Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

and Stortind (Hill 1150). The Norwegians kept Hill 559 occupied by one company until May 6. Company 2, Alta Bn and Co 2, 1/16th, the latter sent via Lortvann from the 6th Brigade to secure the 7th Brigade’s left flank, relieved each other in 24-hour intervals and conducted extensive patrolling to their front between Britatind and Lægastind. These patrols reported considerable German activity that pointed to a counterattack.

The counterattack came against Hill 785 during the night between May 4 and 5. The most forward Norwegian platoon was driven out of its position but it was recaptured in a counterattack the same day. Fourteen German soldiers, including one officer, were captured along with a number of weapons including machineguns and mortars. Five of those captured were wounded. The Germans admit losing a platoon to Norwegian ski troops in this attack and blame the loss on the unit’s lack of mobility in the deep snow.

Company 3, Alta Bn had the difficult task of trying to eliminate German positions, including a number of well-concealed machinegun nests, from the very broken and difficult terrain between the mountains and Route 50. The company moved from Fjelldal, where it had been the battalion reserve, on May 3 and occupied the high ground about one kilometer east of Reisevann. The company resumed its advance at 2330 hours but it soon ran into heavy German fire and the attack was called off after a fight that lasted over three hours. Norwegian casualties were one killed and six wounded. The company continued to patrol and probe the German positions on May 5 and 6. There were frequent clashes, with losses on both sides. The Germans withdrew to new positions between Reisevann and Storevann on May 6.

Norwegian army and naval aircraft provided valuable support for the ground operations by flying numerous reconnaissance and ground support missions. Attacks by Norwegian aircraft are mentioned frequently in the 3rd Division’s war journal. The Luftwaffe was also active, despite problems mentioned earlier. One Norwegian aircraft was shot down and four others were wrecked. Two pilots were captured.

The Germans were well armed with automatic weapons and were able to establish a belt of interlocking fire along the valley and Route 50. The same applied to the mountain massif where the placement of machineguns on key terrain covered not only the approaches to the heights but also the valleys between those heights. The German positions reduced the possibility of bypassing and flanking maneuvers and it became necessary for the Norwegians to drive the Germans from their mountain strong points by frontal attacks. This proved both tough and time-consuming in difficult terrain with deep snow against very competent and obstinate German defenders.

Orders from the division on May 5 called for a continuation of the offensive by both brigades. The division saw the clearing of the area north and northeast of Læigastind as the most important mission for the 7th Brigade. Dahl viewed Hill 842 as the key German defensive position. He decided that Hills 698 and 684 had to be captured before an attack could be carried out against Hill 842. The Norwegian attack on these hills was carried out during the night between May 5 and 6. The attack against Hill 698 succeeded but the attack against Hill 684 was repelled.

Dahl decided to attack along his whole front from Hill 785 to Britatind. Two companies on the Brigade’s left flank were to attack the high ground near the lake to the east of Læigastind while two companies attacked Hill 842. Another two companies were kept back as brigade reserve. The attacks were supported by all available artillery and mortar resources and by air attacks against Hills 842 and 780.

The Norwegian attack proceeded according to plans. Company 1, Alta Bn successfully stormed the well-fortified Hill 842 at 0600 hours on May 7. Company 7, 2/15th Inf passed through Co 1 quickly and proceeded against Roasme (Hill 856). The Germans were driven from this important height and the Norwegians now had a clear view of Herjangsfjord and could see the Narvik Peninsula in the distance. They were less than eight kilometers from Colonel Windisch’s headquarters. The distance is misleading since some very rough terrain still separated the Norwegians from that location.

The Germans mounted a determined defense against the attack by the 7th Brigade’s left flank units and they succeeded in keeping Norwegian reconnaissance patrols at a distance. The reinforced Co 2, Alta Bn, carried out the attack. It did not start out well since the platoon that was to secure the company’s right flank was bombed by friendly aircraft and had to withdraw temporarily. German fire intensified as the company neared its objective and the attack stalled despite the commitment of an additional platoon from Co 2, 1/16th. Another platoon was added to the attacking force in the morning of May 7, but the Germans were able to keep the attack from progressing despite heavy artillery support from the 8th Mountain Artillery Battery.

The Norwegians learned that Britatind was unoccupied. The relatively short distance from Britatind would allow effective fire to be placed on the German positions from that location, especially by snipers. A platoon from Co 2, 1/16th quickly occupied Britatind. It appears that neither the 139th Regiment nor the 3rd Division knew that Britatind was unoccupied since the 3rd Division journal states that a message from the 139th reported that Britatind was lost after it was attacked by a Norwegian battalion with heavy artillery support. The Norwegian platoon on Britatind placed effective fire on the enemy positions and the German company withdrew in some disorder. When the Norwegians occupied the abandoned positions, they found weapons, ammunition, hand grenades, and rucksacks discarded in the hasty withdrawal. The Norwegians, who had suffered five badly wounded, captured five Germans, one wearing a Norwegian uniform.

Dietl and Windisch concluded that the situation on the northern front had reached a crisis stage. They decided to withdraw to a line Storfoss-Læigasvann-Ørnefjell-Skogfjell. Dietl’s concerns are illustrated by the fact that at 1745 hours on May