History of the Peloponnesian War by Thucydides (free ebooks for android .txt) 📕

Naupactus and from Pylos, then held by the Athenians, were taken

with them to the war. There were also a few Megarian exiles, whose

fate it was to be now fighting against the Megarian Selinuntines.

The engagement of the rest was more of a voluntary nature. It was

less the league than hatred of the Lacedaemonians and the immediate

private advantage of each individual that persuaded the Dorian Argives

to join the Ionian Athenians in a war against Dorians; while the

Mantineans and other Arcadian mercenaries, accustomed to go against

the enemy pointed out to them at the moment, were led by interest to

regard the Arcadians serving with the Corinthians as just as much

their enemies as any others. The Cretans and Aetolians also served for

hire, and the Cretans who had joined the Rhodians in founding Gela,

thus came to consent to fight for pay against, instead of for, their

colonists. There were also some Acarnanians paid to serve, although

they came chiefly for love of Demosthenes and out of goodwill to the

Athenians whose allies they were. These all lived on the Hellenic side

of the Ionian Gulf. Of the Italiots, there were the Thurians and

Metapontines, dragged into the quarrel by the stern necessities of a

time of revolution; of the Siceliots, the Naxians and the Catanians;

and of the barbarians, the Egestaeans, who called in the Athenians,

most of the Sicels, and outside Sicily some Tyrrhenian enemies of

Syracuse and Iapygian mercenaries.

Such were the peoples serving with the Athenians. Against these

the Syracusans had the Camarinaeans their neighbours, the Geloans

who live next to them; then passing over the neutral Agrigentines, the

Selinuntines settled on the farther side of the island. These

inhabit the part of Sicily looking towards Libya; the Himeraeans

came from the side towards the Tyrrhenian Sea, being the only Hellenic

inhabitants in that quarter, and the only people that came from thence

to the aid of the Syracusans. Of the Hellenes in Sicily the above

peoples joined in the war, all Dorians and independent, and of the

barbarians the Sicels only, that is to say, such as did not go over to

the Athenians. Of the Hellenes outside Sicily there were the

Lacedaemonians, who provided a Spartan to take the command, and a

force of Neodamodes or Freedmen, and of Helots; the Corinthians, who

alone joined with naval and land forces, with their Leucadian and

Ambraciot kinsmen; some mercenaries sent by Corinth from Arcadia; some

Sicyonians forced to serve, and from outside Peloponnese the

Boeotians. In comparison, however, with these foreign auxiliaries, the

great Siceliot cities furnished more in every department—numbers of

heavy infantry, ships, and horses, and an immense multitude besides

having been brought together; while in comparison, again, one may say,

with all the rest put together, more was provided by the Syracusans

themselves, both from the greatness of the city and from the fact that

they were in the greatest danger.

Such were the auxiliaries brought together on either side, all of

which had by this time joined, neither party experiencing any

subsequent accession. It was no wonder, therefore, if the Syracusans

and their allies thought that it would win them great glory if they

could follow up their recent victory in the sea-fight by the capture

of the whole Athenian armada, without letting it escape either by

sea or by land. They began at once to close up the Great Harbour by

means of boats, merchant vessels, and galleys moored broadside

across its mouth, which is nearly a mile wide, and made all their

other arrangements for the event of the Athenians again venturing to

fight at sea. There was, in fact, nothing little either in their plans

or their ideas.

The Athenians, seeing them closing up the harbour and informed of

their further designs, called a council of war. The generals and

colonels assembled and discussed the difficulties of the situation;

the point which pressed most being that they no longer had

provisions for immediate use (having sent on to Catana to tell them

not to send any, in the belief that they were going away), and that

they would not have any in future unless they could command the sea.

They therefore determined to evacuate their upper lines, to enclose

with a cross wall and garrison a small space close to the ships,

only just sufficient to hold their stores and sick, and manning all

the ships, seaworthy or not, with every man that could be spared

from the rest of their land forces, to fight it out at sea, and, if

victorious, to go to Catana, if not, to burn their vessels, form in

close order, and retreat by land for the nearest friendly place they

could reach, Hellenic or barbarian. This was no sooner settled than

carried into effect; they descended gradually from the upper lines and

manned all their vessels, compelling all to go on board who were of

age to be in any way of use. They thus succeeded in manning about

one hundred and ten ships in all, on board of which they embarked a

number of archers and darters taken from the Acarnanians and from

the other foreigners, making all other provisions allowed by the

nature of their plan and by the necessities which imposed it. All

was now nearly ready, and Nicias, seeing the soldiery disheartened

by their unprecedented and decided defeat at sea, and by reason of the

scarcity of provisions eager to fight it out as soon as possible,

called them all together, and first addressed them, speaking as

follows:

“Soldiers of the Athenians and of the allies, we have all an equal

interest in the coming struggle, in which life and country are at

stake for us quite as much as they can be for the enemy; since if

our fleet wins the day, each can see his native city again, wherever

that city may be. You must not lose heart, or be like men without

any experience, who fail in a first essay and ever afterwards

fearfully forebode a future as disastrous. But let the Athenians among

you who have already had experience of many wars, and the allies who

have joined us in so many expeditions, remember the surprises of

war, and with the hope that fortune will not be always against us,

prepare to fight again in a manner worthy of the number which you

see yourselves to be.

“Now, whatever we thought would be of service against the crush of

vessels in such a narrow harbour, and against the force upon the decks

of the enemy, from which we suffered before, has all been considered

with the helmsmen, and, as far as our means allowed, provided. A

number of archers and darters will go on board, and a multitude that

we should not have employed in an action in the open sea, where our

science would be crippled by the weight of the vessels; but in the

present land-fight that we are forced to make from shipboard all

this will be useful. We have also discovered the changes in

construction that we must make to meet theirs; and against the

thickness of their cheeks, which did us the greatest mischief, we have

provided grappling-irons, which will prevent an assailant backing

water after charging, if the soldiers on deck here do their duty;

since we are absolutely compelled to fight a land battle from the

fleet, and it seems to be our interest neither to back water

ourselves, nor to let the enemy do so, especially as the shore, except

so much of it as may be held by our troops, is hostile ground.

“You must remember this and fight on as long as you can, and must

not let yourselves be driven ashore, but once alongside must make up

your minds not to part company until you have swept the heavy infantry

from the enemy’s deck. I say this more for the heavy infantry than for

the seamen, as it is more the business of the men on deck; and our

land forces are even now on the whole the strongest. The sailors I

advise, and at the same time implore, not to be too much daunted by

their misfortunes, now that we have our decks better armed and greater

number of vessels. Bear in mind how well worth preserving is the

pleasure felt by those of you who through your knowledge of our

language and imitation of our manners were always considered

Athenians, even though not so in reality, and as such were honoured

throughout Hellas, and had your full share of the advantages of our

empire, and more than your share in the respect of our subjects and in

protection from ill treatment. You, therefore, with whom alone we

freely share our empire, we now justly require not to betray that

empire in its extremity, and in scorn of Corinthians, whom you have

often conquered, and of Siceliots, none of whom so much as presumed to

stand against us when our navy was in its prime, we ask you to repel

them, and to show that even in sickness and disaster your skill is

more than a match for the fortune and vigour of any other.

“For the Athenians among you I add once more this reflection: You

left behind you no more such ships in your docks as these, no more

heavy infantry in their flower; if you do aught but conquer, our

enemies here will immediately sail thither, and those that are left of

us at Athens will become unable to repel their home assailants,

reinforced by these new allies. Here you will fall at once into the

hands of the Syracusans—I need not remind you of the intentions with

which you attacked them—and your countrymen at home will fall into

those of the Lacedaemonians. Since the fate of both thus hangs upon

this single battle, now, if ever, stand firm, and remember, each and

all, that you who are now going on board are the army and navy of

the Athenians, and all that is left of the state and the great name of

Athens, in whose defence if any man has any advantage in skill or

courage, now is the time for him to show it, and thus serve himself

and save all.”

After this address Nicias at once gave orders to man the ships.

Meanwhile Gylippus and the Syracusans could perceive by the

preparations which they saw going on that the Athenians meant to fight

at sea. They had also notice of the grappling-irons, against which

they specially provided by stretching hides over the prows and much of

the upper part of their vessels, in order that the irons when thrown

might slip off without taking hold. All being now ready, the

generals and Gylippus addressed them in the following terms:

“Syracusans and allies, the glorious character of our past

achievements and the no less glorious results at issue in the coming

battle are, we think, understood by most of you, or you would never

have thrown yourselves with such ardour into the struggle; and if

there be any one not as fully aware of the facts as he ought to be, we

will declare them to him. The Athenians came to this country first

to effect the conquest of Sicily, and after that, if successful, of

Peloponnese and the rest of Hellas, possessing already the greatest

empire yet known, of present or former times, among the Hellenes. Here

for the first time they found in you men who faced their navy which

made them masters everywhere; you have already defeated them in the

previous sea-fights, and will in all likelihood defeat them again now.

When men are once checked in what they consider their special

excellence, their whole opinion of themselves suffers more than if