Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

companies withdrew successfully. Two mountain howitzers at the east end of Hartvigvann provided continuous support for the withdrawing units. The withdrawal of Group Windisch was mostly completed by 0700 hours on May 14 and the regimental headquarters, the last unit to cross the bridge at Gamberg, was established at the northeastern corner of Fiskeløsvann by 0900 hours.

There was precious little General Dietl and his staff could do to assist Colonel Windisch from their location at Bjørnefjell. Radio communications with Group Windisch were only sporadic after 2145 hours on May 12 and the situation remained unclear until the morning of May 14. Messengers took a long time to cover the distance to Bjørnefjell.

The only unit available after Dietl ordered the divisional reserve, Co 3/138th, forward to cover Windisch’s withdrawal was a platoon of engineers under the command of Lieutenant von Brandt. This unit was sent forward to the hills immediately west of Cirkelvann but it was not expected to arrive until the next day because of difficult snow conditions. The arrival of fleeing and demoralized naval personnel did little to improve the expectations of Dietl and his staff. Communications were also lost between Colonel Windisch and Major Schleebrügge’s task force on the far right.

The 3rd Division expected at any time to receive news of catastrophic events on the northern front. The entry in the division journal for 0700 on May 13 offers a concise summary of the prevailing sentiment: “It is doubtful that Gruppe Windisch will succeed in withdrawing its units since the enemy has made deep advances in its left flank.” Group XXI’s report to the OKW in the evening of May 13 is equally pessimistic: “Success [of Group Windisch’s withdrawal] in view of its current battle worthiness is questionable.”

Messages to Group XXI and the air support center in Trondheim called for immediate reinforcements and strong Luftwaffe support. The weather prevented effective air support and the only reinforcement received was Co 1, 1st Parachute Regiment commanded by Lieutenant Becker. Sixty-six men of this unit parachuted into the Bjørnefjell area around noon on May 14. The 3rd Division journal notes that the paratroopers arrived without rucksacks, overcoats, snowshoes and equipment needed for mountain operations. Clothing and equipment had to be scraped together to make these troops capable of operating in the mountains. However, within six hours of their arrival, the paratroopers were sent northward to reinforce Major Schleebrügge’s hard-pressed troops where the situation had become critical because of 6th Brigade’s attacks.

Dietl must have uttered a sigh of relief when Windisch reported at 0700 hours on May 14 that his exhausted mountain troops had managed to occupy new defensive positions running generally from Hill 548 in the west (Melbyfjell) to Storebalak in the east. The situation was still critical and it was doubtful if the Germans could hold Storebalak and Neverfjell.

We have seen why the Foreign Legionnaires advancing from Elvegårdsmoen failed to close the trap on Group Windisch in the Hartvigvann area. Let us now examine why the French 6th Battalion CA and the Norwegian 7th Brigade failed to do so from the north. The two postponements of the amphibious assaults made things difficult for General Fleischer. The deteriorating conditions for supplying his left wing due to the spring thaw, led him to allow the 6th Brigade to ignore the second postponement.

Fleischer visited Lieutenant Colonel Dahl and the men of the Alta Bn on Roasme on May 12. After the visit, he issued an addendum to the order for the forthcoming operation. The addition was clear and to the point, “The attack tonight will only begin, as far as the 7th Brigade is concerned, when it is determined indisputably that the French advance has actually begun.”12 Hovland suggests that this more cautious approach was a result of the events in Gratangen on 24 April.

More recent events may also have influenced Fleischer. The French advance along Route 50 had fallen almost two miles behind that of the 7th Brigade and exposed that unit’s right flank to possible German counterattacks. Then there was the refusal of the French company from the 6th Bn CA to advance from Roasme against Ørnefjell in support of the Norwegian attack on Hills 676 and 664, or even to provide mortar support for the Norwegians pinned down in front of those two objectives. Dahl and Major Hyldmo are likely to have brought these examples to Fleischer’s attention.

Regardless of whether or not the addendum was justified, it was also unfortunately open to interpretation by his subordinates as a lack of faith in his allies. An openly expressed attitude of that nature has a tendency to spread rapidly. Some have used the order as an illustration that Fleischer had become too cautious and that his excessive concern for the welfare of his own units led to a lack of initiative and a failure to exploit opportunities. General Ruge wrote later “The circumstances were that the German forces in Narvik could indisputably have been liquidated earlier if we and the allies had pressed harder.”13 Hovland writes that this is a serious accusation. However, the conclusion drawn by Ruge is similar to views expressed by German writers.

There also appear to have been some difficulties with respect to the operational boundaries between French and Norwegian forces. This caused Fleischer to send a written message to the French commander (Béthouart?) in the evening of May 12 to clarify the boundaries and to insure “…that the French units in this operation occupy the terrain to and including Ørnefjell on the assumption that the attack is actually carried out tonight…” Fleischer states that if the attack was postponed again “then the terrain east of Storevann-Kvandal will be occupied by the 7th Brigade tomorrow before noon.”14

This clarification was sent to the French only hours before the Bjerkvik landing. It is not known when it reached the French but it is unlikely that it filtered down to subordinate units before they landed. The 27th Half-Brigade may have received it directly from the division or the 7th Brigade. It is,