Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

The two westerly Norwegian ski detachments, numbering about 120 men and fighting in familiar terrain and weather, should have been able to stop or seriously delay the German envelopment force. The detachment at Bjerkemoen withdrew without offering resistance except for some long-range rifle fire. The detachment at Lille Akersvann resisted and held its position. The Germans bypassed the Norwegian detachment without attempting to eliminate it. The Norwegians failed to prevent the continued northward movement of the German force.

Sorko’s main force approached the British positions along the Finneid-Mo road. He started probing the British positions at 1830 hours while waiting for the expected flank attack of the enveloping force. Artillery on both sides was involved. British artillery fire became ineffective after German artillery fire severed the wire communications between the guns and the forward units. The Germans were unable to cross the river near the destroyed bridge because of intense British fire and they suffered a number of casualties.

Meanwhile, there was no news from the envelopment force and Sorko concluded that the difficult terrain had prevented it from reaching its attack positions. The enveloping force finally reached Kobbernagel at 2030 hours, two hours after Sorko began his probing attacks, and its commander sent a messenger to the battalion in order to insure that their attack would coincide with Sorko’s main attack. The messenger did not reach his destination until the following morning and by then the German main force had broken into the British positions. The enveloping force commander heard sounds of heavy fighting during the night but remained confused about the situation and decided to wait until morning. Fortunately for the British, he also decided not to carry out the planned advance to the road to cut their line of retreat.4

After his probing attacks were repulsed and with no news from his enveloping force, Sorko decided to carry out a more limited envelopment with Cos 6 and 8 of his main force. He moved this force eastward and managed to make an unopposed crossing of the river east of Hjelmedal. This enabled the Germans to launch a full-scale attack on the British left flank around 0200 hours. Some intense close-quarter fighting followed but within one hour, the Germans broke into the British positions. Lieutenant Colonel Trappes-Lomax tried to reinforce his left-flank company from his other forces but his men were slowly driven back over Hill 441. This forced a general withdrawal through the second defensive line.

The wider of the two German flanking forces divided into two elements after passing the Norwegian positions west of Lille Akersvann. One company proceeded to Kobbernaglen where it remained rather inactive. The ski platoon from Captain Holzinger’s company continued eastward towards its objective west of Mofjell. It reached the built-up area in the rear of the British forces around 1700 hours on May 17. The British assumed that this force included the German paratroopers believed to have landed to their east and this threat may have contributed to their decision to abandon their second defensive line.

At 2100 hours, Roscher-Nielsen ordered the Winter War volunteers located on the southern outskirts of Mo to attack and eliminate the German unit that had reached the main road in the rear of the British positions. About 40 volunteers had arrived in Mo on May 16 and were commanded by a Swede, Captain Björkman, who had previously participated in the fighting near the Swedish border in central Norway.

Captain Björkman and his men encountered the Germans and attacked them frontally and in the flank and drove them back into the mountains. British sources make no mention of the counterattack by the Winter War volunteers. They do give considerable praise to another Swedish volunteer, Captain Count Erik Lewenhaupt, who helped bring the company that failed to get the withdrawal order to safety.

Trappes-Lomax informed Roscher-Nielsen at 0230 hours on May 18 that his position at Stien was enveloped and that he had to withdraw from Mo since there were no hopes of reinforcements. Roscher-Nielsen asked General Fleischer if he wanted the Norwegians to continue the defense of the Mo area alone. Fleischer ordered him to withdraw.

Roscher-Nielsen and Trappes-Lomax worked out a plan and timetable for the retreat. They agreed that the British would cover the Norwegian battalions as they withdrew to Storfoshei, about ten kilometers northeast of Mo. From there, the Reserve Battalion, 14th Inf was to be withdrawn during the night of 18–19 May and the 1/14th Inf the following night.

Sorko pressed his attack, but it was not until the evening of May 18 that the area around Hill 481 was cleared. The withdrawing British companies lost men who became separated from their units during the withdrawal. Company B, occupying the second line, apparently failed to get the withdrawal order and found its line of retreat to Mo blocked by German forces. If that is correct, either the German ski unit must have returned to the road after its engagement with the volunteers, or other units from Sorko’s group had managed to slip behind the second line. The battalion commander assumed that Co B was lost. However, it disengaged and made an exhaustive retreat through the mountains in deep snow and across the Rana River. It reached the main road a few miles north of Mo. The Germans reached Mo in the evening of May 18.

Buchner reports the German losses as 14 killed and 26 wounded. This is about the same numbers given by Breckan. The British had at least seven killed and 40 were captured by the Germans. Adams puts the number of British killed, wounded, and missing at over 70 while the regimental history states that they suffered between 70 and 80 casualties of whom three were killed. The Germans report that they captured 14 machineguns, 6 mortars, and one 40mm antiaircraft gun. Three Norwegians and one Swedish volunteer died in the fighting.

Gubbins, who had received another brevet promotion, this time to brigadier, arrived at Trappes-Lomax’s headquarters,