Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

the 24th Brigade, and they would not arrive until April 15. Cork also received a message from the British Admiralty at about the same time that put another brake on the operation: “We think it imperative that you and the General should be together and act together and that no attack should be made except in concert.”1 These two messages put an end to the plan for an immediate attack on Narvik, and Cork proceeded to Harstad, where he arrived on April 15.

General Mackesy established contact with the Norwegian civil authorities in Harstad soon after he arrived on April 14. Through these contacts, he learned that there were no Germans in the area and that the British would be well received by the population. Mackesy also wished to establish contact with the Norwegian military authorities as quickly as possible. He learned that the Norwegian military headquarters was located in Moen, Målselv. This was the reason he landed the two companies of the Scots Guards at Sjøvegan. These troops established contact with Norwegian ground forces before evening.

Aurora entered Andfjord in the morning of April 15, at the same time as the convoy carrying the 24th Brigade arrived. The battleship Valiant and nine destroyers escorted the three troop transports. There were now a number of German submarines in the Vågsfjord area. Admiral Dönitz, at the request of the German Naval Staff after the British attack on the German destroyers in Narvik on April 10, had ordered four boats from the 5th Submarine Group (U38, U47, U48, and U49), patrolling the waters between the Shetlands and the Norwegian coast, to patrol Vågsfjord and adjacent areas.

A Norwegian naval observation station warned the British about the presence of German submarines. The British destroyers Fearless and Brazen, escorts for Aurora, attacked and sank U49. One German from a crew of 42 was killed. Admiral Maund writes that the British were aware when they left Scapa Flow that the Germans had four submarines on patrol in the Lofoten-Narvik area and that all four had been accounted for with the sinking of U49, three sunk by destroyers and one by aircraft from Warspite. He is mistaken. The Germans had five submarines in Group 1, which operated along the Narvik approaches, and they lost only one, to Warspite’s aircraft. U49 belonged to Group 5. However, the loss of U64 and U49 as well as the torpedo problems caused the Germans to redeploy the submarines to the vicinity of the Shetlands on April 19 and 20.

The 1st Irish Guards and 1st Scots Guards battalions and the brigade headquarters arrived in Harstad on April 15. The 1st Irish Guards were moved to Bogen, on the north side of Ofotfjord, on April 19. The 34th Light Anti-Aircraft Battery was also landed in Harstad, but it had no guns. The brigade’s third battalion, 2nd South Wales Borderers, landed on April 16 and moved to Bogen to join the 1st Irish Guards on April 21. Various support troops more than equal to the combat forces in numbers, were also landed on April 16.

Harstad had a population of about 4,000 in 1940 and the pier, transport, and storage facilities were limited. The unloading and clearing of the harbor was completed on April 17 and 18 and the transports returned to Great Britain. Derry reports that confusion caused by conditions and decisions that marked the expedition’s inception was great. The lack of tactical loading required that everything be sorted after landing and much had to be reloaded and sent to Namsos since it belonged to the 146th Brigade.

François Kersaudy is more graphic in his description of conditions in Harstad. He describes the arrival of several convoys, without warning, over a five-day period, “1,000 administrators, office clerks and accountants, together with huge amounts of office furniture.” He also notes that General Mackesy discovered that “His brigade had practically no mortar shells, very few grenades, no spare ammunition, no artillery, no anti-aircraft guns, no skis, no snow shoes, no trucks, no landing craft …”2

The British found Harstad unsuitable as a naval base, and Admiral Cork decided to establish a base for the naval forces at Skånland, at the northern end of Tjeldsund. This place is located approximately 15 miles southeast of Harstad. A Royal Marine Fortress Unit prepared positions for placing shore batteries; however, the work was not finished. The British also started work on a large airfield near Skånland but it was never completed to the point where it could be used.

The Debate about an Immediate Attack on Narvik

There has been much speculation about the possible success of an attack on Narvik after the destruction of the German destroyers on April 13. Churchill charged General Mackesy with tardy and negligent behavior not warranted by the tactical situation. While Derry finds little to support Churchill’s conclusion, Ziemke takes the opposite view. He writes:

In view of present knowledge it seems that a landing during the first days would have had a good chance of success since Dietl had only one battalion of mountain troops in Narvik to oppose two British battalions at hand on the 15th and an additional battalion that arrived on the 16th.3

However, the British units were not prepared to deal with opposition immediately after landing. They required a period in a relatively secure area to organize and receive their equipment, to compensate for their hurried deployment. This delay cannot be attributed to Mackesy.

The first meeting between Admiral Cork and General Mackesy took place on April 15. While no records are available, it was described as a heated encounter. Cork was surprised to find that the troops were embarked in anticipation of a peaceful landing and not ready for immediate operations. He was equally surprised to learn that Mackesy’s orders also precluded the landing of troops against organized opposition.

While the general viewed his instructions as not forbidding an immediate move against Narvik if a favorable situation presented itself, there were serious practical impediments. The primary ones had to do with the loading of the transports