The Grammar of English Grammars by Goold Brown (free ebook reader .txt) 📕

our words an infinitude of terms that are significant only of local ideas, such as men any where or at any time may have had concerning any of the individuals they have known, whether persons, places, or things. But, however important they may be in the eyes of men, the names of particular persons, places, or things, because they convey only particular ideas, do not properly belong to what we call our language. Lexicographers do not collect and define proper names, because they are beyond the limits of their art, and can be explained only from history. I do not say that proper names are to be excluded from grammar; but I would show wherein consists the superiority of general terms over these. For if our common words did not differ essentially from proper names, we could demonstrate nothing in science: we could not frame from them any general or affirmative proposition at all; because all our terms would be particular, and not general; and because every individual thing in nature must necessarily be for ever itself only, and not an other.

OBS. 2.—Our common words, then, are the symbols neither of external particulars, nor merely of the sensible ideas which external particulars excite in our minds, but mainly of those general or universal ideas which belong rather to the intellect than to the senses. For intellection differs from sensation, somewhat as the understanding of a man differs from the perceptive faculty of a brute; and language, being framed for the reciprocal commerce of human minds, whose perceptions include both, is made to consist of signs of ideas both general and particular, yet without placing them on equal ground. Our general ideas—that is, our ideas conceived as common to many individuals, existing in any part of time, past, present, or future—such, for example, as belong to the words man, horse, tree, cedar, wave, motion, strength, resist—such ideas, I say, constitute that most excellent significance which belongs to words primarily, essentially, and immediately; whereas, our particular ideas, such as are conceived only of individual objects, which arc infinite in number and ever fleeting, constitute a significance which belongs to language only secondarily, accidentally, and mediately. If we express the latter at all, we do it either by proper names, of which but very few ever become generally known, or by means of certain changeable limitations which are added to our general terms; whereby language, as Harris observes, "without wandering into infinitude, contrives how to denote things infinite."—Hermes, p. 345. The particular manner in which this is done, I shall show hereafter, in Etymology, when I come to treat of articles and definitives.

OBS. 3.—If we examine the structure of proper names, we shall find that most of them are compounds, the parts of which have, in very many instances, some general signification. Now a complete phrase commonly conveys some particular notion or conception of the mind; but, in this case, the signification of the general terms is restricted by the other words which are added to them. Thus smith is a more general term than goldsmith; and goldsmith is more general than a goldsmith; a goldsmith, than the goldsmith; the goldsmith, than one Goldsmith; one Goldsmith, than Mr. Goldsmith; Mr. Goldsmith, than Oliver Goldsmith. Thus we see that the simplest mode of designating particular persons or objects, is that of giving them proper names; but proper names must needs be so written, that they may be known as proper names, and not be mistaken for common terms. I have before observed, that we have some names which are both proper and common; and that these should be written with capitals, and should form the plural regularly. It is surprising that the Friends, who are in some respects particularly scrupulous about language, should so generally have overlooked the necessity there is, of compounding their numerical names of the months and days, and writing them uniformly with capitals, as proper names. For proper names they certainly are, in every thing but the form, whenever they are used without the article, and without those other terms which render their general idea particular. And the compound form with a capital, is as necessary for Firstday, Secondday, Thirdday, &c., as for Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, &c. "The first day of the week,"—"The seventh day of the month,"—"The second month of summer,"—"The second month in the year," &c., are good English phrases, in which any compounding of the terms, or any additional use of capitals, would be improper; but, for common use, these phrases are found too long and too artificial. We must have a less cumbersome mode of specifying the months of the year and the days of the week. What then? Shall we merely throw away the terms of particularity, and, without substituting in their place the form of proper names, apply general terms to particular thoughts, and insist on it that this is right? And is not this precisely what is done by those who reject as heathenish the ordinary names of the months and days, and write "first day," for Sunday, in stead of "the first day of the week;" or "second month," for February, in stead of "the second month in the year;" and so forth? This phraseology may perhaps be well understood by those to whom it is familiar, but still it is an abuse of language, because it is inconsistent with the common acceptation of the terms. Example: "The departure of a ship will take place every sixth day with punctuality."—Philadelphia Weekly Messenger. The writer of this did not mean, "every Friday;" and it is absurd for the Friends so to understand it, or so to write, when that is what they mean.

OBS. 4.—In the ordinary business of life, it is generally desirable to express our meaning as briefly as possible; but legal phraseology is always full to the letter, and often redundant. Hence a merchant will write, "Nov. 24, 1837," or, "11 mo. 24th, 1837;" but a conveyancer will have it, "On the twenty-fourth day of November, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-seven;"—or, perhaps, "On the twenty-fourth day of the eleventh month, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty-seven." Accordingly we find that, in common daily use, all the names of the months, except March, May, June, and July, are abbreviated; thus, Jan., Feb., Apr., Aug., Sept., Oct., Nov., Dec. And sometimes even the Arabic number of the year is made yet shorter; as '37 for 1837; or 1835-6-7, for 1835, 1836, and 1837. In like manner, in constructing tables of time, we sometimes denote the days of the week by the simple initials of their names; as, S. for Sunday, M. for Monday, &c. But, for facility of abbreviation, the numerical names, whether of the months or of the days, are perhaps still more convenient. For, if we please, we may put the simple Arabic figures for them; though it is better to add d. for day, and mo. for month: as, 1 d., 2 d., 3 d., &c.;—1 mo., 2 mo., 3 mo., &c.:—or more compactly thus: 1d., 2d., 3d., &c.;—1mo., 2mo., 3mo., &c. But, take which mode of naming we will, our ordinary expression of these things should be in neither extreme, but should avoid alike too great brevity and too great prolixity; and, therefore, it is best to make it a general rule in our literary compositions, to use the full form of proper names for the months and days, and to denote the years by Arabic figures written in full.

OBS. 5.—In considering the nature of words, I was once a little puzzled with a curious speculation, if I may not term it an important inquiry, concerning the principle of their identity. We often speak of "the same words," and of "different words;" but wherein does the sameness or the difference of words consist? Not in their pronunciation; for the same word may be differently pronounced; as, p=at'ron or p=a'tron, m=at'ron or m=a'tron. Not in their orthography; for the same word may be differently spelled; as, favour or favor, music or musick, connexion or connection. Not in their form of presentation; for the same word may be either spoken or written; and speech and writing present what we call the same words, in two ways totally different. Not in their meaning; for the same word may have different meanings, and different words may signify precisely the same thing. This sameness of words, then, must consist in something which is to be reconciled with great diversity. Yet every word is itself, and not an other: and every word must necessarily have some property peculiar to itself, by which it may be easily distinguished from every other. Were it not so, language would be unintelligible. But it is so; and, therefore, to mistake one word for an other, is universally thought to betray great ignorance or great negligence, though such mistakes are by no means of uncommon occurrence. But that the question about the identity of words is not a very easy one, may appear from the fact, that the learned often disagree about it in practice; as when one grammarian will have an and a to be two words, and an other will affirm them to be only different forms of one and the same word.

OBS. 6.—Let us see, then, if amidst all this diversity we can find that principle of sameness, by which a dispute of this kind ought to be settled. Now, although different words do generally differ in orthography, in pronunciation, and in meaning, so that an entire sameness implies one orthography, one pronunciation, and one meaning; yet some diversity is allowed in each of these respects, so that a sign differing from an other only in one, is not therefore a different word, or a sign agreeing with an other only in one, is not therefore the same word. It follows thence, that the principle of verbal identity, the principle which distinguishes every word from every other, lies in neither extreme: it lies in a narrower compass than in all three, and yet not singly in any one, but jointly in any two. So that signs differing in any two of these characteristics of a word, are different words; and signs agreeing in any two, are the same word. Consequently, if to any difference either of spelling or of sound we add a difference of signification everybody will immediately say, that we speak or write different words, and not the same: thus dear, beloved, and deer, an animal, are two such words as no one would think to be the same; and, in like manner, use, advantage, and use, to employ, will readily be called different words. Upon this principle, an and a are different words; yet, in conformity to old usage, and because the latter is in fact but an abridgement of the former, I have always treated them as one and the same article, though I have nowhere expressly called them the same word. But, to establish the principle above named, which appears to me the only one on which any such question can be resolved, or the identity of words be fixed at all, we must assume that every word has one right pronunciation, and only one; one just orthography, and only one; and some proper signification, which, though perhaps not always the same, is always a part of its essence. For when two words of different meaning are spelled or pronounced alike, not to maintain the second point of difference, against the double orthography or the double pronunciation of either, is to confound their identity at once, and to prove by the rule that two different words are one and the same, by first absurdly making them so.

OBS. 7.—In no part of grammar is usage more unsettled and variable than in that which relates to the figure of words. It is a point of which modern writers have taken but very little notice. Lily, and other ancient Latin grammarians, reckoned both species and figure among the grammatical accidents of nearly all the different parts of speech; and accordingly noticed them, in their Etymology, as things worthy to be thus made distinct topics, like numbers, genders, cases, moods, tenses, &c. But the manner of compounding words in Latin, and also in Greek, is always by consolidation. No use appears to have been made of the hyphen, in joining the words of those languages, though the name of the mark is a Greek compound, meaning "under one." The compounding of words is one principal means of increasing their number; and the arbitrariness with which that is done or neglected in English, is sufficient of itself to make the number of our words a matter of great uncertainty. Such terms, however, having the advantage of explaining themselves in a much greater degree than others, have little need of definition; and when new things are formed, it is very natural and proper to give them new