Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

sufficient to sustain 4,000 troops for three months. The train also brought 30 intelligence personnel, apparently disguised as Red Cross workers.10 The Germans were also allowed to send personnel to Germany and the first transport consisted of 514 personnel. These were primarily crews from German merchant ships sunk in Narvik as well as naval specialists that the SKL required back in Germany.

Fleischer’s Offensive Plan

While Fleischer had no precise knowledge of the German order of battle, he knew that it was possible to achieve local superiority since a large portion of the German force had to defend Narvik and the railway to Sweden. It was important to keep the Germans guessing as to the location of the attacks and to present them with multiple threats that would make it difficult for them to switch forces on interior lines to meet Norwegian thrusts.

General Fleischer’s original offensive plan, after halting the German advance along the road at Lapphaugen, involved launching attacks along multiple axes. Gratangen was the brigade’s immediate objective. The 2/15th Inf, supported by the 3rd Mountain Artillery Bn and reinforced by Co Forseth, would engage the Germans at Lapphaugen and drive them south along the road to Gratangen (Route 50) while the 1/16th Inf moved west from Bones through the wilderness in Vassdal, Gressdal, and Raudal. The 1/12th Inf would attack across Fjordbotneidet from the north. The Alta Bn would constitute the Brigade reserve from a location near Levangen, behind the advancing 1/12th Inf. The Norwegians hoped that the Germans would concentrate their defense along Route 50. The force advancing through Fjordbotneidet would threaten the German left flank and their line of retreat along Route 50. The force moving from Bones could bring about two possible successes: the destruction of the main German force by cutting their line of retreat or the early capture of Bjerkvik and Elvegårdsmoen by the force moving northwest through Raudal.

The two sides spent the time after April 13 consolidating their positions and preparing for future operations. Both sides, particularly the Norwegians, engaged in heavy patrol activities. The Norwegians needed information about German strengths and positions in preparing their offensive. From the patrol activities, the Norwegians concluded that the enemy had two battalions in the Bjerkvik-Gratangen area, with about 300-400 troops in Gratangen. They estimated correctly that the Germans had one reinforced company at Lapphaugen. German ski patrol, from 15 to 60 men in size, operated regularly to the east in the Hartvigvann-Gressdal area but a move against Bones or Lund was not attempted.

Mobilization and Deployments

The forces called for in General Fleischer’s plan were not yet available. The units envisioned for the drive through Fjordbotneidet against the German left flank, the 1/12th Infantry and the Alta Bn, were still in Finnmark, more than 300 miles from where they were needed. The distance itself fails to tell the whole story. Road communications were virtually non-existant at this time of the year, and the troops had to be transported to their new operational area by sea. Most Norwegian naval forces in Fleischer’s area of responsibility were destroyed or captured and this presented a problem. The 1/12th Inf, commanded by Major Nils Bøckman, was transported from Kirkenes to Sjøvegan in two echelons, arriving there on April 17 and 20. British warships escorted the transports. The Alta Bn, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Arne D. Dahl and consisting of 830 officers and men and 112 horses, was transported in two coastal passenger ships and one cargo ship, without naval escorts, and disembarked in Sjøvegan on April 21. The battalion arrived in the Tennevoll area in Levangen in the evening of April 23. The 2/15th Inf was located in the Fossbakken area. The 3rd Mountain Artillery Bn was also ordered to that area. The road through Salangsdal was impassable and it was not until April 22 that the 9th Battery (motorized) of the battalion reached its destination. The plan called for half of Battery 8 to support the advance of the 1/12th Inf while the other half was located in Fossbakken along with Batteries 7 and 9.

Except for the 15th Regiment and some smaller units that had their depot at Elvegårdsmoen fall into enemy hands on the first day of the German attack, the mobilization in North Norway proceeded in an orderly manner. The 1/15th Inf had problems mobilizing. Most of the weapons, equipment, and supplies required had to come from reserve depots located some distance from the new place of mobilization near Setermoen. Mobilization day was April 18 but due to equipment and personnel problems, the battalion was not fully mobilized until May 20. Major Omdal assumed command on April 24 and the partially mobilized battalion moved to Bardufoss Airfield for security on May 5. One ski platoon acted as security for the British and Polish troops in Bogen. The Reserve Battalion, 15th Inf had the same problems as the 1/15th since Elvegårdsmoen was also its mobilization depot. Attempts were made to mobilize, with a planned completion date of June 10.

The 1/16th Inf (less one company), commanded by Major Nils Hunstad, departed its mobilization depot at Setermoen on April 15 for the Lund-Bones area in Salangsdal. Nevertheless, the unit was not fully mobilized until April 21, when it numbered 720 officers and men. Co 3 was ordered to Fossbakken where it was attached to the 2/15th Inf. It reverted to the control of its parent battalion in the morning of April 22. The 1/16th Infantry’s missions were to secure the valley between Lund and Bones and prepare to take part in the upcoming offensive by moving against the German right flank through Gressdal and Raudal.

The 2/16th Inf completed mobilization on April 20 when it had 802 officers and men present for duty. This battalion had not participated in the neutrality watch and it was therefore necessary to give it some training before it was committed. The Reserve Battalion of the 16th Inf assembled at Setermoen on April 18 and it remained there until April 30.

Lieutenant Colonel Nummedal was acting commander