An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith (ebook reader macos .TXT) 📕

great wars, and three great battles, to subdue that little

kingdom, of which the conquest would probably have been still

more difficult, had it not been for the cowardice of its last

king. The militias of all the civilized nations of the ancient

world, of Greece, of Syria, and of Egypt, made but a feeble

resistance to the standing armies of Rome. The militias of some

barbarous nations defended themselves much better. The

Scythian or Tartar militia, which Mithridates drew from the

countries north of the Euxine and Caspian seas, were the most

formidable enemies whom the Romans had to encounter after the

second Carthaginian war. The Parthian and German militias, too,

were always respectable, and upon several occasions, gained very

considerable advantages over the Roman armies. In general,

however, and when the Roman armies were well commanded, they

appear to have been very much superior; and if the Romans did not

pursue the final conquest either of Parthia or Germany, it was

probably because they judged that it was not worth while to add

those two barbarous countries to an empire which was already too

large. The ancient Parthians appear to have been a nation of

Scythian or Tartar extraction, and to have always retained a good

deal of the manners of their ancestors. The ancient Germans were,

like the Scythians or Tartars, a nation of wandering shepherds,

who went to war under the same chiefs whom they were accustomed

to follow in peace. ‘Their militia was exactly of the same kind

with that of the Scythians or Tartars, from whom, too, they were

probably descended.

Many different causes contributed to relax the discipline of the

Roman armies. Its extreme severity was, perhaps, one of those

causes. In the days of their grandeur, when no enemy appeared

capable of opposing them, their heavy armour was laid aside as

unnecessarily burdensome, their laborious exercises were

neglected, as unnecessarily toilsome. Under the Roman emperors,

besides, the standing armies of Rome, those particularly which

guarded the German and Pannonian frontiers, became dangerous to

their masters, against whom they used frequently to set up their

own generals. In order to render them less formidable, according

to some authors, Dioclesian, according to others, Constantine,

first withdrew them from the frontier, where they had always

before been encamped in great bodies, generally of two or three

legions each, and dispersed them in small bodies through the

different provincial towns, from whence they were scarce ever

removed, but when it became necessary to repel an invasion. Small

bodies of soldiers, quartered in trading and manufacturing towns,

and seldom removed from those quarters, became themselves trades

men, artificers, and manufacturers. The civil came to predominate

over the military character ; and the standing armies of Rome

gradually degenerated into a corrupt, neglected. and

undisciplined militia, incapable of resisting the attack of the

German and Scythian militias, which soon afterwards invaded the

western empire. It was only by hiring the militia of some of

those nations to oppose to that of others, that the emperors were

for some time able to defend themselves. The fall of the western

empire is the third great revolution in the affairs of mankind,

of which ancient history has preserved any distinct or

circumstantial account. It was brought about by the

irresistible superiority which the militia of a barbarous has

over that of a civilized nation; which the militia of a nation of

shepherds has over that of a nation of husbandmen, artificers,

and manufacturers. The victories which have been gained by

militias have generally been, not over standing armies, but over

other militias, in exercise and discipline inferior to

themselves. Such were the victories which the Greek militia

gained over that of the Persian empire; and such, too, were those

which, in later times, the Swiss militia gained over that of the

Austrians and Burgundians.

The military force of the German and Scythian nations, who

established themselves upon ruins of the western empire,

continued for some time to be of the same kind in their new

settlements, as it had been in their original country. It was a

militia of shepherds and husbandmen, which, in time of war, took

the field under the command of the same chieftains whom it was

accustomed to obey in peace. It was, therefore, tolerably well

exercised, and tolerably well disciplined. As arts and industry

advanced, however, the authority of the chieftains gradually

decayed, and the great body of the people had less time to spare

for military exercises. Both the discipline and the exercise of

the feudal militia, therefore, went gradually to ruin, and

standing armies were gradually introduced to supply the place of

it. When the expedient of a standing army, besides, had once been

adopted by one civilized nation, it became necessary that all its

neighbours should follow the example. They soon found that their

safety depended upon their doing so, and that their own militia

was altogether incapable of resisting the attack of such an army.

The soldiers of a standing army, though they may never have seen

an enemy, yet have frequently appeared to possess all the courage

of veteran troops, and, the very moment that they took the field,

to have been fit to face the hardiest and most experienced

veterans. In 1756, when the Russian army marched into Poland, the

valour of the Russian soldiers did not appear inferior to that of

the Prussians, at that time supposed to be the hardiest and most

experienced veterans in Europe. The Russian empire, however, had

enjoyed a profound peace for near twenty years before, and could

at that time have very few soldiers who had ever seen an enemy.

When the Spanish war broke out in 1739, England had enjoyed a

profound peace for about eight-and-twenty years. The valour of

her soldiers, however, far from being corrupted by that long

peace, was never more distinguished than in the attempt upon

Carthagena, the first unfortunate exploit of that unfortunate

war. In a long peace, the generals, perhaps, may sometimes forget

their skill; but where a well regulated standing army has been

kept up, the soldiers seem never to forget their valour.

When a civilized nation depends for its defence upon a militia,

it is at all times exposed to be conquered by any barbarous

nation which happens to be in its neighbourhood. The frequent

conquests of all the civilized countries in Asia by the Tartars,

sufficiently demonstrates the natural superiority which the

militia of a barbarous has over that of a civilized nation. A

well regulated standing army is superior to every militia.

Such an army, as it can best be maintained by an opulent and

civilized nation, so it can alone defend such a nation against

the invasion of a poor and barbarous neighbour. It is only by

means of a standing army, therefore, that the civilization of any

country can be perpetuated, or even preserved, for any

considerable time.

As it is only by means of a well regulated standing army, that a

civilized country can be defended, so it is only by means of it

that a barbarous country can be suddenly and tolerably civilized.

A standing army establishes, with an irresistible force, the law

of the sovereign through the remotest provinces of the empire,

and maintains some degree of regular government in countries

which could not otherwise admit of any. Whoever examines with

attention, the improvements which Peter the Great introduced into

the Russian empire, will find that they almost all resolve

themselves into the establishment of a well regulated standing

army. It is the instrument which executes and maintains all his

other regulations. That degree of order and internal peace, which

that empire has ever since enjoyed, is altogether owing to the

influence of that army.

Men of republican principles have been jealous of a standing

army, as dangerous to liberty. It certainly is so, wherever the

interest of the general, and that of the principal officers, are

not necessarily connected with the support of the constitution of

the state. The standing army of Czesar destroyed the Roman

republic. The standing army of Cromwell turned the long

parliament out of doors. But where the sovereign is himself the

general, and the principal nobility and gentry of the country the

chief officers of the army ; where the military force is placed

under the command of those who have the greatest interest in the

support of the civil authority, because they have themselves the

greatest share of that authority, a standing army can never be

dangerous to liberty. On the contrary, it may, in some cases, be

favourable to liberty. The security which it gives to the

sovereign renders unnecessary that troublesome jealousy, which,

in some modern republics, seems to watch over the minutest

actions, and to be at all times ready to disturb the peace of

every citizen. Where the security of the magistrate, though

supported by the principal people of the country, is endangered

by every popular discontent; where a small tumult is capable of

bringing about in a few hours a great revolution, the whole

authority of government must be employed to suppress and punish

every murmur and complaint against it. To a sovereign, on the

contrary, who feels himself supported, not only by the natural

aristocracy of the country, but by a well regulated standing

army, the rudest, the most groundless, and the most licentious

remonstrances, can give little disturbance. He can safely pardon

or neglect them, and his consciousness of his own superiority

naturally disposes him to do so. That degree of liberty which

approaches to licentiousness, can be tolerated only in countries

where the sovereign is secured by a well regulated standing army.

It is in such countries only, that the public safety does not

require that the sovereign should be trusted with any

discretionary power, for suppressing even the impertinent

wantonness of this licentious liberty.

The first duty of the sovereign, therefore, that of defending the

society from the violence and injustice of other independent

societies, grows gradually more and more expensive, as the

society advances in civilization. The military force of the

society, which originally cost the sovereign no expense, either

in time of peace, or in time of war, must, in the progress of

improvement, first be maintained by him in time of war, and

afterwards even in time of peace.

The great change introduced into the art of war by the invention

of firearms, has enhanced still further both the expense of

exercising and disciplining any particular number of soldiers in

time of peace, and that of employing them in time of war. Both

their arms and their ammunition are become more expensive. A

musket is a more expensive machine than a javelin or a bow and

arrows; a cannon or a mortar, than a balista or a catapulta. The

powder which is spent in a modern review is lost irrecoverably,

and occasions a very considerable expense. The javelins and

arrows which were thrown or shot in an ancient one, could easily

be picked up again, and were, besides, of very little value. The

cannon and the mortar are not only much dearer, but much heavier

machines than the balista or catapulta; and require a greater

expense, not only to prepare them for the field, but to carry

them to it. As the superiority of the modern artillery, too, over

that of the ancients, is very great ; it has become much more

difficult, and consequently much more expensive, to fortify a

town, so as to resist, even for a few weeks, the attack of that

superior artillery. In modern times, many different causes

contribute to render the defence of the society more expensive.

The unavoidable effects of the natural progress of improvement

have, in this respect, been a good deal enhanced by a great

revolution in the art of war, to which a mere accident,