vis'e@sa@nasya tasyâjñânât, tasmâdidamaha@m jânâmiti na vyavasâya@h kintu anuvyavasâyah." Tattvacintâma@ni, p. 795.]

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and in all other known objects similar to the pak@sa in having the sâdhya in it (sapak@sa-sattâ), i.e., which are known to possess the sâdhya (possessing fire in the present example). The liñga must not be present in any such object as does not possess the sâdhya (vipak@sa-vyâv@rtti absent from vipak@sa or that which does not possess the sâdhya). The inferred assertion should not be such that it is invalidated by direct perception {pratyak@sa) or the testimony of the s'âstra (abâdhita-vi@sayatva). The liñga should not be such that by it an inference in the opposite way could also be possible (asat-pratipak@sa). The violation of any one of these conditions would spoil the certitude of the hetu as determining the inference, and thus would only make the hetu fallacious, or what is technically called hetvâbhâsa or seeming hetu by which no correct inference could be made. Thus the inference that sound is eternal because it is visible is fallacious, for visibility is a quality which sound (here the pak@sa) does not possess [Footnote ref l]. This hetvâbhâsa is technically called asiddha-hetu. Again, hetvâbhâsa of the second type, technically called viruddha-hetu, may be exemplified in the case that sound is eternal, since it is created; the hetu "being created" is present in the opposite of sâdhya {vipak@sa), namely non-eternality, for we know that non-eternality is a quality which belongs to all created things. A fallacy of the third type, technically called anaikântika-hetu, is found in the case that sound is eternal, since it is an object of knowledge. Now "being an object of knowledge" (prameyatva) is here the hetu, but it is present in things eternal (i.e. things possessing sâdhya), as well as in things that are not eternal (i.e. which do not possess the sâdhya), and therefore the concomitance of the hetu with the sâdhya is not absolute (anaikântika). A fallacy of the fourth type, technically called kâlâtyayâpadi@s@ta, may be found in the example—fire is not hot, since it is created like a jug, etc. Here pratyak@sa shows that fire is hot, and hence the hetu is fallacious. The fifth fallacy, called prakara@nasama, is to be found in cases where opposite hetus are available at the same time for opposite conclusions, e.g. sound like a jug is non-eternal,

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[Footnote 1: It should be borne in mind that Nyâya did not believe in the doctrine of the eternality of sound, which the Mîmâ@msâ did. Eternality of sound meant with Mîmâ@msâ the theory that sounds existed as eternal indestructible entities, and they were only manifested in our ears under certain conditions, e.g. the stroke of a drum or a particular kind of movement of the vocal muscles.]

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since no eternal qualities are found in it, and sound like âkâs'a is eternal, since no non-eternal qualities are found in it.

The Buddhists held in answer to the objections raised against inference by the Cârvâkas, that inferential arguments are valid, because they are arguments on the principle of the uniformity of nature in two relations, viz. tâdâtmya (essential identity) and tadutpatti (succession in a relation of cause and effect). Tâdâtmya is a relation of genus and species and not of causation; thus we know that all pines are trees, and infer that this is a tree since it is a pine; tree and pine are related to each other as genus and species, and the co-inherence of the generic qualities of a tree with the specific characters of a pine tree may be viewed as a relation of essential identity (tâdâtmya). The relation of tadutpatti is that of uniformity of succession of cause and effect, e.g. of smoke to fire.

Nyâya holds that inference is made because of the invariable association (niyama) of the li@nga or hetu (the concomitance of which with the sâdhya has been safeguarded by the five conditions noted above) with the sâdhya, and not because of such specific relations as tâdâtmya or tadutpatti. If it is held that the inference that it is a tree because it is a pine is due to the essential identity of tree and pine, then the opposite argument that it is a pine because it is a tree ought to be valid as well; for if it were a case of identity it ought to be the same both ways. If in answer to this it is said that the characteristics of a pine are associated with those of a tree and not those