Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

contact with enemy units on or near Hill 648. Company 6, supported now by Co 8, was located on Kobberfjell’s northern slope while Co 3 was located on the northeast slopes of that same mountain.

It had become obvious that the best way to secure Kobberfjell itself was by threatening the defenders’ line of retreat, since the very steep mountainsides would make a frontal assault very costly. Lieutenant Colonel Berg ordered the attacks delayed pending the outcome of “negotiations at higher levels” about a large-scale joint action, apparently with the 7th Brigade and the French. Munthe-Kaas writes, “As many times before during the campaign, nothing came of the coordinated attack.”24

Major Munthe-Kaas and his men used the pause to bring additional fire-support into place. They hoped to bring two of the four howitzers in the 8th Field Artillery Battery across the Vassdal River, now in flood. They managed to bring one howitzer across a snow-bridge before it collapsed. The howitzer was disassembled and a 72-man workforce managed, with the use of ropes and pulleys, to bring it up the precipitous 1500-foot north side of Storebalak within a period of two hours. The howitzer was quickly reassembled and firing on the surprised Germans on Kobberfjell.

A coordinated battalion attack was launched at 1100 hours on May 18. When the forces on the right flank began to stall, the battalion commander switched all but one platoon of Co 3 to that flank to bolster the attack. The fighting subsided around midnight because of a heavy fog. The Norwegians succeeded in seizing a hill about 300 meters northwest and across a small lake from the German positions on Hill 648. Major Munthe-Kaas writes in his report to the brigade on May 19:

The enemy has excellent prepared positions with stone front and side protection. The fire is especially heavy from Hill 648, from the south side of Kobberfjellvann, from three places on Kobberfjell, and from the high ground between Næverfjellvannene … The last four days have been exhausting with little sleep, little chance for hot meals, cold nights, continual combat, and strenuous transports. The fog today is welcomed since it makes large-scale fighting impossible. I have no reports about contact with the Alta Battalion or the French.25

Berg had a meeting with the Alta Bn commander on the same day, to coordinate their operations. They decided that the 6th Brigade would continue its two-battalion attack against Kuberget and Kobberfjell while the 1/12th advanced through the steep valley between Storebalak and Lillebalak and attacked Hill 648. Simultaneously, the Alta Bn would attack and seize Lillebalak (Hill 572) and Hill 482. It was anticipated that the French would attack towards Fiskeløsvann and Hill 482 from their positions west and south of Hartvigvann. According to Norwegian sources, one company made this attack on the night of May 17-18 but was stopped by heavy German air attacks. This attack is not mentioned in French sources.

The Alta Bn’s attack order issued in the evening of May 19 stated that it would attack southward that night while a French battalion attacked in the direction of Nedre Jernvann from Trældal. This was apparently the 14th Bn CA, which had arrived in Liljedal by ALCs and a destroyer that morning. The Alta Bn’s attack was to be carried out by three companies. Company 1, on the left, would cross the river and seize Lillebalak. It would dig in and support the attacks on German positions near Kobberfjellvann and Hill 336 with its heavy weapons. Company 2, in the center would attack one hour after Co 1 and seize Hill 336. Company 3, on the right, would make a concealed approach one hour after Co 1 began its advance, to attack positions northwest of Hill 482.

The brigade notified Major Munthe-Kaas at 2350 hours on May 19 that the attacks by the 1/12th Inf against Hill 648 and by Alta Bn against Lillebalak and Hill 482, were in progress. The 2/16th was unable to participate in or witness the attacks because a heavy fog blanketed the areas above 500 meters. Contact between the two 2/16th and 1/12th was established at noon on May 20. The 2/16th began its attack at 1500 hours, after the fog had lifted. It continued its attacks against Kobberfjell and Hill 648 in the evening of May 20 but encountered heavy resistance from both objectives.

Company 1, Alta Bn seized Lillebalak and Co 2 also captured its objective, Hill 336. There was contact between Co 2, Alta Bn and the right flank company of the 1/12th Inf. A little over three hours after securing Lillebalak, the Norwegians came under heavy artillery fire and withdrew from the hill. Two soldiers were killed and another three wounded. Soon thereafter, Co 2 on Hill 336 came under heavy mortar fire from the hills south of Hartvigvann. It appears that French artillery and mortar fire caused both incidents. The French had difficulties in differentiating between the grey-green uniforms worn by both Germans and Norwegians. Sometimes, even Germans and Norwegians experienced this difficulty. Special markings were agreed on between the Norwegians and the French, but these were apparently misunderstood or not seen. There was a direct telephone line between the French forces and the Alta Bn and the latter had notified the French at 1300 hours that Norwegian forces had occupied Lillebalak, but word did not filter down to the gun batteries.

The results of the Alta Bn’s attacks were disappointing. The Norwegian troops withdrew back across the river to rest while only a picket line was left on the northern slope of Lillebalak and Hill 336. The Germans reoccupied Lillebalak and their machineguns put a stop to the advance of the 1/12th Inf in the valley between Lillebalak and Storebalak.

The two battalions of the 6th Brigade had so far been almost solely responsible for the high plateau operation. Except for the abortive effort against Lillebalak and Hill 336 in the morning of May 20, the 7th Brigade remained relatively inactive. The advance of the 1/12th Inf was brought to