Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

Whitworth returned with the battleship and destroyers after dark and remained in the fjord during the night taking aboard wounded sailors. Norwegians brought the survivors from Hardy and the British merchant seamen who had joined them, to a place where they were taken aboard two British destroyers. All British ships withdrew from the fjord by daylight on April 14.

The German problems with their torpedoes again saved the British from potentially heavy losses. Lieutenant Commander Viktor Schütze in U25, positioned in Vestfjord, made two attempts to torpedo Warspite as she left the fjord the first time. The destroyer Foxhound drove off one attack while the second attack failed, probably because of faulty torpedoes. Schütze tried again on the battleship’s second visit to the fjord. The single torpedo again missed, or malfunctioned. The ability of both U25 and U46 to penetrate the destroyer screens with relative ease demonstrates the inordinate risk the British were taking by sending a battleship into these restricted waters. The Second Naval Battle of Narvik could have been a costly affair if the German torpedoes had functioned properly.

At 2115 hours the Admiralty urged Admiral Forbes to occupy Narvik in order to prevent later opposition to a landing. They apparently believed that the German troops were driven out of town because of the naval bombardment. Derry writes that it is unknown if Admiral Whitworth was aware of this message since the reception conditions in the fjord were poor. He did send a message later that evening reporting that he believed “the enemy forces in Narvik were thoroughly frightened” and recommended that the main landing force should occupy Narvik as quickly as possible.10 Whitworth followed up this message the following morning with one recommending that a small landing force could secure the city if he could support such a landing with the naval forces under his command.11 However, Forbes soon ordered Whitworth to take Warspite out of Vestfjord for fear of submarine and air attacks. The Home Fleet’s experience with the Luftwaffe in the North Sea may have influenced this decision.

The British losses in the Second Naval Battle of Narvik were 41 killed (15 on Eskimo, 14 on Punjabi, 11 on Cossack, and 1 on Foxhound) and over 60 wounded. No British destroyers were sunk but most sustained some minor damage from German shells. The destroyers Eskimo, Cossack, and Punjabi were heavily damaged, and they were brought to the improvised naval depot in Skjellfjord for repairs. In the three naval engagements as a whole, 276 Norwegians, at least 316 Germans, and 188 British were killed.

The Home Fleet departed for Scapa Flow on April 15, but British naval operations in the area continued. The First Cruiser Squadron under Admiral Cunningham stayed behind in the Troms/Finnmark area as did all the ships involved in the transport and escort of the troops that were beginning to arrive.

The loss of ten German destroyers in the two battles was a hard blow to the German Navy. It represented 45% of their destroyer force. However, the survivors from the destroyers enabled Dietl to add about 2,100 men to his force, doubling its size. The crews from the four destroyers sunk in the inner part of Rombakfjord were organized into a regiment commanded by Commander Fritz Berger, which was used initially as a security force for the railroad east of Narvik.

The crew of Hermann Künne was organized into a battalion under the command of Lieutenant Commander Kohte and assigned to Colonel Windisch. The survivors from Wilhelm Heidkamp and Anton Schmitt were organized into a battalion commanded by Lieutenant Commander Erdmenger and given the mission of local defense in Narvik. This allowed Dietl to move soldiers from the 3rd Mountain Division inland to take part in ground operations. Technical personnel from the destroyers were used to maintain and repair the railroad line. The destroyer crews were issued uniforms, weapons, and supplies from Norwegian stores captured at Elvegårdsmoen.

T

HE

N

ARVIK

F

RONT

, A

PRIL

13–26

“One should give something up as lost only when it is lost.”

GENERAL ALFRED JODL’S RESPONSE TO HITLER ON APRIL 14, 1940 WHEN THE LATTER PLANNED TO GIVE UP NARVIK.

”The British are coming”—Unprepared for Operations

As the Second Naval Battle of Narvik was fought, a convoy of British troops was on its way to Harstad carrying most of the 24th Guards Brigade and the 146th Brigade. The two transports carrying the 146th Brigade were diverted to Namsos shortly before they reached Harstad. General Mackesy, in the cruiser Southampton, arrived in Harstad on April 14 with two companies of the Scots Guards.

Admiral Cork, in the cruiser Aurora, had intended to proceed directly to Harstad but a message from Admiral Whitworth caused him to change his plans and proceed to Skjellfjord. He arrived there before noon on April 14. The message from Whitworth to the Admiralty and copied to Admirals Forbes and Cork gave Whitworth’s assessment of the situation in Narvik. He estimated that there were 1,500 to 2,000 German troops in Narvik and was convinced that the city could be taken by direct assault without serious opposition, provided a naval force on the same scale as that used in the battle on the previous day supported the landing.

In view of this assessment, Cork decided to carry out a combined attack on Narvik in the morning of April 15 using the two companies embarked on the Southampton and about 200 Royal Marines from the ships in Skjellfjord. He sent an order to Southampton to proceed to Skjellfjord, to arrive there by 2000 hours on April 14. Because of poor radio communications, the message was not received until after Southampton arrived in Harstad and had landed the troops at Sjøvegan.

General Mackesy was dubious about Admiral Cork’s planned operation and said as much in a message to the admiral. He went on to state that if the operation were to be carried out, the troops would have to come from the transports bringing the main force of