Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

Auchinleck was an officer with considerable experience in mountain warfare in India but no experience in amphibious or arctic operations. While the growing size of the international force in the Narvik area undoubtedly warranted a higher ranking ground commander, it was also a convenient way for Churchill and his colleagues to rid themselves of the cautious and recalcitrant Mackesy.

Mackesy was rushed to North Norway on short notice in early April. General Auchinleck, on the other hand, was in no hurry. He arrived in Harstad on May 11. Auchinleck’s “secret instructions,” according to his biographer, were to assume command immediately upon arrival in Norway. His official instructions, signed by Oliver Stanley on May 5, were apparently a watered down version since they told him not to interfere with existing plans “until they have either achieved success or been abandoned.”7

The British Chiefs of Staff wanted to send a message to Admiral Cork encouraging him to launch the attack on Narvik but instead it was decided to ask Cork for his personal views. This may have been a way for Churchill to put pressure Cork, who had written that he would do his best to justify the trust Churchill had placed in him. Cork replied that he favored the attack, although there was no certainty of success, but he had decided to await the arrival of Auchinleck. The Chiefs of Staff, with the approval of the War Cabinet, answered that strong action was favored, that risk-taking would be supported, and that “Auchinleck’s coming should be left out of his calculations.”8 Cork’s answer stated that he had committed himself to the alternate operation recommended by Mackesy. Ironside notes that Churchill appeared to be weighted down by events in Narvik, wanted the city taken, “yet doesn’t dare to give a direct order to Cork.”9

Despite having considered a landing at Bjerkvik out of the question only a few days earlier, Mackesy now ordered General Béthouart to do just that. Some consider that the addition of the Polish troops, now just arriving, gave him more confidence but this is not very likely since he and Cork were already considering sending the 24th Guards Brigade south to meet the German drive from Namsos. It is more likely that he saw that his attempts to delay operations would no longer work and that he settled on what he considered the least dangerous of two courses of action, landing at Narvik or landing at Bjerkvik. The operation against Bjerkvik was also in accordance with an earlier recommendation by General Fleischer and the wishes of his French allies.

The Bjerkvik Landing

General Béthouart was charged with the planning and execution of the landing. He decided to use the two battalions of the 13th Half-Brigade of the Foreign Legion for the landing. The reaction of a legionnaire officer to this mission was probably typical:10 “Ah, it is all very difficult. We are used to traveling on camels across the desert, and here you give us boats, and we have to cross the water. It is very difficult but it will be all right. I think so.” Béthouart also intended to use one of the newly arrived Polish battalions for an overland approach against Bjerkvik from Bogen.

Simultaneously, he planned that the troops on Ankenes Peninsula undertake operations to tie down German forces in that area. Finally, he sought and received General Fleischer’s agreement on May 8 for an attack by the 7th Brigade and the 6th and 14th Battalions of the 27th CA towards Bjerkvik from the north against the 1/139th. The 6th Brigade would attack on the left against the 3/139th on the Kuberg Plateau.

The plan called for the 27th CA to advance along Route 50 to secure the ridgeline from Hill 409 to Hill 416. Having secured Hill 416, the 27th would proceed towards Kvandal, link up with the Foreign Legion at Hill 336 (Skogfjell), continue eastward in the area north of Hartvigvann and make contact on their left with the 7th Brigade and on their right with units of the Foreign Legion advancing eastward from Elvegårdsmoen. The Norwegians were asked to secure the high ground from Hills 664 to 842 and thereafter cut the German line of retreat. Béthouart’s original plan called for the amphibious operation and the Norwegian and French attacks from the north to take place simultaneously during the night of May 10-11. The Norwegians were to launch their attacks at the sound of the heavy guns in Ofotfjord.

The lack of amphibious resources forced Béthouart’s legionnaires to attack the shore in two waves. The 1/13th Half-Brigade constituted the first wave to be landed directly in Bjerkvik while the 2nd Bn, in the second wave, landed at Melby, on the eastern shore of Herjangsfjord. Difficulties in loading the five light tanks that were to support the landings caused one MLC to be damaged beyond repair and this, along with the delay in transporting the Polish battalion from Harstad to Bogen, caused the attack to be delayed for 24 hours. The Polish troops lacked all their medical equipment and much of their means of transportation since these items had been loaded on an unknown ship in Brest.

The operation was postponed yet another day because of transportation difficulties, caused primarily by efforts to shore up the defenses in Nordland Province. The assault force assembled in Ballagen on May 12. The battleship Resolution, the cruisers Effingham and Aurora, and five destroyers constituted the bombardment part of the force. The 1,620 assault troops were embarked on warships, ALCs, and open boats. Cork, Auchinleck, and Béthouart were on the cruiser Effingham. Mackesy was ill on May 13.

The naval bombardment began at midnight and lasted intermittently for two hours. It was already so late in the year that there was only partial darkness in the Narvik area and a night landing had little concealment from enemy observation. However, darkness still prevailed in central Norway and it was hoped that the night landing would complicate German air operations from