Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

considered the situation critical and did not believe Windisch could hold the new positions without reinforcements.

A Question of Strategy

General Dietl viewed a direct attack on Narvik as the logical next step by the Allies after his forces were expelled from Bjerkvik and had withdrawn to the mountains north of Rombaksfjord. While he assumed that the large Allied buildup was for the purpose of a direct attack on Narvik, he still viewed the threat from the north as the most dangerous. A Norwegian breakthrough resulting in the loss of Bjørnefjell would seal the fate of his command. His reports and frequent requests for immediate reinforcements in the following days painted a picture of a dire situation on the northern front. Dietl had concluded that unless that front was stabilized he would be forced to withdraw from Narvik, even if a direct attack against that city did not develop. He made it clear that the only avenue open to his exhausted forces if the northern front did not hold was a retreat to the mountains in the Bjørnefjell area.

Dietl, however, was in desperate need of reinforcements to stem Norwegian pressures in order to carry out such a withdrawal successfully. Even if a withdrawal succeeded, lack of timely reinforcement would probably result in a retreat into Sweden. In a message sent on May 13, Group XXI requested OKW approval for such a move if it became necessary. The lead elements of Feurstein’s forces were still about 300 kilometers from Narvik and no one seriously believed that they would reach Narvik in time to save the situation.

For the Norwegians, the stage was set to secure the key terrain on the high plateau. However, the German defense line had been shortened considerably and if their losses in personnel and equipment could be replaced, they would be able to occupy the remaining defensive positions with stronger forces.

Generals Fleischer and Béthouart felt the troops needed some time to rest before tackling the difficult tasks ahead. The attack on Narvik was expected within a few days and as soon as the city was taken, the offensive against Bjørnefjell would be launched. The timing of these attacks was unfortunate since it spared the Germans from having to face simultaneous offensives against both Narvik and Bjørnefjell.

Béthouart assumed command of all Allied ground forces in the Narvik area when the British units moved south to stop General Feurstein’s advance. On May 14 he met with Fleischer at the 6th Division headquarters to discuss the offensive and establish a boundary between the French and Norwegian troops. It was agreed that the initial boundary would run from just northwest of Hartvigvann to the southwest portion of Fiskeløsvann. It was also decided that one Norwegian infantry battalion and a motorized field artillery battery would participate in the direct attack on Narvik. Fleischer selected the 2/15th Inf since many troops in this unit were recruited from the town and surrounding area. This battalion and the 9th Motorized Artillery Battery were removed from the front to Setermoen. They sat idle at Setermoen for almost two weeks because of repeated postponements of the Narvik attack. The newly mobilized 1/15th Inf was at Bardufoss preparing to move to the Bodø area. The Reserve Battalion, 16th Inf had completed its training period at Setermoen on April 30 but was not deployed to the front as a unit. By pulling the 1/15th out of the line, Fleischer reduced his forward-deployed forces to the equivalent of three and one half battalions since the 1/12th Inf was still recovering from its losses in Gratangen.

At this time, the Allied forces were positioned as follows:

1. The two French Foreign Legion battalions were located in the Bjerkvik-Øyjord area with 1st Bn occupying Hills 509 and 589, the high ground east of Herjangsfjord; 2nd Bn was at Elvegårdsmoen with forward units west and south of Hartvigvann.

2. The 27th Half-Brigade CA had its battalions spread throughout the area. The 6th Bn was relocated to Gratangen (later to Sjøvegan) since 65% of its personnel suffered from frostbite. The 12th Bn on Ankenes Peninsula was relieved by the 1st Polish Bn in the evening of May 17 and moved across Ofotfjord to Lenvik as a reserve. The 14th Bn was located in the Øyjord area and plans were to move east from that area but frostbite problems ruled out an overland move. The battalion was moved in ALCs and a British destroyer to Liljedal during the night of 18-19 May with the mission of establishing a bridgehead in the Aasen area.

3. The entire Polish Brigade was located on Ankenes Peninsula, or to its west, by May 19.

The Foreign Legion moved into the area around Fiskeløsvann on May 16 but heavy air attacks and German artillery fire brought the advance to a halt. The French forces withdrew on May 19 after the Norwegians assumed responsibility for this area. The Germans bombed the headquarters of the French half-brigade in Bjerkvik on May 17 and eight soldiers, including the battalion commander, were killed. General Ruge, who was visiting, was not hurt.

Fleischer had made it clear in his directives since late April that Bjørnefjell was his main objective and the 6th Brigade was expected to carry out the main burden of the attack. However, the 6th Brigade was deployed on a wide front from just east of Lillebalak to the Swedish border with no apparent main effort, despite Lieutenant Colonel Berg’s earlier suggestion that better possibilities for maneuver existed in the east, between Nævertind and the Swedish border.

Would the outcome have been more favorable if Berg’s suggestion had been taken up? There were no German forces deployed in that area on May 14. General Dietl and Colonel Windisch became very concerned about their right flank after reports of Norwegian troop movements, their seizure of the Nævertind area, and a buildup against Kuberget. These actions on the part of the Norwegians resulted in a scramble by the Germans to make forces available to plug the gaping hole in their right flank. It was