Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

The Scots Guards went into position at Viskiskoia on May 23. Gubbins intended to hold this position until May 27. The Scots Guards were reinforced by the 3rd Independent Co, which had marched south from Rognan, and two Norwegian ski detachments, each numbering about 40 men. The morale of the battalion had deteriorated considerably.

The pursuing Germans gave the Guards precious little time to rest. They attacked the Viskiskoia positions at 1600 hours on May 23, only a few hours after the British arrived. Adams writes that it was during the heat of the resulting battle that the Guards learned that their popular commander had been relieved. Lieutenant Colonel Trappes-Lomax was ordered back to Harstad. The battalion war diary describes the effect on the troops:

This crushing blow took place in the middle of an enemy attack, and it is hardly to be wondered at that the morale of both officers and men was still further shaken by the loss of a Commanding Officer for whose personality and ability everyone had the highest respect, and in whom everyone had the greatest confidence.12

While his career was damaged, Trappes-Lomax was exonerated, promoted to colonel in 1944, and retired as a brigadier in 1948. When he died in 1962, an old comrade wrote the following about his actions in Norway in The Times: “Trappes appreciated every situation during that enforced retreat with calmness, patience and accuracy. He was right where others were wrong time and time again.”13 The removal of Trappes-Lomax was also a disappointment to the Norwegians. He had worked well with Roscher-Nielsen and other Norwegian officers.

Trappes-Lomax’s relief did not alter the British situation. The independent company was driven back and this allowed the Germans to enfilade the Scots Guards’ main position. It was ironic that Brigadier Gubbins, who had arrived at the battalion, had to cancel his earlier demand that Viskiskoia be held until May 27. He ordered a withdrawal at 1800 hours to a new position behind a blown bridge at Storjord.

One British and one Norwegian company, along with a Norwegian ski detachment occupied the Storjord position before the arrival of the Scots Guards. This position was given up without a fight when Gubbins ordered the withdrawal to continue through Posthus, which was 20 kilometers further back and now occupied by fresh troops. The Scots Guards were evacuated to Bodø by sea from Rognan on May 25.

The disposition of British forces in the Bodø area should have aroused Norwegian suspicions that another unannounced evacuation was imminent. Gubbins had decided not to hold Posthus, only to fight another rear guard action. He spread most of his forces along the Bodø Peninsula, supposedly to prevent amphibious and/or airborne landings. This was undoubtedly a genuine concern and it shows the long-term psychological effects of German amphibious operations in Trondheimfjord and at Hemnesberg.

Roscher-Nielsen pointed out to General Fleischer on May 22 that the British force disposition north of Saltfjord included only one company between Fauske and Finneid. The route to Narvik led through Finneid and Fauske. While Gubbins had assured the Norwegians that this area would be defended, the positioning of the British forces may have led Roscher-Nielsen to suspect that the British were no longer preoccupied with halting Feurstein’s advance in the direction of Narvik. A defense of the Bodø Peninsula west of Fauske would not impede the German drive to the north. It was possible that the Germans would have halted to eliminate the Bodø bridgehead but it was more likely that they would leave a covering force to protect their flank while continuing their advance. Follow-up forces could then deal with Bodø.

The Norwegians were desperately trying to reorganize and reconstitute their own forces in the area, knowing that these forces alone had no chance of contesting Feurstein’s advance. The trouble-plagued 1/14th Inf was dissolved and parts of it were organized into ski detachments, while other members still fit for duty were distributed among the companies in 1/15th Inf when that unit arrived in the Bodø area. An infantry company from the reserve battalion of the 16th Inf and the 11th Motorized Artillery Battery had already arrived. Company 3, 1/15th Inf arrived in Finneid aboard fishing vessels on May 21. Roscher-Nielsen sent this company immediately into the Sulitjelma area to prevent an enemy envelopment of the Saltdal front.

Despite their enormous setbacks, a strange optimism prevailed among the British leaders in Harstad, even after the Germans had crossed Saltfjell. Auchinleck prepared a Special Order of the Day for May 24, Empire Day. It was apparently so well liked that all service commanders signed it. This was the day before the order to evacuate Bodø. A couple of excerpts are illustrative:

It is our firm intention to stop the further advance northwards of the enemy and to round up their forces in the Narvik area … Our brave allies, the French, had already carried out a brilliant landing operation from boats near Narvik and bundled the enemy out of their forward positions; they are pressing forward steadily in the most difficult country and have the upper hand … Man for man you are more than a match for the Germans so give them what they deserve.

While the order may have reflected the new mood at the British headquarters, it was also undoubtedly intended to lift the spirit of soldiers who were tired and whose morale was declining. A more accurate reflection of Auchinleck’s view of the situation is contained in a letter he wrote to General Dill, the new Chief of the Imperial General Staff, a few days later:

It is lamentable that in this wild underdeveloped country where we, with all our wealth of experience, should be at our best, are outmaneuvered and outfought every time. It makes me sick with shame. The French are all right, real soldiers. As I said, our new armies will have to be very different from our old if we are going to recover our