Criminal Psychology by Hans Gross (10 best books of all time .txt) 📕

correct. The weakness must, however, not be sought where we expect to find it, but in the quite different feminine intelligence. Wherever intelligence is not taken into consideration, woman is likely to show herself stronger than man. She is better able to stand misfortune, to nurse patients, to bear pain, to bring up children, to carry out a plan, to persevere in a plan. It would be wrong to say that feminine weakness is a weakness of will, for most examples show that women’s wills are strong. It is in matters of intelligence that they fail. When somebody has to be persuaded, we find that a normally-organized man may agree when he is shown a logically-combined series of reasons. But the feminine intelligence is incapable of logic; indeed, we should make a mistake in paying honor to the actual feminine in woman if she were capable of logic. She is rather to be persuaded with apparent reasons, with transitory and sparkling matters that have only the semblance of truth. We find her too ready to agree, and blame her will when it is only her different form of intelligence. She persuades herself in the same way. An epithet, a sparkling epigram, a pacifying reflection is enough for her; she does not need a whole construction of reason, and thus she proceeds to do things that we again call “weak.” Take so thoroughly a feminine reflection as this: “The heart seems to beat—why shouldn’t it beat for somebody?” and the woman throws herself on the breast of some adventurer. The world that hears of this fact weeps over feminine “weakness,” while it ought really to weep over defective intelligence and bad logic. That the physiological throb of the heart need not become significant of love, that the owner of a beating heart need not be interested in some man, and certainly not in that particular adventurer, she does not even consider possible. She is satisfied with this clean-cut, sparkling syllogism, and her understanding is calm. The judge in the criminal court must always first consider the weakness of the feminine intelligence, not of the feminine will.

It is supposed to be weakness of will which makes woman gossipy, unable to keep a secret. But here again it is her understanding that is at fault. This is shown by the fact, already thoroughly discussed by Kant, that women are good keepers of their own secrets, but never of the secrets of others. If this were not a defect of intelligence they would have been able to estimate the damage they do. Now, every one of us criminalists knows that the crime committed, and even the plan for it, has in most cases been betrayed by women. We can learn most about this matter from detectives, who always go to women for the discovery of facts, and rarely without success. Of course, the judge must not act like a detective, but he must know, when something is already a matter of discussion and its source is sought, where to look. He is to look for the woman in the case.

Another consideration of importance is the fact that women who have told secrets have also altered them. This is due to the fact that because they are secrets the whole is not told them and they have had to infer much, or they have not properly understood what was told. Now, if we perceive that only a part of the revealed secret can be correct, the situation may be inferred with complete safety, but only by remembering this curious trait of feminine intelligence. We have only to ask what illogical elements does the matter contain? When these are discovered we have to ask, what is their logical form? If the process is followed properly we get at the truth that what happens happens logically, but what is thought, is thought illogically even by women.

When we summarise all we know about woman we may say briefly: Woman is neither better nor worse, neither more nor less valuable than man, but she is different from him and inasmuch as nature has created every object correctly for its purpose, woman has also been so created. The reason of her existence is different from that of man’s and hence, her nature is different.

Section 78. (b) Children.

The special character of the child has to be kept in mind both when it appears as witness and as accused. To treat it like an adult is always wrong. It would be wrong, moreover, to seek the differences in its immaturity and inexperience, in its small knowledge and narrower outlook. This is only a part of the difference. The fact is, that because the child is in the process of growth and development of its organs, because the relations of these to each other are different and their functions are different, it is actually a different kind of being from the adult. When we think how different the body and actions of the child are, how different its nourishment, how differently foreign influences affect it, and how different its physical qualities are, we must see that its mental character is also completely different. Hence, a difference in degree tells us nothing, we must look for a difference in kind. Observations made by individuals are not enough. We must undertake especial studies in the very rich literature.[281]

Section 79. (1) General Consideration.

One does not need to have much knowledge of children to know that as a rule, children are more honest and straightforward than adults. They are good observers, more disinterested and hence unbiased in giving evidence, but because of their weakness, more subject to the influence of other people. Apart from intentional influences there is the tremendous influence of selected preconceptions. If a child is an important witness we can never get the truth from him until we discover what his ideals are. It is, of course, true that everybody who has ideals is influenced by them, but it is also true that children who have adventurous, imaginative tendencies are so steeped in them that everything they think or do gets color, tone, and significance from them. What the object of adventure does is good, what it does not do is bad, what it possesses is beautiful, and what it asserts is correct. Numerous unexplainable assertions and actions of children are cleared up by reference to their particular ideals, if they may be called ideals.

As a rule, we may hold that children have a certain sense of justice, and that they find it decidedly unpleasant to see anybody treated otherwise than he deserves. But in this connection it must be considered that the child has its own views as to what a person’s deserts are, and that these views can rarely be judged by our own. In the same way it is certain that, lacking things to think or to trouble about, children are much interested in and remember well what occurs about them. But, again, we have to bear in mind that the interest itself develops from the child’s standpoint and that his memory constructs new events in terms of his earlier experiences. As a rule, we may presuppose in his memory only what is found already in his occupations. What is new, altogether new, must first find a function, and that is difficult. If, now, a child remembers something, he will first try to fit it to some function of memory already present and this will then absorb the new fact, well or ill, as the case may be. The frequent oversight of this fact is the reason for many a false interpretation of what the child said; he is believed to have perceived falsely and to have made false restatements, when he has only perceived and restated in his own way.

As children have rarely a proper sense of the value of life, they observe an undubitable death closely without much fear. This explains many an unbelievable act of courage or clear observation in a child in cases where an adult, frightened, can see nothing. It is, hence, unjust to doubt many a statement of children, because you doubt their “courage.” “Courage” was not in question at all.

Concerning the difference between boys and girls, Löbisch[282] says rightly, that girls remember persons better, and boys, things. He adds, moreover: “The more silent girl, who is given to observe what is before her, shows herself more teachable than the spiteful and also more imaginative boy who understands with difficulty because he is intended to be better grounded and to go further in the business of knowing. The girl, all in all, is more curious; the boy, more eager to know. What he fails in, what he is not spurred to by love or talent, he throws obstinately aside. While the girl loyally and trustfully absorbs her teachings, the boy remains unsatisfied without some insight into the why or how, without some proof. The boy enters daily more and more into the world of concepts, while the girl thinks of objects not as members of a class, but as definite particular things.”

Section 80. (2) Children as Witnesses.

Once, in an examination of the value of the testimony of children, I found it to be excellent in certain directions because not so much influenced by passion and special interest as that of adults, and because we may assume that children have classified too little rather than too much; that they frequently do not understand an event but perceive instinctively that it means disorder, and hence, become interested in it. Later the child gets a broader horizon and understands what he has not formerly understood, although, possibly, not altogether with correctness.

I have further found that the boy just growing out of childhood, in so far as he has been well brought up, is especially the best observer and witness there is. He observes everything that occurs with interest, synthesizes events without prejudice, and reproduces them accurately, while the girl of the same age is often an unreliable, even dangerous witness. This is almost always the case when the girl is in some degree talented, impulsive, dreamy, romantic, and adventurous,—she expresses a sort of weltschmerz connected with ennui. This comes early, and if a girl of that age is herself drawn into the circle of the events in question, we are never safe from extreme exaggeration. The merest larceny becomes a small robbery; a bare insult, a remarkable attack; a foolish quip, an interesting seduction; and a stupid, boyish conversation, an important conspiracy. Such causes of mistakes are well-known to all judges; at the same time they are again and again permitted to recur.

The sole means of safety from them is the clearest comprehension possible of the mental horizon of the child in question. We have very little general knowledge about it, and hence, are much indebted to the contemporary attempts of public-school teachers to supply the information. We all know that we must make distinctions between city and country children, and must not be surprised at the country child who has not seen a gas-lamp, a railroad, or something similar. Stanley Hall tried to discover from six year old children whether they really knew the things, the names of which they used freely. It seemed, as a result, that 14% of them had never seen a star; 45% had never been in the country; 20% did not know that milk came from a cow; 50% that fire-wood comes from trees; 13% to 15% the difference between green, blue and yellow; and 4% had never made the acquaintance of a pig.

Karl Lange made experiments (reported in “Über Apperzeption,” Plauen, 1889) on 500 pupils in 33 schools in small towns. The experiment showed that 82% had never seen sun-rise; 77% a sunset; 36% a corn field; 49% a river; 82% a pond; 80% a lock;