Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

Ruge sent an immediate message to Colonel Finne directing him to appeal the evacuation decision, since a German occupation of Bodø meant that German fighters would soon dominate the skies over Narvik. He also pointed out that the surrender of the Bodø area to the enemy would have a detrimental impact on Norwegian morale after the operations there had resulted in the destruction of the city.

Roscher-Nielsen asked Fleischer to prevail on the British to delay their evacuation by three days to allow him to withdraw his troops safely. Fleischer did this through General Ruge’s headquarters on May 29. Derry and Hovland write that the request to delay the evacuation from Bodø for three days was accepted. This is misleading. The final evacuation took place in the evening of May 31, two days after the request. Furthermore, the withdrawal from Fauske was completed before May 30, when Roscher-Nielsen reported that he was alone on the isthmus.

The Irish Guards and the two independent companies had actually departed the isthmus in the morning of May 29. To the Norwegians, it was not important when the British evacuated the town of Bodø but when they evacuated the Fauske area. This would leave the Norwegians in the untenable position of facing the Germans alone. Ash agrees, writing that Gubbins withdrew his forces during the promised three-day delay and that the Norwegians were cut off long before the time was up.

The Norwegian Navy assembled over 100 fishing vessels and these were sent to Røsvik to evacuate the Norwegian troops. Roscher-Nielsen decided to hold the Djupvik positions with units from 1/15th Inf while the Reserve Battalion, 14th Inf was sent to Røsvik for evacuation. This battalion was successfully evacuated to the Lofoten Islands on May 30. Only one platoon from the company at Sulitjelma reached Røsvik. The rest of the company found its route of withdrawal to Røsvik blocked by German detachments and it was demobilized.

General Feurstein had to make a quick decision as his lead elements approached Fauske. He was presented with the same dilemma as had faced Admiral Lütjens, almost two months earlier. It was tempting to let battle groups Sorko and Schrantz aggressively pursue the retiring British troops. There is little doubt that large elements of the British brigade-size force would have been destroyed or captured if he had selected that course of action. However, Feurstein did not lose sight of the main objective, the relief of General Dietl’s forces in Narvik.

Feurstein split his forces when he reached Fauske. The forces approaching that location consisted of two and one-half mountain infantry battalions, two companies of bicycle troops, and one mountain artillery battery. Lieutenant Colonel Nake commanded these forces. Feurstein allowed one part of this force, under Nake, to follow the British while the remainder, under Sorko, continued its trek northward to Røsvik. The forces sent westward did not press their pursuit and there were no significant engagements between them and the retreating Guards. Between May 28 and 31, the British successfully evacuated their forces in two destroyers and the old cruiser Vindictive, under the cover of aircraft operating from Bardufoss. They faced little German interference. Two of the independent companies were taken directly to Great Britain aboard Vindictive, while the other forces were brought to Harstad. The British destroyed most of their heavy weapons, vehicles, and the oil storage facilities in the harbor.

British operations in Nordland Province, which had begun with considerable optimism three weeks earlier, ended as the last destroyer pulled away from Bodø. British losses in the Nordland Campaign, according to Derry, amounted to 506 killed, wounded, and captured. This included a small number from the South Wales Borderer’s on Ankenes Peninsula at Narvik.

The 1/15th Inf, under Major Omdal, fought an effective delaying action from their position at Djupvik. The first German attack was repelled. The position held until the early afternoon of May 31 when a withdrawal was ordered, covered by the machinegun company. The last engagement took place three kilometers south of Røsvik. The evacuation was carried out during a period of fog that prevented German air operations. Horses and vehicles were left behind but the floating depot was towed away. The rear guard managed to hold the Germans at a distance until the last unit had embarked at 1800 hours on May 31.

Operation Büffel (Buffalo)

With the British and Norwegian forces out of his way, Feurstein could begin what was perhaps the most difficult part of his effort to relieve Narvik. His forces had covered about 700 kilometers under difficult conditions in 27 days. These forces were still over 150 kilometers from Narvik and ahead of them lay a roadless mountain wilderness that the OKW had declared impassable even by mountain troops. There were several efforts underway to bring assistance to Narvik but the connection through the mountains was viewed by some as the only effective way.

Planning and preparations for the last leg of the advance began when the Germans were still between Mo and Posthus. Three battalions of specially selected individuals were created by selecting a platoon of the best soldiers from each company in the division. These three platoons from each battalion would form a company. The three companies thus formed became a “Narvik Battalion.” Each battalion was reinforced with three heavy machineguns, one infantry gun, and two mountain howitzers. The battalions consisted of about 600 men. Special equipment for high-mountain operations was ordered and delivered to Fauske.

Lieutenant Colonel Ritter von Hengl, commander of the 137th Regiment and a future commander of the 2nd Mountain Division, was selected to command the “Narvik Battalions.” He established his headquarters in Mo and began the detailed planning for the operation, code-named Büffel (Buffalo). According to Major Zorn, the 2nd Division’s operation officer, he selected this name because it used to be the battle cry of Dietl’s downhill skiers when Dietl was a company commander in Munich.

The route selected for the battalions avoided places where the troops could come under fire from British warships and any violation of the Swedish frontier