History of the Peloponnesian War by Thucydides (free ebooks for android .txt) π
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mercenaries than upon soldiers obliged to serve, like their own. He
therefore said that they ought to stay and carry on the siege, and not
depart defeated in point of money, in which they were much superior.
Nicias spoke positively because he had exact information of the
financial distress at Syracuse, and also because of the strength of
the Athenian party there which kept sending him messages not to
raise the siege; besides which he had more confidence than before in
his fleet, and felt sure at least of its success. Demosthenes,
however, would not hear for a moment of continuing the siege, but said
that if they could not lead off the army without a decree from Athens,
and if they were obliged to stay on, they ought to remove to Thapsus
or Catana; where their land forces would have a wide extent of country
to overrun, and could live by plundering the enemy, and would thus
do them damage; while the fleet would have the open sea to fight in,
that is to say, instead of a narrow space which was all in the enemyβs
favour, a wide sea-room where their science would be of use, and where
they could retreat or advance without being confined or
circumscribed either when they put out or put in. In any case he was
altogether opposed to their staying on where they were, and insisted
on removing at once, as quickly and with as little delay as
possible; and in this judgment Eurymedon agreed. Nicias however
still objecting, a certain diffidence and hesitation came over them,
with a suspicion that Nicias might have some further information to
make him so positive.
_Nineteenth Year of the War - Battles in the Great Harbour -
Retreat and Annihilation of the Athenian Army_
While the Athenians lingered on in this way without moving from
where they were, Gylippus and Sicanus now arrived at Syracuse. Sicanus
had failed to gain Agrigentum, the party friendly to the Syracusans
having been driven out while he was still at Gela; but Gylippus was
accompanied not only by a large number of troops raised in Sicily, but
by the heavy infantry sent off in the spring from Peloponnese in the
merchantmen, who had arrived at Selinus from Libya. They had been
carried to Libya by a storm, and having obtained two galleys and
pilots from the Cyrenians, on their voyage alongshore had taken
sides with the Euesperitae and had defeated the Libyans who were
besieging them, and from thence coasting on to Neapolis, a
Carthaginian mart, and the nearest point to Sicily, from which it is
only two daysβ and a nightβs voyage, there crossed over and came to
Selinus. Immediately upon their arrival the Syracusans prepared to
attack the Athenians again by land and sea at once. The Athenian
generals seeing a fresh army come to the aid of the enemy, and that
their own circumstances, far from improving, were becoming daily
worse, and above all distressed by the sickness of the soldiers, now
began to repent of not having removed before; and Nicias no longer
offering the same opposition, except by urging that there should be no
open voting, they gave orders as secretly as possible for all to be
prepared to sail out from the camp at a given signal. All was at
last ready, and they were on the point of sailing away, when an
eclipse of the moon, which was then at the full, took place. Most of
the Athenians, deeply impressed by this occurrence, now urged the
generals to wait; and Nicias, who was somewhat over-addicted to
divination and practices of that kind, refused from that moment even
to take the question of departure into consideration, until they had
waited the thrice nine days prescribed by the soothsayers.
The besiegers were thus condemned to stay in the country; and the
Syracusans, getting wind of what had happened, became more eager
than ever to press the Athenians, who had now themselves
acknowledged that they were no longer their superiors either by sea or
by land, as otherwise they would never have planned to sail away.
Besides which the Syracusans did not wish them to settle in any
other part of Sicily, where they would be more difficult to deal with,
but desired to force them to fight at sea as quickly as possible, in a
position favourable to themselves. Accordingly they manned their ships
and practised for as many days as they thought sufficient. When the
moment arrived they assaulted on the first day the Athenian lines, and
upon a small force of heavy infantry and horse sallying out against
them by certain gates, cut off some of the former and routed and
pursued them to the lines, where, as the entrance was narrow, the
Athenians lost seventy horses and some few of the heavy infantry.
Drawing off their troops for this day, on the next the Syracusans
went out with a fleet of seventy-six sail, and at the same time
advanced with their land forces against the lines. The Athenians put
out to meet them with eighty-six ships, came to close quarters, and
engaged. The Syracusans and their allies first defeated the Athenian
centre, and then caught Eurymedon, the commander of the right wing,
who was sailing out from the line more towards the land in order to
surround the enemy, in the hollow and recess of the harbour, and
killed him and destroyed the ships accompanying him; after which
they now chased the whole Athenian fleet before them and drove them
ashore.
Gylippus seeing the enemyβs fleet defeated and carried ashore beyond
their stockades and camp, ran down to the breakwater with some of
his troops, in order to cut off the men as they landed and make it
easier for the Syracusans to tow off the vessels by the shore being
friendly ground. The Tyrrhenians who guarded this point for the
Athenians, seeing them come on in disorder, advanced out against
them and attacked and routed their van, hurling it into the marsh of
Lysimeleia. Afterwards the Syracusan and allied troops arrived in
greater numbers, and the Athenians fearing for their ships came up
also to the rescue and engaged them, and defeated and pursued them
to some distance and killed a few of their heavy infantry. They
succeeded in rescuing most of their ships and brought them down by
their camp; eighteen however were taken by the Syracusans and their
allies, and all the men killed. The rest the enemy tried to burn by
means of an old merchantman which they filled with faggots and
pine-wood, set on fire, and let drift down the wind which blew full on
the Athenians. The Athenians, however, alarmed for their ships,
contrived means for stopping it and putting it out, and checking the
flames and the nearer approach of the merchantman, thus escaped the
danger.
After this the Syracusans set up a trophy for the sea-fight and
for the heavy infantry whom they had cut off up at the lines, where
they took the horses; and the Athenians for the rout of the foot
driven by the Tyrrhenians into the marsh, and for their own victory
with the rest of the army.
The Syracusans had now gained a decisive victory at sea, where until
now they had feared the reinforcement brought by Demosthenes, and
deep, in consequence, was the despondency of the Athenians, and
great their disappointment, and greater still their regret for
having come on the expedition. These were the only cities that they
had yet encountered, similar to their own in character, under
democracies like themselves, which had ships and horses, and were of
considerable magnitude. They had been unable to divide and bring
them over by holding out the prospect of changes in their governments,
or to crush them by their great superiority in force, but had failed
in most of their attempts, and being already in perplexity, had now
been defeated at sea, where defeat could never have been expected, and
were thus plunged deeper in embarrassment than ever.
Meanwhile the Syracusans immediately began to sail freely along
the harbour, and determined to close up its mouth, so that the
Athenians might not be able to steal out in future, even if they
wished. Indeed, the Syracusans no longer thought only of saving
themselves, but also how to hinder the escape of the enemy;
thinking, and thinking rightly, that they were now much the
stronger, and that to conquer the Athenians and their allies by land
and sea would win them great glory in Hellas. The rest of the Hellenes
would thus immediately be either freed or released from
apprehension, as the remaining forces of Athens would be henceforth
unable to sustain the war that would be waged against her; while they,
the Syracusans, would be regarded as the authors of this
deliverance, and would be held in high admiration, not only with all
men now living but also with posterity. Nor were these the only
considerations that gave dignity to the struggle. They would thus
conquer not only the Athenians but also their numerous allies, and
conquer not alone, but with their companions in arms, commanding
side by side with the Corinthians and Lacedaemonians, having offered
their city to stand in the van of danger, and having been in a great
measure the pioneers of naval success.
Indeed, there were never so many peoples assembled before a single
city, if we except the grand total gathered together in this war under
Athens and Lacedaemon. The following were the states on either side
who came to Syracuse to fight for or against Sicily, to help to
conquer or defend the island. Right or community of blood was not
the bond of union between them, so much as interest or compulsion as
the case might be. The Athenians themselves being Ionians went against
the Dorians of Syracuse of their own free will; and the peoples
still speaking Attic and using the Athenian laws, the Lemnians,
Imbrians, and Aeginetans, that is to say the then occupants of Aegina,
being their colonists, went with them. To these must be also added the
Hestiaeans dwelling at Hestiaea in Euboea. Of the rest some joined
in the expedition as subjects of the Athenians, others as
independent allies, others as mercenaries. To the number of the
subjects paying tribute belonged the Eretrians, Chalcidians, Styrians,
and Carystians from Euboea; the Ceans, Andrians, and Tenians from
the islands; and the Milesians, Samians, and Chians from Ionia. The
Chians, however, joined as independent allies, paying no tribute,
but furnishing ships. Most of these were Ionians and descended from
the Athenians, except the Carystians, who are Dryopes, and although
subjects and obliged to serve, were still Ionians fighting against
Dorians. Besides these there were men of Aeolic race, the Methymnians,
subjects who provided ships, not tribute, and the Tenedians and
Aenians who paid tribute. These Aeolians fought against their
Aeolian founders, the Boeotians in the Syracusan army, because they
were obliged, while the Plataeans, the only native Boeotians opposed
to Boeotians, did so upon a just quarrel. Of the Rhodians and
Cytherians, both Dorians, the latter, Lacedaemonian colonists,
fought in the Athenian ranks against their Lacedaemonian countrymen
with Gylippus; while the Rhodians, Argives by race, were compelled
to bear arms against the Dorian Syracusans and their own colonists,
the Geloans, serving with the Syracusans. Of the islanders round
Peloponnese, the Cephallenians and Zacynthians accompanied the
Athenians as independent allies, although their insular position
really left them little choice in the matter, owing to the maritime
supremacy of Athens, while the Corcyraeans, who were not only
Dorians but Corinthians, were openly serving against Corinthians and
Syracusans, although colonists of the former and of the same race as
the latter, under colour of compulsion, but really out of free will
through hatred of Corinth. The
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