Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

to the severe climate found in this area and should have been able to endure the weather conditions in the open better than their opponents. This very fact may have led to an underestimation of enemy capabilities. Norwegian security was lax in Narvik, at Bjørnefjell, and in the Gratang Valley. General Hovland notes that the main reason for the failure of Major Bøckman and others who made glaring mistakes was lack of experience. There is no doubt that lack of experience was a major factor in many of the mistakes, but the errors at Bjørnefjell and Gratangen weer so elementary to the military profession that the “lack of experience” explanation falls short.

The three failures—Narvik, Bjørnefjell, and Gratang Valley—led the Norwegians—like Admiral Forbes after the German bombing attacks on the Home Fleet—to become overly cautious and methodical, as we will see in subsequent chapters. The Germans noted the Norwegian display of hesitancy and caution after the reverse in Gratangen and also noted the importance of Stautner’s daring attack for future operations around Narvik.14

Hovland does not exempt General Fleischer from criticism but places the major blame for the debacle in Gratangen on the general’s subordinates.15 The military commanders may have been weak but the general’s own mistakes cannot be ignored. Fleischer’s attack plan was good but the multiple envelopments originally envisioned were too complicated for units that had not worked together and were going into combat for the first time. The lack of adequate communications exacerbated the problem. It is puzzling that he should have opted for such a complicated operation in the worst possible weather conditions in view of his own assessment that his units were hardly able to undertake missions involving maneuver in war until they had undergone extended training under favorable conditions. It would have been wise to keep the envelopments tighter and simpler since the Germans were deployed on a narrow front.

The constant shifting of units in atrocious weather conditions before and during the fighting exhausted the troops. The frequent incremental changes to the attack plan and the exhausting movements of units to accommodate these changes point to a sense of doubt and hesitancy at brigade and division. It is debatable whether the attack should have been launched at all in those deplorable weather conditions. There may have been an unstated feeling that the Germans would be incapable of mounting a defense under such circumstances. The blizzard had raged for 24 hours when the 1/12th was ordered forward and it is strange that the effect of weather on the operation was not seriously considered before sending that unit across Fjordbotneidet.

Colonel Løken and Lieutenant Colonel Hyldmo failed to insure that the forward units kept contact with the enemy after the attack ground to a halt. With their superior mobility, the Norwegians could have harassed the withdrawing Germans and possibly inflicted severe losses on them. If the Norwegian troops near Lapphaugen knew the Germans had withdrawn, they could have informed the 1/12th that a German unit was heading in its direction. This may have averted the calamity that followed the next morning.

While the wisdom of Fleischer’s decision to take personal command of the envelopment force can be questioned, the results would undoubtedly not have been different if Løken was left in command. The prohibition against the two enveloping battalions descending into the Gratang Valley is difficult to understand. If both battalions were allowed to enter the valley, one could have pushed towards Elvenes, and thereby fixed the German forces in that area. The other battalion could have served as a blocking force against the reinforced company at Lapphaugen, which had to withdraw if the pressure was maintained. Under these circumstances, it would have been a good idea to appoint an overall commander for the enveloping force. Dahl was the senior of the two battalion commanders and therefore the logical choice.

Rather than redeploying the 1/16th from Fossbakken to the Tennevoll area, Fleischer should have ordered the 6th Brigade to resume its attack on Lapphaugen with two battalions. The 1/12th was sitting astride the German withdrawal route and it was the right time to pry the Germans out of their Lapphaugen position. A resumed advance would have revealed that the Germans had already withdrawn and this would have rectified, to some extent, the failure to maintain contact with the enemy.

General Hovland is right in identifying the wartime leadership quality among the officers as the most serious problem within the 6th Division in April 1940. The actions in Narvik, Bjørnefjell and Gratangen all support this conclusion, but I believe that the problem went down to the company level, at least in the case of Narvik and Bjørnefjell.

There is no evidence that General Fleischer came down hard on his subordinates for their failures and this may be because he was fully aware of his own mistakes. The reverse in the Gratang Valley did not affect the careers of his battalion commanders adversely. Bøckman and Hyldmo retired as colonels and Hunstad and Dahl as major generals.

The town of Narvik in 1940.

Narvik on April 8, 1940. The two coastal defense ships are at center and left.

The German supply ship Altmark, which was also carrying British prisoners.

Narvik in 1940 (with author’s annotations).

The British destroyer Cossack.

The German battleship Gneisenau (Scharnhorst was of the same class).

The German heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper.

Summer 2007 view of the Gratang Valley looking generally to the west-northwest, with Gratangsbotn Fjord in the distance. The ridgline to the right is where the Alta Battalion was located during the battle. (Courtesy of Magnor Kr. Fjellheim)

A 1984 photo of Bjerkvik from the west. (Courtesy of Magnor Kr. Fjellheim)

German Admiral Günther Lütjens.

Admiral Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord.

The town of Elverum in ruins.

German seaplane transport in Norwegian fjord.

The British destroyer Glowworm on fire as seen from the