Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

maintained that a bombardment of Narvik would only be successful if it led to a German surrender of the city before British troops landed. To achieve such a lofty goal it was necessary to bombard the city itself. This, in his view, would destroy future Norwegian cooperation and was a direct violation of the British Government’s instruction governing bombardment of shore targets. This directive could only be changed by a governmental order. The Admiral and General agreed to restrict the bombardment targets.

The final plan was based on the hope that the Germans would surrender the city after a powerful bombardment by British warships. Troops were not to be landed as long as German opposition could be expected, but only when the Germans hoisted the white flag. The bombardment was scheduled for April 24 and the radio station in Tromsø directed the civilian population in Narvik to evacuate the city.

Low cloud cover, a snowstorm, and poor visibility characterized the weather in Ofotfjord on April 24. These conditions precluded the participation of aircraft from the Furious but they also prevented the Luftwaffe from attacking the warships. The bombarding force consisted of the battleship Warspite, the cruisers Effingham, Aurora, and Enterprise, and the destroyer Zulu. The 1st Battalion, Irish Guards embarked on the old cruiser Vindictive, prepared to land in Narvik if the Germans surrendered the city.

The British warships bombarded targets in the Narvik area for about three hours but the results were disappointing. One pier in Narvik was heavily damaged and a ship tied up to that pier sank. Some railroad rolling stock was also damaged. Enemy defensive positions were not observed and the British concluded that they had not been neutralized. The Germans displayed no signs of broken morale or that they intended to surrender the city. In fact, they suffered no fatalities from the bombardment. In a report dated July 17, 1940, Admiral Cork states that the weather conditions on April 24 precluded any assessment of the bombardment’s effectiveness and this led to the decision not to land.

The 1st Battalion, Irish Guards, was put ashore in Bogen in the afternoon of April 24. Most British warships returned to Scapa Flow. Only ten destroyers remained in North Norway to support operations. By April 25, 11 days after the first British troops landed, they had not fired a shot in anger. In fact, they had not even seen a German soldier.

The First Crisis in the German High Command

The critical situation in Norway, particularly in Trondheim and Narvik, brought on a crisis in the German high command. German troops in those two cities were isolated because Operation Weserübung had failed to achieve a Norwegian surrender that would have given the Germans control of the interior lines of communications. Hitler was well aware that the responsibility for a defeat in Norway would fall on him personally since the political decision, the military planning, and the execution were carried out by the OKW under his direct supervision. The German Army had deliberately refrained from involving itself in the planning for and conduct of this operation. Its participation was limited to providing officers for the planning staffs and meeting the requirements for troops, supplies, and equipment that emanated from the OKW. A defeat in Norway could deal a fatal blow to Hitler’s prestige and could provide the army with the moral courage to depose him.

Hitler became agitated before he learned the fate of the destroyers in Narvik. By the evening of April 12, it became clear that the forces in Narvik were isolated and that the hoped-for link to the Swedish border and the capture of an airfield had not been achieved. It also appeared that similar situations were developing in Trondheim and Bergen and von Falkenhorst’s full-scale breakout from the Oslo bridgehead had not started.

It was decided at a strategy conference on April 13 not to force the issue in Norway by pouring in more troops in case of further deterioration. Instead, the Halder Diary notes that a decision was made to examine the possibility of launching the attack in the west within a week or two, in order to reduce Allied pressure in Norway. This, however, was a very problematic solution because of inclement weather forecasts and since units could not move into attack positions on short notice without alerting Allied intelligence.

The diaries of the participants depict Hitler in a state of near panic when word of the naval catastrophe in Narvik arrived in the afternoon of April 13. In what is described as “a state of frightful agitation,” Hitler proposed that Dietl be ordered to give up Narvik and withdraw southward. General Jodl tried desperately to persuade Hitler on April 14 not to give up on Narvik and not to order Dietl to break out to the south. The diary notes that he told Hitler, “…one should give something up as lost only when it is lost.”

General Keitel told Brauchitsch the following day that Narvik would be evacuated. The OKH was not about to be drawn into what they probably viewed as a trap by Hitler and the OKW. If they ordered, or acquiesced in an order, to give up Narvik, they suspected that the responsibility for this debacle would be shifted to their shoulders. Brauchitsch decided that they should not agree to an evacuation and he ordered Halder to talk to Jodl. Jodl answered that Narvik could not be held, that the troops were to withdraw to the surrounding mountains, but that the question of the complete evacuation of the area was not yet decided. The OKW sent a message to Dietl discussing the possibility of evacuating Narvik and withdrawing into strong points in the mountains near the Swedish border.

The problem came to a boil again on April 17, despite the news that Dietl’s forces had reached the Swedish border. Hitler now insisted that Dietl’s forces evacuate by air or withdraw into Sweden. Jodl insisted that the mountains south of Narvik barred any possibility of retreat in that direction. He even